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I. INTRODUCTION 
Welfare reform in 1996 occurred at the intersection of two 
narratives: a substantive debate on the systematic restructuring of a 
failed welfare agenda and a tactical discussion on the means of 
implementation.  By most accounts, scholars have treated these two 
narratives—and the reform legislation they propagated—as internally 
consistent, if not altogether harmonious.  The chosen process-based 
theories of devolution of social service provision (through local 
governments, private corporations, and churches) have been viewed 
as inseparably linked with the substantive objectives of the anti-
dependency, pro-work agenda.  After all, as conventional wisdom 
goes, we need to harness the dynamism and flexibility of state and 
local government in order to end dependency and promote work.  
The intuition that often follows is that devolution is our panacea.  But 
this intuition is wrong. 
Our almost blithe acceptance of the marriage between means 
(devolution) and ends (reducing dependency) has limited occasions 
to evaluate critically the compatibility between procedural devolution 
and substantive welfare reform.1  Yet such an evaluation is needed.2  
Despite the assumed political and ideological connection between 
devolution and substantive reform, this purportedly natural alliance3 
 
 1 Among the major contributions to the understanding of welfare reform and 
policy since the 1996 reform, some of the most insightful analyses tend to posit 
holistic critiques and, accordingly, devote comparatively less attention to the separate 
and separable conceptions of welfare reform as system (i.e., substantive reform) and 
as process (i.e., means and loci of implementation).  See, e.g., Matthew Diller, The New 
Localism in Welfare Advocacy, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413 (2000) [hereinafter 
Diller, Localism]; Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, 
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000) [hereinafter 
Diller, Revolution]; David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 
BROOK. L. REV. 231 (1998); Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 471 (1997); Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the 
End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493 (1999); Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing 
Bill Clinton Had Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43. 
 2 See, e.g., Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1126 (“Observers of the welfare 
system long have recognized the central importance of administration in the 
operation of assistance programs.  The structure of the bureaucracy and 
administrators’ conceptions of their missions have a vital impact on the accessibility 
of benefits and on the social messages that are communicated by benefit programs. . 
. .  Many states explicitly have targeted the organization and culture of welfare offices 
for reform.”). 
 3 Professor Cashin has recognized that a number of welfare reform’s 
supporters in Congress believed that federalism “would enhance the likelihood of 
meeting the Act’s core substantive goals.  They believed that states were best suited to 
design programs that would end welfare dependency.”  Sheryll Cashin, Federalism, 
Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 554 (1999); see also id. at 
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spawns unnatural and unintended side effects that threaten the long-
term success of welfare reform.  In truth, significant problems 
emerge when the federal government, ostensibly insistent on meeting 
certain objective goals, nevertheless abdicates its authority and 
responsibility for overseeing the implementation and for securing the 
success of the biggest restructuring of American welfare policy in 
generations.4 
Simply put, in abdicating this responsibility, Congress has 
actually allowed one narrative to dominate the other.  It has 
privileged the aims of devolution and privatization—at the expense 
of ensuring fidelity to the policy aims and objectives of welfare reform 
and, importantly, at the expense of ensuring fidelity to the concept of 
federalism itself.  This capitulation to the forces of devolution, I need 
not add, may be politically expedient,5 but otherwise incongruous 
from the perspective of prudent policymaking.6  State and local 
governments, as well as private and faith-based providers, could be 
quite effective partners in designing and implementing welfare 
reform.  But left to their own devices, they lack the institutional 
capacity and, oftentimes, the proper incentives to bear primary 
 
553 (“One major strain of political rhetoric animating the passage of the [Welfare 
Reform] Act was that of political federalism—an a priori presumption that . . . states 
are the natural situs of all policy authority.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Poor Relief, Welfare Paralysis, and Assimilation, 1996 
UTAH L. REV. 1, 11 (describing PRWORA as representing a “substantial change in 
locus for poor relief from AFDC and related programs, the pattern for which began 
in the 1960s”); Christopher Ogden, Clinton and Congress Agree To End Six Decades of 
New Deal Protections, TIME (Int’l Ed.), Aug. 12, 1996, at 17; Robert Pear, Clinton To 
Sign Welfare Bill that Ends U.S. Aid Guarantee and Gives States Broad Power, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 1996, at A1; The Roosevelt Legacy, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1996, at 38 (describing 
the “repeal of the 60-year-old federal guarantee of welfare for the poor” as heralding 
the “unraveling of the New Deal”). 
 5 See, e.g., William Claiborne, Governors Push for Greater Power, WASH. POST, Aug. 
29, 1994, at A19 (describing a bipartisan movement among some of America’s 
governors to draft constitutional amendments aimed at promoting states’ rights and 
to press for the need for a constitutional convention); Roger Pilon, Editorial, A 
Matter for the States, WASH. POST, June 18, 1996, at A13 (describing candidate Bob 
Dole as having “put the 10th Amendment and a call for returning power to the states 
and the people at the center of his presidential campaign”); see also Richard L. Berke, 
A Conservative Sure His Time Has Come, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1995, at A1 (describing 
presidential candidate Pat Buchanan’s self-proclaimed successes in shifting the mood 
toward greater state autonomy: “I’ve won that battle. . . .  Jack Kemp’s talking about 
shutting down HUD.  Richard Lugar is talking about abolishing the I.R.S.  Pete 
Wilson is talking about illegal immigration.”); Keith Bradsher, States’ Rights Lose Some 
of Their High, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, at D6 (describing advocates’ efforts to devolve 
affirmative action policy and drug policy and quoting them as comparing federal 
control in those realms to “Soviet repression”). 
 6 See John D. Donahue, The Devil in Devolution, AM. PROSPECT, May/June 1997, 
at 42. 
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responsibility for ensuring the successful transition of America’s 
dependent, welfare population to the world of work and personal 
responsibility.  The shrinking of the federal government’s 
responsibilities over social welfare, moreover, creates civic harms as 
well.7  To abandon our national commitment to assist some of the 
most vulnerable among us, is to rend the very fabric of our collective 
identity. 
For Congress to conflate welfare reform with devolved welfare 
reform8 is to ensure that it left itself without the necessary tools to 
make that fabric whole again.  At stake in this inquiry, therefore, is an 
understanding that the substantive objectives of 1996 welfare reform 
may be all but overridden or subverted by the very process by which 
that reform has been implemented.  This Article’s ambition is three-
fold.  First, I identify the existence of discordant narratives embedded 
in the story of welfare reform.  Then, I detail the distortions and 
unintended harms that are engendered in the process of 
implementing welfare reform.  And, finally, I propose a rough 
blueprint for reform. 
* * * 
Accordingly, this Article begins in Part II by seeking to 
 
 7 See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New 
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (2003) (“The new versions of privatization . . . 
jeopardize public purposes by pressing for market-style competition, by sidestepping 
norms that apply to public programs, and by eradicating the public identity of social 
efforts to meet human needs.”); see also Matthew Diller, Redefining the Public Sector: 
Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization: Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1307 (2001) (characterizing concerns with privatization, including how greater 
privatization leads to less public accountability and how privatization leads to a 
shrinking of opportunities for meaningful public engagement). 
 8 Indeed, critics of devolved welfare tend to see the process as intimately and 
intuitively linked to the substantive agenda.  They see PRWORA as an effort to make 
cash assistance less generous and less accessible, and they see the states as effective 
agents in furthering those aims.  For example, Professor Cashin has recently argued 
that states are more frugal with respect to social welfare spending and more likely to 
succumb to racial biases in policymaking and appropriations spending than is the 
federal government.  See Cashin, supra note 3.  Prior to 1996, economic arguments 
concerning the dangers of devolving social welfare programs were raised by, among 
others, Paul Kantor and Paul Peterson.  See, e.g., PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY 
REVISITED 5-14, 95-99 (1988) (arguing that municipalities have limited control over 
their political economies and thus aggressively compete with one another to entice 
business development, often at the expense of social welfare spending); PAUL E. 
PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 69-72 (1981) (suggesting state and local governments must 
expend on economic development projects and are reluctant to redistribute any 
incoming wealth); Paul E. Peterson, Devolution’s Price, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 
114-21 (1995) (cataloguing the secular decline in state allocations for welfare 
benefits from the early 1970s to the early 1990s).  In other words, many observers 
believe that the substantive (understood as harsher) revisions that are part of welfare 
reform are furthered via devolution. 
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disaggregate the “intuitive” connection between the aims of ending 
dependency and the means of accomplishing those aims.  Part II 
further seeks to describe how Congress distorted and undermined its 
own, stated policy aims by acceding to the forces of devolution and 
privatization.  For the most part, scholars’ critiques of welfare reform 
have voiced concerns that the legislation is too harsh, does not 
sufficiently preserve legal avenues for redress, grants states too much 
control, and gives too much power to private and sectarian providers.  
And, because many of the scholars critical of welfare reform believe it 
to be uniformly or holistically misguided—or, worse, mean-spirited—
they have not focused their energy on examining the legislation’s 
internal inconsistencies.9  Thus, few have systematically undertaken 
 
 9 Notable works in the field have begun this conversation by challenging the 
assumptions underlying this allegedly natural alliance between welfare reform and 
devolution, contending that there is no a priori fit between local governance and 
effective social welfare provision.  See Cashin, supra note 3, at 583-86 (describing, in 
fact, the opposite trend that states are inherently averse to generous social welfare 
spending and subject to greater political pressure to be fiscally conservative than the 
federal government would otherwise be); see also Matthew Diller, Form and Substance 
in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739 (2002) (describing how 
privatization of welfare administration weakens government oversight and limits 
public control and contending that privatization initiatives may, counterintuitively, 
not even be efficient). 
Scholars have, moreover, decried the lack of due process protections that 
accompany the shift to devolution and have focused their criticism on the 
discretionary powers that flow from the termination of the federal entitlement, 
discretion that leaves the client population of welfare recipients susceptible to the 
(potentially arbitrary) vagaries of the administrative system.  See Diller, Revolution, 
supra note 1, at 1127-28 (describing the change in implementation strategy that flows 
from the abandonment of a federal entitlement to welfare); id. at 1180 (“[T]he 
principles reflected in the APA have created a framework that is in effect throughout 
our legal system and has become the dominant means of ensuring administrative 
accountability.”); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 231. 
Other scholars, of course, have raised similar concerns.  See, e.g., Barbara L. 
Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local 
Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1564 
(2001) (“It is not obvious which new mechanisms will permit citizens to hold state 
and local governments accountable in their performance of these new roles and 
responsibilities.”).  Professor Bezdek complicates the analysis of welfare reform by 
inquiring into the procedural limitations of contracting with private vendors in a way 
that marks an effort to bridge the many components of welfare reform: devolution, 
privatization, its substantive aims, and its procedural tools.  Her study richly conveys 
the attenuated control over the programmatic agenda of corporate providers.  See 
generally id. at 1603 (“[P]rivatization of government service delivery presents a 
paradox: it is said repeatedly that citizens believe government should contract out for 
services, and yet, government must be very competent to design, let, and monitor 
effective service contracts.”). 
R. Kent Weaver, moreover, mentions the federalism trap: granting states 
additional discretion will lead them to do things the politicians do not like.  See R. 
KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 123 (2000).  But even Weaver, who 
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an internal analysis of how welfare reform is itself undermined by its 
own methods of implementation.  Part II aims to commence just such 
an exploration. 
Next, in the middle parts of the Article, I turn to the 
implementation of welfare reform at devolved and sub-devolved10 
levels of authority and administration.  I argue that these new loci of 
devolved welfare policy inevitably and inescapably distort the 
substantive aims of the federal wave of reform; these distortions, 
which occur in varying degrees of severity at each level of devolved 
administration, take three forms.  There are (1) institutional harms 
that occur because the (devolved) institutional actor in charge of 
welfare policy lacks the requisite tools, jurisdictional reach, and 
overall capabilities to meet the objective policy aims of federal welfare 
reform.  These mismatches between aims and capacity create macro-
inefficiencies in the overall implementation of welfare policy.  
Moreover, there are (2) managerial or bureaucratic harms that limit the 
effective design and dispersal of social service welfare provisions 
because the welfare providers themselves possess sets of incentives 
that may lead them to stray from the federal welfare reform agenda.  
Finally, there are (3) civic-citizenship harms.  The devolved and 
privatized loci of welfare administration may prove particularly ill-
equipped or ill-disposed to promote public accountability, 
democratic transparency, and due process remediation.  These harms 
may engender greater senses of alienation and social exclusion from 
public governance in ways that directly undermine the ideals of social 
integration implicit in the federal welfare agenda. 
Thus, in Parts III, IV, and V, I examine how states, for-profit 
corporations, and sectarian faith-based organizations, respectively, 
are all authorized to act as the providers of choice, responsible for 
implementing the federal legislation.  I assess the degree to which 
these providers are able (and willing) to meet the stated substantive 
aims set forth in the federal mandate.  And, I ultimately conclude 
that America’s poor may be ill-served, not necessarily by the objective 
ambitions of Congress’s welfare reform per se, but by the structural 
 
points to this possibility only in passing, fails to suggest that devolved welfare reform 
is internally inconsistent; instead, he simply posits that tinkering with the system 
becomes increasingly difficult as states define themselves in opposition to Congress.  
See id. at 123. 
10 See Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Reform Ends in 2002: What’s Ahead for Low-
Income and No-Income Families, 61 MD. L. REV. 246, 250-51 (2002) (describing the 
practice of states instituting “second-order devolution” to counties); see also Thomas 
L. Gais & Cathy M. Johnson, The Implication of Welfare Reform for Children, 60 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1327, 1346 (1999) (describing state practice of sub-delegating administrative and 
policymaking authority over welfare services). 
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design of the legislation; the legislation opens the door to 
policymaking by devolved and privatized providers while closing the 
door to effective federal participation, coordination, and stewardship. 
Finally, in Part VI, I propose an alternative architectural 
framework that might better meet the dual goals of effective and 
decentralized welfare reform.  I thus attempt to reconcile the 
currently discordant narratives (and the inconsistencies between 
means and ends) by positing a vision of a reconceptualized welfare 
agenda that acknowledges the imperatives for more local and flexible 
authority but respects the substantive aims of federal welfare reform.  
By forging multiple socioeconomic development partnerships 
centering on federal-state, federal-municipality, and federal-private 
cooperatives, welfare reform presents an opportunity not only to 
promote the day-to-day needs of America’s poor, but also to harness 
the forces of federalism constructively to design the 
intergovernmental and public-private partnerships that are necessary 
to tackle the massive responsibility of combating poverty.  It is these 
partnerships that could both reaffirm the federal government’s 
relevance and dynamism with respect to solving socio-economic ills 
and re-connect Washington with local governments and community 
organizations, breeding greater civic consciousness and public 
engagement. 
Simply put, federalism is not devolution per se, and thus I need 
to dust off a more authentic understanding of federalism and return 
it to its rightful place at the center of American legal architecture.  I 
reject the wholesale “farming out” of social services and see the need 
and opportunity instead to promote new communitarian 
connections, to draw Washington and Peoria closer together as well 
as to foster ties between Peoria and, say, Indianapolis.  Multiple layers 
of civic partnerships will help communities seize upon the 
appropriate economies of scale, encourage greater public 
engagement and discourse on the proper relations of the actors, and 
allow the federal government an opportunity not only to monitor 
what goes on with county social services, private vendors, and faith-
based organizations, but also to develop and construct policy along 
side of them.  One way to attack Washington for being out-of-touch is 
to shut it out of the process entirely.  Another way to register the 
same complaint more constructively is to invite Washington to 
participate in the decentralized process at the ground level.  It is, after 
all, the difference between devolution and federalism. 
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II. A TALE OF TWO NARRATIVES:  
THE BUILDUP TO WELFARE REFORM 
Welfare reform is not devolution; nor is it privatization.  Yet in 
the mêlée to overhaul American welfare policy in 1996, these 
obviously discrete and different concepts tended to lose their 
distinctiveness.  Conflating systems with processes, substantive aims 
with logistical means, the architects of welfare reform designed 
legislation in response to the wishes of the public.  Substantively, the 
American people demanded welfare recipients get their lives 
together and go out and find work (like everyone else); Congress 
accordingly ended the long-standing, means-tested federal 
entitlement to cash assistance and, instead, conditioned temporary, 
transitional cash assistance on proof that recipients were actively 
seeking work.11  Procedurally, the American people signaled their 
preference for more locally devised social service provision over 
federal management and administration; Congress accordingly—but 
perhaps paradoxically—devolved to the states nearly complete 
authority and discretion in implementing the federal objectives.12 
This Article challenges the neatness and coherence of these two 
narratives that were made to converge into one story.  The instant 
inquiry is not simply my pointing out an interesting “quirk” in the 
legislative design—namely, that states, churches, and corporations 
may not follow the federal directives to a tee.  Rather, I argue these 
ersatz agents are institutionally incapable of satisfying the federal 
aims.  Accordingly, the forces of devolution and privatization, distinct 
from any criticisms of the substantive aims of welfare reform per se, 
may actually constitute a serious threat to the long-term success of 
welfare reform.  And, perhaps most importantly, this Article suggests 
Congress’s understanding of federalism as devolution may signal a 
drastic shift in federal-state relations (as well as in public-private 
sphere relations) that will influence not only how resources are 
allocated to America’s poor, but also how we as a community 
collectively embrace (or shed) the responsibility of promoting the 
common welfare.13  Thus bluntly, I challenge Congress’s desiccated 
 
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000) (ending the federal entitlement to AFDC 
assistance and replacing it with discretionary, temporary assistance grants); Christine 
N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
89 (2002); Jason DeParle, U.S. Welfare System Dies as State Programs Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 1997, at A1. 
12 See 42 U.S.C.§§ 601-02, 604 (2000) (ending the federal entitlement to AFDC 
assistance and replacing it with discretionary, temporary assistance grants); DeParle, 
supra note 11. 
13 See Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1565 (“[N]ational governments are [ostensibly] 
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view of federalism qua devolution and offer a more faithful 
understanding of this delicate federal-state balance that could vastly 
improve welfare reform.  Once it becomes clear that the substantive 
aims of welfare reform may not be best met through the procedural 
means established in 1996, it will become imperative for us to rethink 
this seemingly natural connection.  This imperative begins to take 
shape presently. 
A. Clamoring for Reform 
In this Section, I briefly describe the two sets of converging 
narratives that ultimately gave the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),14 its distinctive 
characteristics.  I discuss the rising influence in the 1980s and early 
1990s of conservative thinkers and activists who challenged and 
ultimately helped de-legitimize the extant AFDC welfare system,15 
 
trying to reduce their roles, lower public spending, trim the direct provision of 
services, and rely more on private markets.  The anti-big government movement is a 
general retreat from collectivism [that] emphasizes private property and freedom of 
contract.  Although often cast in economic terms of costs, benefits, efficiency, and 
program management, this is really a watershed about governance, the uses of power 
in society, and the boundaries between public action and private concerns.”) 
(footnote omitted).  Solomon and Vlissides characterize this transformation in 
attitudes by comparing Franklin Roosevelt’s rhetoric during the New Deal with 
President Clinton’s at the signing of PRWORA.  Clinton called for “all of us—States 
and cities, the Federal Government, businesses and ordinary citizens—to work 
together to make the promise of this new day real.”  By contrast, Roosevelt, in 
conveying the newfound sense of community empowerment via government, had 
proclaimed: “where heretofore men had turned to neighbors for help and advice, 
they now turned to Government.”  Lewis D. Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissides, Jr., 
Faith-Based Charities and the Quest to Solve America’s Social Ills: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 
10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 265, 271 (2001).  For a discussion of constitutional 
(and congressional) imperatives to take seriously the responsibility of providing for 
the general welfare, see Jon D. Michaels, To Promote the General Welfare: The Republican 
Imperative To Enhance Citizenship Welfare Rights, 111 YALE L.J. 1457 (2002). 
14 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 
Titles 7, 8, 26, and 42 of the United States Code). 
15 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”), or its predecessor, Aid to 
Families with Children (“AFC”), was the foundational cash welfare assistance 
program in the United States from the New Deal through 1996.  See, e.g., WEAVER, 
supra note 9, at 16, 28, 244-45; Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the 
Cooperative Federalism of America’s Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 
123, 143-44 (1996); Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of 
Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225, 266-69 (1998).  The cornerstone of this program 
was the federal guarantee of cash assistance, which was endorsed by the Supreme 
Court in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).  There, the Court reversed the governing 
presumption that states were free to change and modify any eligibility rules unless 
they were expressly forbidden.  After King, the states were not permitted unilaterally 
to change the standards of eligibility if they were to frustrate the federal aims of cash 
assistance.  See Zasloff, supra, at 269-70. 
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which they considered morally bankrupt and programmatically 
ineffective.  I also describe—again, quite briefly—the revitalized 
challenge to federal hegemony in the realm of domestic 
policymaking writ large.  Advocates for greater states’ rights and/or 
greater privatization gained considerable momentum at the same 
time these welfare critics were demanding substantive reform.  These 
“smaller government” advocates championed wholesale devolution 
and deregulation in the name of greater democracy, authenticity, 
choice, and efficiency; and, they succeeded in making devolution and 
privatization priorities in policymaking circles, the courts, and on the 
campaign trail.  I will show, later, that both this chronological overlap 
and the political alliance between these two movements actually belie 
a real tension: that devolution serves to undermine the substantive 
aims of welfare reform. 
1. Substantive Reform: Combating Dependency 
Some policymakers in the 1980s, fed up with the unsuccessfully 
waged War on Poverty, began rethinking America’s anti-poverty 
policy and challenging some sacred tenets of the modern welfare 
state.16  Among them was Ronald Reagan, whose rhetorical attack on 
welfare helped drastically to shift the terms of the debate.17  Reagan 
directed his indignation at the poor, whose benefits, he argued, 
 
16 See Jason DeParle, Debris of Past Failures Impedes Poverty Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
7, 1993, at D3 (describing the saliency of President Reagan’s quip “we fought a war 
on poverty and poverty won”); see also GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981); 
MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF 
POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA (1993); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING 
GROUND (1984). 
17 Among the most memorable rhetorical attacks with sustained resonance is 
the conservative attack on the alleged “welfare queen.”  See, e.g., Editorial, And Now, 
Ronald Reagan, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1979, at A18 (depicting Reagan as campaigning 
against welfare provisions in California because of flagrant abuses by welfare queens 
who wear “designer jeans”); Paul Krugman, Editorial, Wag the Dog, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2000, at D15 (describing Ronald Reagan’s constant attack against Cadillac-driving 
welfare queens as “mean-spirited”); Herbert Mitgang, The Problem that Won’t Go Away, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at C19 (discussing Reagan’s insistence on the existence of 
Cadillac-driving welfare queens as a way of diverting middle-class concerns away from 
the plight of the underclass); Steven V. Roberts, Food Stamps Program, How It Grew and 
How Reagan Wants to Cut It Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1981, at A1 (describing the 
saliency of the conservative “legend of the so-called ‘welfare queen,’ a heavy woman 
driving a big white Cadillac and paying for thick steaks with wads of food stamps, 
became a rhetorical staple for conservative politicians, including Ronald Reagan”); 
see also KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME 230 (2000) (recalling Reagan 
holding up the want-ad section of the Washington Post to suggest jobs are available 
and that the dependent poor must be  lazy); Steven V. Roberts, Editorial, Reagan and 
His “Golden Oldies,” N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1987, at A24 (recalling President Reagan’s 
frequent attacks on “welfare queens”). 
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drained needed resources away from the market economy and from 
otherwise more productive enterprises.  Reagan’s attack on what he 
memorably referred to as the “welfare queen” took on an 
iconography that had an effect domestically akin to what his 
depiction of the Soviet Union as an Evil Empire had on international 
relations.18  At the Reagan Revolution’s zenith, the very existence of 
the modern welfare state seemed threatened.19 
Though little by way of actual policy transformations occurred 
during the 1980s, attitudes did take on a new hue.20  Conservatives, 
ranging from Margaret Thatcher to Charles Murray, continually 
pressed their case against government support for “undeserving” 
(non-working) poor.21  They lamented the declining significance 
 
18 See Richard Cohen, Editorial, Evil, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1983, at C1 
(describing the “I-told-you-so” quality of Reagan’s “Evil Empire” appellation as 
particularly resonant in light of the Soviet downing of a Korean airplane); Hendrik 
Hertzberg, Grinding Axis, NEW YORKER, Feb. 11, 2002, at 23 (suggesting that “Ronald 
Reagan’s most famous phrase[,] ‘[e]vil empire[,]’ is now chiselled on history’s wall 
next to ‘iron curtain’ as an example of prescient moral clarity”); Stephen S. 
Rosenfeld, Editorial, The Moral Edge, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1984, at A17 
(characterizing the moral force of Reagan’s declaration). 
19 See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 120 (1987) (describing 
how the New Deal Coalition “collapsed when Reagan was elected” and how this 
Republican resurgence represented a particular attack on means-tested social 
services, such as welfare, rather than a general attack, say, on Social Security).  The 
sentiments of Senator William Armstrong in the early 1980s resonated with those of 
the White House.  Armstrong argued that “[p]eople on welfare ought to work, work, 
work because it is good for the soul, because it is fair to the taxpayers, because it 
rankles people who are paying taxes to support these programs to see people who 
are recipients not get out and work.”  MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE 
POORHOUSE 306 (1996); see also id. at 295 (describing the central role the Reagan 
administration played as “[t]he [f]ederal [g]overnment [w]ages [w]ar on 
[w]elfare”). 
20 See KATZ, supra note 19, at 300 (describing how little impact the rhetoric of 
reform had on welfare policy under Reagan and George H.W. Bush).  But see Family 
Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 666 
(2000)).  For discussions of the Family Support Act, see KATZ, supra note 19, at 307-
09; WEAVER, supra note 9, at 70-76; Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1577; Joel F. Handler, The 
Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in 
Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457 (1987-1988); and Zasloff, 
supra note 15, at 289-94. 
21 Though America never had a “full welfare state” akin to what European 
nations had (both in terms of coverage and generosity), see Joel F. Handler, Questions 
About Social Europe by an American Observer, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 437 (2000), as early as 
the mid-1960s welfare benefits in the United States were quite substantial.  See, e.g., 
KATZ, supra note 19, at 259-82; JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST 
POVERTY, 1900-1994, at 157-84 (1994); see also FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. 
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR (1993) (describing dissatisfaction with degrading 
policies leading up to and during the 1960s); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT 
ENTITLED (1994); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND (1991) (describing the 
expansive Great Society policies); WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE 
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(and resonance) of the Anglo-American ideals of the Protestant Work 
Ethic and rugged individualism.  Instead, as Thatcher famously put it, 
we have abandoned self-reliance and are instead left with a “Nanny 
State.”22  Charles Murray, for his part, argued persuasively that the 
welfare state infrastructure, built to alleviate poverty, has only 
reinforced the social pathologies that placed families in this 
precarious position in the first place.23  Murray 
insisted that handouts had demoralized the urban ghettos, 
leading young blacks to cling to welfare rather than work for a 
living.  His view of these people reflected an ironic departure 
from nineteenth-century visions of the downtrodden in the slums.  
Then conservatives had often depicted slum dwellers as 
intemperate, shiftless, and immoral.  To Murray these poor 
people were crassly rational calculators of their own self-interest: 
the benefits of welfare, Murray thought, induced them to quit 
work and live off the public trough.24 
And, while cogent liberal and moderate responses were 
forthcoming,25 the conservative attack ultimately carried the day.  
Conservatives successfully shifted the entire discourse away from 
fighting poverty and toward combating dependency.  For them, the 
evil to be eradicated was not poverty per se; rather, it took both the 
form of a willingness to accept government support indefinitely and 
the form of a behavioral pathology acutely felt by the 
intergenerational underclass.26 
 
STATE 304-31 (1999) (describing the expansion of welfare policies and the increase 
in welfare spending); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare 
Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985) (describing the legal-procedural underpinnings of 
the modern welfare state). 
22 See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 213; see also Jo Thomas, Britain Proposes Broad 
Overhaul of Almost All Welfare Programs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1985, at A1; Mortimer B. 
Zuckerman, Editorial, The Nanny State of the Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 3, 
1995, at 72; The Immortal Remains of Margaret Thatcher, ECONOMIST (U.K. Ed.), Oct. 2, 
1993, at 37. 
23 See MURRAY, supra note 16. 
24 PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 213. 
25 See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L. MASHAW, & PHILIP L. HARVEY, 
AMERICA’S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 
104-14 (1990); WILSON, supra note 19, at 93-95; see also MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. 
ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM (1994); CHRISTOPHER 
JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 70-91 (1992). 
26 See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 213-19 (describing such underclass “lifestyle 
choices” to include out-of-wedlock children and joblessness).  For early formulations 
of this cultural phenomenon, see Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON 
UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 187 (Daniel P. 
Moynihan ed., 1968); Daniel P. Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National 
Action, reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND 
THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY: A TRANS-ACTION SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
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What was devastating about the conservative attack was that it 
was bilingual: It spoke the language of morality and the language of 
economics.  If you were someone concerned with culture of poverty 
arguments, the conservatives could tell you why welfare policy was 
contributing to the social deviancy of the underclass by subsidizing 
dependency and promoting unstable family patterns; if you were 
someone more persuaded by rational-actor models, then the 
conservatives had an answer there, too: Under AFDC, it actually made 
more economic sense to remain dependent than it did to find a low-
end job.27 
Thus, entering the 1990s, ending dependency was the central 
theme in social policy—and not just among conservatives.28  Both 
major political parties were operating, for the first time in a long 
while, under the same assumptions about federal welfare policy goals: 
Anti-poverty programs that support the dependent class are 
ineffective, and temporary assistance coupled with greater workforce 
participation should replace the status quo.  President Clinton’s 1992 
campaign platform focused heavily on reforming welfare in this 
direction.29  And, with only minor differences in levels and degrees of 
support, both parties during the Clinton years wanted desperately to 
condition welfare benefits on participation in the job market.  Hence, 
there existed considerable bipartisan support for many of the 
substantive aims of 1996 welfare reform.30 
2. Procedural Reform:  
The Devolution and Privatization Revolution 
This period of backlash against guaranteed welfare provisions 
and federal entitlements under the New Deal and Great Society 
 
REPORT 40-125 (1967) [hereinafter Moynihan, The Negro Family]. 
27 See MURRAY, supra note 16, at 154-77 (illustrating this point by using his 
seminal hypothetical working couple, Harold and Phyllis). 
28 See, e.g., BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 25, at 144-54 (describing the “make 
work pay” agenda of changing the relative reservation wage for current welfare 
recipients to enter the labor market); Mickey Kaus, The Work Ethic State, NEW 
REPUBLIC, July 7, 1986, at 22 (describing the civic virtues of work that underlie full 
citizenship and social engagement). 
29 See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 9, at 223-27; Richard L. Berke, Clinton: Getting 
People off Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at A20; Gwen Ifill, Clinton Presses Welfare 
Overhaul, Stressing Job Training and Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at A1. 
30 It is beyond the scope and interest of this Article to describe and compare the 
different welfare bills proposed during Clinton’s first term.  Though the Clinton 
proposals, which were never enacted, had greater safeguards in terms of 
guaranteeing jobs to those transitioning into the world of work, the substantive aims 
of those bills were relatively similar to PRWORA’s.  See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 9, at 
316-27. 
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coincided, chronologically, with an across-the-board revolt against the 
federal government’s alleged dominance in domestic policymaking.  
In spite of the fact that welfare was actually administered in 
accordance with models of cooperative federalism since its creation,31 
critics nevertheless wanted to circumscribe further the size, scope, 
and authority of the federal government.32  Their broad calls for 
greater transfers of authority to state and local governments were 
well-received.33  Underlying this movement was a theory of better, 
more responsive government.  As Justice O’Connor noted in Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, federalism in the direction of devolution (1) enhances 
citizenship participation, (2) stimulates innovation, and (3) increases 
administrative efficiency.34  Indeed, proponents of devolution have 
championed the “bottom-up tradition that celebrates interlocal 
variation and emphasizes local decision-making autonomy, local 
responsibility for services delivered locally, and local political 
accountability to the electorate.”35  Among the most vocal and 
effective of the lobbyists promoting devolution in the 1980s and 
1990s has been the National Governors Association, which has 
successfully secured for the states greater responsibility in, inter alia, 
the areas of environmental36 and social service policymaking.37 
 
31 See Joel F. Handler, ”Constructing the Political Spectacle”: Interpretation of 
Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 
899, 949-50 (1990) (describing state and local government as policymaking loci for 
welfare services); Sugarman, supra note 15, at 144-46 (same); see also infra note 79 and 
accompanying text. 
32 See Sugarman, supra note 15, at 143-46 (noting the federal guarantees that 
were in place prior to passage of PRWORA and identifying places where rolling back 
federal protections would be possible under devolved welfare reform). 
33 See supra note 5. 
34 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
35 Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1607; see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (arguing that the “genius” of federalism is its 
ability to generate competition among states); John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not 
Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74 
(1997); Richard Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 
(1992); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987).  Moreover, some suggest the structural design of our 
constitutional system makes a commitment to federalism an institutional imperative.  
See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the 
Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 217 (1997). 
36 See, e.g., Editorial, Environmental Defiance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1996, at A38 
(describing the strong support in Congress and state capitols for giving states greater 
autonomy on environmental regulation policy).  The efforts by the National 
Governors Association to gain control over low-level radioactive waste provide an 
excellent example of states wresting power from Washington.  See William F. 
Newberry, The Rise and Fall and Rise and Fall of American Public Policy on Disposal of Low-
Level Radioactive Waste, 3 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 56 (1993); see also Low-Level Radioactive 
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This devolution revolution,38 which ushered in a process-
oriented movement for locating legislative and regulatory authority at 
lower levels of government regardless of the substantive content of 
the policies in question, was complemented by calls for greater 
privatization—at every level of government.  What, the argument 
went, would be more efficient than harnessing the productive 
capacities of the private sector?  Tired and dissatisfied with a large, 
unwieldy, and inefficient bureaucracy,39 privatization advocates have 
 
Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (describing state efforts to manage and share the burden of low-
level waste disposal). 
37 The National Governors Association was critical in putting devolution at the 
forefront of the welfare reform agenda.  See WEAVER, supra note 9, at 207-21.  Under 
the pre-existing AFDC framework, states in the mid 1990s liberally used their 
regulatory right to experiment with and restructure the design of welfare policy 
within their jurisdictional boundaries; and, they did so in creative and commendable 
ways.  See Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and 
Welfare “Reform,” 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741 (1993) (describing a system in which 
waivers were summarily granted and states were given wide latitude to experiment in 
the crafting of welfare packages); Cimini, supra note 11, at 96.  Under President 
Clinton, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services granted nearly seventy 
waivers to forty states experimenting with welfare reform. Todd S. Purdham, Clinton 
in a Box as Welfare Bill Edges Closer, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1996, at A1; see also Cashin, 
supra note 3, at 620-21. 
Of note, however, it must be remembered that welfare policy in America has 
never really been programmatically centralized.  For most of the history of AFDC, 
states have had considerable flexibility in determining eligibility and shaping the size 
and scope of welfare packages.  See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.  As will 
be discussed below, however, see infra Section III.B-V.C, the 1996 reforms permit a 
seismic shift toward qualitatively greater state autonomy and away from federal 
guideposts and oversight. 
38 See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Editorial, The Devolution Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 1995, at D15 (describing devolution as the “next stage in the long, alternative 
history of federalism”); see also Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of 
Federalism—An American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE J. 
ON REG. 227, 228 (1996) (describing Senator Bob Dole’s declaration that “America’s 
historical detour into bureaucracy and centralization is over”); Peter H. Schuck, Some 
Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5 (1996) (“The pressure to 
devolve power from the center to the periphery is a nearly universal phenomenon in 
contemporary society.”); Richard L. Berke, Forget Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
1997, at D5 (describing the consensus supporting devolution); Charles Murray, 
Editorial, Welfare Hysteria, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at A25 (“The heart of the 
American project was that government’s powers should be limited and exercised as 
close to home as possible.  The federalization of American life in the last half-
century, not the prospect of devolution in 1995, is the historical aberration.”). 
 39  For instance, current leaders in government have embraced the 
management style of businesses over the governance structures of bureaucracy.  See 
John Solomon, Bush, Harvard Business School and the Makings of a President, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2000, at C17 (describing how the management styles of business are only 
now being recognized as applicable in government settings); see also Bradley Graham, 
White-Rumsfeld Dispute, Round 2, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2003, at A23 (“[The] 
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sought to slash the federal workforce, circumvent the procedural red 
tape characteristic of the modern administrative state, and embrace 
competitive market dynamics that lead to lower operating and 
management costs.40  Indeed, America’s current wholesale embrace 
of privatization as the cornerstone of good government as efficient 
government is a relatively new, but significant phenomenon41 that has 
garnered bipartisan attention and support.42  The massive movement 
 
appointment [of former Enron executive Thomas White] as Army secretary in 2001 
reflected a broad push by Rumsfeld to place corporate executives at the top of the 
military services.  James G. Roche, a Northrop Grumman vice president, was tapped 
to head the Air Force, and Gordon R. England, a General Dynamics executive vice 
president, took charge of the Navy.  Together, the three were to form a kind of 
board of directors with Rumsfeld as chairman . . . .”); Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Thom 
Shanker, Army Secretary Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003, at A17 (characterizing 
the appointment of Secretary White as “a way to bring business efficiency to the 
Pentagon’s sometimes bureaucratic culture”). 
40 Proponents of privatization think private actors and agencies perform more 
efficiently than government in providing social services, in (self-)regulating and 
monitoring industrial health and environmental standards, and in building 
consensus on proposed rules and regulations.  See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: 
Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988). 
Besides market-based efficiencies, privatization tends to lower costs due to lower 
labor expenses.  See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1523-24 (2001) (describing savings costs associated with 
hiring private employees who lack the job security and civil service status that 
government employees enjoy); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of 
Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 602-03 (2001) (characterizing some of the 
savings costs associated with privatization in terms of enlarging the proportion of 
unionized, unprotected labor). 
Moreover, many bureaucratic agencies are perceived as being “captured” by 
special interests; this knowledge makes the leap to privatization increasingly sensible 
and attractive.  Thomas Merrill describes the public choice theorists’ concerns with 
political institutions.  Public choice theorists, he argues, suggest that the “public 
interest will best be served by transferring decisional authority away from the political 
institutions altogether.”  Thomas Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts, 1967-1983, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1054 (1997); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & 
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 23-24 (1997). 
41 For general discussions on the rise in privatization in America, see JOHN D. 
DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989); JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM 
BUREAUCRACY (1996); PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (Shelia B. Kamerman & 
Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1989); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1982); John J. 
DiIulio, Jr., Response Government by Proxy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1271 (2003); and Martha 
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1229 (2003).  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional 
Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 249-50 (1996) (characterizing 
the 104th Congress as “signal[ing] the transformation of America into a genuinely 
post-New Deal regulatory state” intent of rethinking the regulatory state and the 
problems of overregulation and centralization). 
42 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1285, 1292-94 (2003); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a 
Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 27 (2001).  
The two Presidents Bush as well as President Clinton have all suggested that 
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to allow the private sector to perform traditional government services, 
including prison management,43 environmental enforcement,44 and, 
increasingly, even military and national security functions45 suggests 
 
downsizing and privatization are key features of their efforts to reinvent government.  
The first President Bush assigned Dan Quayle primary responsibility over the Council 
on Competitiveness, a task force dedicated to deregulating and privatizing 
governmental responsibilities.  Ann Devroy, Quayle Panel Takes First Step with Murky 
Mandate, WASH. POST, June 21, 1989, at A21 (describing the Quayle council as 
promoting an agenda of smaller government through deregulation); Philip J. Hilts, 
Questions on the Role of Quayle Council, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1991, at B12 
(characterizing the council as promoting deregulation).  More recently, Vice 
President Al Gore adopted a comparable role as he stewarded the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to “reinvent government.”  See Gwen Ifill, Gore Jumps into the 
Job of Cutting U.S. Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1993, at A20; see also E.S. SAVAS, 
PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 222 (2000).  Gore also touted his 
exploits in this area when he ran for president.  See Kevin Sack, For Limited 
Government? That’s Me, Gore Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at A23 (describing the 
presidential candidate’s avowed commitment to smaller federal government).  And, 
most recently, President George W. Bush has promised to slash the federal workforce 
in half, contracting out to private entities many governmental responsibilities.  See 
Richard Stevenson, Government May Make Private Nearly Half of Its Civilian Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A1; see also Peter Finn, With Lawrenceville Facility, Va. Enters 
World of Privately Run Prisons, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at B1; William J. Henderson, 
Editorial, I Ran the Postal Service; It Should Be Privatized, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2001, at 
B1. 
43 See Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 267 (2001); E.S. 
Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 895 (1987) (describing in the 
early years of prison outsourcing that many scholars viewed the introduction of 
privatization into the world of prisons as a “natural and inevitable development”); see 
also Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 359 (1996); Anne 
Larason Schneider, Public-Private Partnerships in the U.S. Prison System, in PUBLIC-
PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 199 (Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000); 
Developments in the Law, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in 
Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1868 (2002). 
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000) (leaving to 
the states the authority for creating plans for “implementation, maintenance, and 
enforcement” of the Clean Air Act); see also David A. Dana, Innovations in 
Environmental Policy: The New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 36 (describing how policymakers avoid the administrative 
and political burdens of traditional forms of governance by revising legislation and 
regulations and striking deals with the regulated community in which “regulators 
contractually commit not to enforce some requirements that are formally applicable 
to the regulated entities in return for the regulated [corporate] entities’ contractual 
commitments to take measures not required under existing formal law”).  Professor 
Dana further describes how private regulation has been a response to the common 
understanding that market-based decisions promote efficiency and compliance in 
ways that often-inflexible government regulations do not.  See id. at 37.  For broader 
efforts aimed at de-emphasizing command-and-control type regulations, see Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (2000).  See 
also Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2000)). 
45 Recent reports indicate an alarming new trend in privatization of traditional 
armed service functions.  See, e.g., P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF 
  
2004 DEFORMING WELFARE 591 
that core policymaking functions do not necessarily have to come 
from state capitols or from Washington. 
B. Coalescing Around Welfare Reform: Systems and Processes 
Since the New Deal and up until 1996, the federal government 
had been increasingly serving as the guarantor of poor relief.46  
Though welfare has always been a federal-state partnership, the 
“procedural revolution” of the late 1960s and early 1970s curtailed 
state agencies’ ability to reject classes of applicants and terminate 
individuals for “improper” behavior.47  But, in 1996, Congress 
 
THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003); James Dao, U.S. Company to Take Over 
Karzai Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at A24; Jonathan D. Tepperman, Out of 
Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 25, 2002, at 10; Leslie Wayne, America’s For-Profit Secret 
Army, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at C1; see also Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Perle’s 
Plunder Blunder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at D13 (describing how a key member of 
private board of advisors to Secretary Rumsfeld was being compensated by 
technology firms with a financial interest in U.S. national security policy); Stephen 
Labaton, Pentagon Adviser Is also Advising Global Crossing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at 
C1 (same).  For analysis of military privatization’s normative and legal departures 
from conventional, domestic privatization, see Jon D. Michaels, Privatizing War: Big 
Government’s Last Stand and the Rise of a New Privatization Paradigm, work in progress, 
(on file with author). 
46 See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 15, at 125 (describing the pre-New Deal state 
programs of assistance for the aged poor and for poor widows with children). 
47 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring states to continue 
paying welfare benefits to those terminated from the rolls until after a proper 
hearing is conducted); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (rejecting state man-of-
the-house midnight inspections by state caseworkers as inconsistent with federal 
welfare laws); see also Cimini, supra note 10, at 249 (noting that since the late 1960s 
under AFDC, “the statutory criteria and absence of caseworker discretion created a 
legitimate expectation in the receipt of benefits for qualified applicants”); Simon, 
supra note 21. 
Indeed, Professor Zasloff has argued that class action lawsuits of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s 
fundamentally transformed the nature of the AFDC program . . . [and] 
changed the previous presumption of the Social Security Act, viz. that 
states were free to adopt any eligibility rules unless they were expressly 
forbidden.  In King v. Smith, the Court unanimously struck down 
Alabama’s “substitute father” rule as violative of the statute.  Broadly 
speaking, that rule denied AFDC benefits to children in otherwise-
eligible households if a man “cohabited” with the children’s mother—
regardless of whether the man was obligated to support the children or 
whether he in fact did so.  The definition of “cohabit” was intentionally 
vague, and states often used it to deny benefits to African-Americans. 
Overturning several decades of deference to federal administrative 
constructions that supported such rules, the Court relied heavily upon 
the notion that “protection of children is the paramount goal of 
AFDC,” and interpreted the statute in light of this overarching 
background rule. . . .  “[F]ederal public welfare policy,” [the Court] 
stated, “now rests on a basis considerably more sophisticated and 
enlightened than the ‘worthy-person’ concept of earlier times.”  In 
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changed America’s bargain with the poor.  Welfare, understood as 
cash assistance, would no longer be considered an entitlement; 
rather, cash assistance for individuals could now be conditioned on 
meeting work (or job-seeking) requirements and adhering to 
personal responsibility codes or contracts.48  Indeed, federal moneys 
would no longer have to go to cash assistance; states would have 
greater discretion to use federal dollars as they see fit.49 
More broadly, PRWORA was a declaratory manifesto describing 
both Congress’s abdication of its commitment to welfare as an 
entitlement and its refusal to subsidize the nonworking 
(undeserving) poor.50  Its intentions and goals were quite clear: 
 
keeping with this belief, the Court moved ahead with sharply curtailing 
states’ control over the program: by 1971, it could state matter-of-factly 
that “in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion 
clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a 
state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance 
under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is 
therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.”  Lower courts followed 
suit throughout the late 60’s and early 70’s, and invalidated a host of 
state regulations, greatly expanding the program and leaving it 
unrecognizable from the small state-driven scheme that had existed ten 
years before. 
Finally, federal officials cowed by previous Congressional antipathy 
now felt emboldened to pressure states to serve more clients.  In 1966 
the . . . central administrator for AFDC in 1962, ordered that state 
plans for eligibility “respect the rights of individuals . . . and not result 
in practices that violate the individual’s privacy or personal dignity, or 
harass him, or violate his constitutional rights.”  In the wake of the Civil 
Rights movement, and protected by a liberal administration, the 
federal bureaucracy set states on notice that it now had the upper 
hand.  States that wanted to get critical federal matching funds had 
little choice but to comply. 
Zasloff, supra note 15 at 269-71 (footnotes omitted). 
48 See, e.g., Cimini, supra note 10, at 257-58 (detailing the contractual symbolism 
of welfare reform); Zasloff, supra note 15, at 228 (“[PRWORA] destroyed the 
previous welfare law’s formal guarantee of child-care subsidies that enabled 
recipients to maintain employment.”). 
49 See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan & Gretchen Caspary, Welfare Dynamics and the 1996 
Welfare Reform, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 605, 609-10 (1997) 
(describing how PRWORA permits states to lower their total spending on the poor 
and to reallocate that reduced spending away from cash assistance); Martha C. 
Nguyen, Note, Welfare Reauthorization: President Bush’s Agenda, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y 489, 489-90 (2002) (describing the loose federal guidelines imposed on 
states vis-à-vis how states use welfare block grant money); Robert Pear, Welfare 
Spending Shows Huge Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at A1 (describing the dramatic 
reallocation of welfare money away from cash assistance and toward transportation 
subsidies, substance abuse programs, and child care and noting that much of this 
reallocated money is not targeted at those families “who do not receive welfare in the 
traditional sense”). 
50 See Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9 GEO. 
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replace AFDC with a temporary, time-limited assistance program 
(TANF) and insist those receiving transitional benefits begin the 
process of finding work.51 
In passing PRWORA, Congress’s substantive anti-dependency 
narrative would be eclipsed (and ultimately undermined) by the 
seemingly complementary narrative of devolution.  Congress not only 
changed the substantive content of welfare policy, but also 
revolutionized the means of design and delivery; indeed, as suggested 
above, it relinquished unprecedented programmatic responsibility 
over welfare to the states, which in turn, have been authorized to 
contract out their administration of welfare to, inter alia, for-profit 
corporations and sectarian religious organizations.  Thus, among the 
inheritors of the federal responsibility for public assistance are 
Lockheed Martin and Catholic Charities. 
Given the dominant systematic and process-oriented narratives 
of the 1980s and 1990s, it is not shocking that they would converge as 
they did in PRWORA.52  The ambitions of budget hawks, opponents 
of a soft welfare state, and states’ rights advocates aligned in their 
antagonism toward big, central government.53  Antagonism toward 
big, central government does accommodate these two narratives 
quite well; and, though these narratives have been incorporated into 
one widely supported legislative agenda,54 it does not necessarily 
follow that we should equate this apparent “coherence” with any type 
 
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 167, 184 (2000) (contending that privatization and 
Charitable Choice “justifies and facilitates the federal government’s abdication of 
responsibility for the poor”). 
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (2000); see also Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1150 
(describing time limits as a significant change in formal welfare policy); Joel F. 
Handler, “Ending Welfare As We Know It”: The Win/Win Spin or the Stench of Victory, 5 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 131, 132 (2001) (“The most significant change introduced by 
PRWORA are the time limits.”). 
52 See Cashin, supra note 3, at 554 (emphasizing the recent prioritization of 
devolutionary trends and the influence of this devolution agenda on public policy 
decisionmaking); Garry Wills, Editorial, Washington Is Not Where It’s At, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 1998, at G26 (describing the confluence of welfare reform and devolution). 
53 See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1565.  It is worth noting that states have had 
considerable influence in their efforts to tie welfare reform to greater state authority.  
The waiver efforts of the 1990s, in which HHS granted states the opportunity to 
experiment with AFDC programs, illustrate the already strong linkages between 
welfare reform and devolution.  See supra note 37. 
54 Robert Pear, Many Subtleties Shaped Members’ Welfare Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
1996, at A22 (characterizing a number of liberal Democrats who were running for re-
election in 1996 as feeling compelled to support PRWORA and indicating that the 
Clinton White House was divided, with policy staffers recommending a veto and the 
political advisors insisting the president support the bill).  The public in general also 
favored welfare reform.  See Richard L. Berke, Public Favors the Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 7, 1996, at A1. 
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of internal harmony or consistency once we move past the criticism 
stage and embrace the responsibilities of affirmative, constructive 
policymaking. 
Consider, for instance, the waiver movement that represented a 
recent, pre-PRWORA attempt at reform.  Throughout the early and 
mid 1990s, the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) allowed states to propose experimental reforms 
within the framework of the existing AFDC system.  Most state 
requests for waivers were summarily granted, which gave governors 
relatively broad discretion to modify the substance of AFDC.55  For 
example, quite a large number of states began experimenting with 
family caps and more stringent work requirements.56 
But in these instances, it was very clear that welfare qua process 
was the very means by which welfare qua system was being subverted.  
These narratives converged in a moment of destructive policymaking.  
Trapped within the AFDC paradigm, the HHS decision to transfer 
greater discretion to the states was a way for reform to be undertaken 
in the shadow of true legislative reform.  Given that the relative 
support to dismantle AFDC was always much greater than any 
coalition rallying behind any one particular affirmative vision of 
constructive reform, the waiver system allowed for substantive reform 
under the rubric of process-based changes.57  The ostensible federal 
purpose for granting waivers liberally was to stimulate (or simulate) 
substantive legal and policy reforms—to put band-aids on a broken 
system. 
 
55 Weaver provides a helpful, succinct summary.  He notes that though waivers 
were statutorily allowable under section 1115 of the Social Security Act of 1962, they 
were seldom applied for by states even during the Reagan-New Federalism years.  
WEAVER, supra note 9, at 131.  “Before the late 1980s, waiver provisions were narrowly 
interpreted and seldom used.  By 1995, however, most states had obtained waivers 
from Washington . . . .”  Id; see also supra note 37; infra notes 56, 57, 80 and 
accompanying text. 
56 See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 56-62 (1995) 
(describing state waiver programs generally); PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 239-40 
(describing waiver programs in Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin); WEAVER, supra note 9, at 131 (characterizing states as experimenting with 
family caps and time limits); Law, supra note 1, at 479-80 (describing the pre-1996 
workfare program in Riverside, California, as a “model for federal reform”). 
57 See WEAVER, supra note 9, at 131 (describing the waivers as allowing states to 
“test dramatic reforms . . . without any legislative change at all by Congress”) (emphasis 
added); see also The Fickle Finger of Welfare Policy; Why the Governors Can’t Decide What 
Reforms They Really Want, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1995, at C5 (describing the lack of 
consensus within the context of the waiver system). 
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C. The Nuts and Bolts of PRWORA 
But PRWORA, for better or worse, represented the fulfillment of 
just such a galvanizing legislative moment so sorely lacking in the 
years of dissatisfaction with the old welfare system.58  By 1996, HHS 
and the states no longer had to conspire to circumvent a failed 
program; instead, the country was ready to tear down the legal and 
substantive foundation of that system—AFDC entitlements—and 
institute a new welfare policy regime.  As suggested earlier, at no time 
in recent memory has there been as strong a national, bipartisan 
commitment to transforming welfare policy as the one that coalesced 
around PRWORA.59  In the years since the legislation’s enactment, 
that consensus has only grown broader and deeper.60  Specifically, the 
widespread support for this programmatic change speaks to a 
national commitment to ending dependency through emphasizing 
work and family values—to shift the terms of public assistance away 
from a rights-oriented entitlement to a more social contractarian 
model insisting on duties and obligations as a condition of 
assistance.61 
 
58 But see Zasloff, supra note 15, at 227 (chronicling the reform measures that 
have been enacted over the last thirty years). 
59 Fifty-three Republicans and twenty-five Democrats, including Senators 
Feingold, Kerry, Kohl, Biden, and Lieberman, all supported the legislation.  See How 
Senate Voted on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1996, at A10; see also Joe Klein, The End of 
the Tide: If Even Clinton Says the Era of Big Government Is Over, What Do the Republicans Do 
Next?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 1996, at 51 (describing the national consensus 
surrounding the welfare legislation); Joseph I. Lieberman, Editorial, Welfare As We 
Know It, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1996, at A23 (offering a Democratic defense of the 1996 
rendition of welfare reform). 
60 Indeed, in the 2000 Democratic presidential primary season, former Senator 
Bill Bradley was considered vulnerable if he were to run as the nominee in the 
general election because he voted against welfare reform.  See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, 
Editorial, Who’s the Real Beltway Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2000, at A25 
(recognizing that Bradley’s opposition to welfare reform in 1996 would hurt his 
chances in the Democratic primaries); Martin Peretz, War of Words, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Sept. 6, 1999, at 46 (calling Bill Bradley’s vote against the 1996 welfare reform 
proposal “wildly out of step with public opinion”). 
61 Lawrence Mead, who characterizes this shift in policy as an ushering in of an 
era of “New Paternalism,” explicitly describes the previous, traditional programs as 
largely “compensatory.”  He sees the new programs as emphasizing duties and 
obligations.  See Lawrence M. Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, in THE NEW PATERNALISM 
1-38 (1997) [hereinafter Mead, The Rise of Paternalism]; Lawrence M. Mead, Telling the 
Poor What to Do, PUB. INT., June 22, 1998, at 97; see also Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1560 
(describing 1996 welfare reform as establishing a new contractual regime: the 
“Contractual Welfare State”); Cimini, supra note 10, at 254-58 (discussing obligations 
and responsibilities under TANF); Judith Havemann, New York’s Workfare Picks Up City 
and Lifts Mayor’s Image, WASH. POST., Aug. 13, 1997, at A1 (quoting a senior advisor to 
Mayor Giuliani as saying that “if the government is going to provide a benefit, it has 
the right and obligation to ask for something in return”). 
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In PRWORA,62 Congress ended the federal entitlement to 
welfare.63  Federal cash assistance (TANF) is now capped at five years 
over a recipient’s lifetime,64 and those time-limited benefits would 
further be conditioned on meeting work requirements and/or on 
adhering to a particular set of moral and family values.65  Congress 
required states to move one-half of its recipient families into work-
related activities by 2002.66 
While retaining these limited goal-setting powers,67 Congress also 
gave the states unprecedented discretion over policymaking and 
administration.68  States are not only afforded great latitude in how 
 
62 Throughout this discussion, I deliberately oversimplify.  There are select 
loopholes that allow states to make exceptions and other loopholes that states have 
themselves found to further skirt the federal imperatives.  Thus, some of the 
statements proffered may seem to lack some nuance, which I readily concede and 
accept for the purposes of describing clearly the broader contours of the new law 
without getting bogged down in the intricacies.  For a handy summary of PRWORA, 
see WEAVER, supra note 9, at 330-34. 
63 See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000). 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2000). 
65 See id. 
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2000).  In 2002, the Bush administration and the House 
of Representatives proposed raising the minimum work requirements for state 
recipients of public assistance.  See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Bloomberg Steps Up to the Plate 
on Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002 (describing local administrators’ 
dissatisfaction with congressional mandates regarding the level of work 
requirements); Editorial, Reforming Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at A18 
(describing the mismatch between federal goals and the limitation of state policies). 
67 Professor Law provides a succinct summary of how Congress’s statutory 
guidelines explicitly promoted a substantive vision of welfare reform.  Specifically: 
TANF funds . . . must be used for enumerated TANF purposes: 
providing cash assistance to needy families with children, promoting 
work, preventing nonmarital births, and promoting the formation and 
maintenance of two-parent families. . . .  Federal TANF funds may not 
be used to provide cash assistance to a family that “includes an adult 
who has received [TANF] assistance . . . for 60 months.”  States must 
require all parents or caretakers receiving assistance to engage in work 
“once the State determines the parent or caretaker is ready to engage 
in work, or once the parent or caretaker has received assistance under 
the program for 24 months (whether or not consecutive), whichever is 
earlier.”  Parents who are not working must participate in community 
service within two months of receiving aid.  Strict limits prevent states 
from counting as “working” people who are attending school or 
vocational education programs.  Federal grants to the state will be 
reduced if the state fails to meet the mandatory job participation rates 
set in the federal statute. 
Law, supra note 1, at 488-89 (footnotes omitted); see Candice Hoke, State Discretion 
Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based 
Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 115, 118-20 (1998) (describing the 
“burdensome and expensive” federal requirements that PRWORA contains). 
68 See Law, supra note 1; Minow, supra note 1; Jonathan Alter et al., Washington 
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they themselves design welfare policy, but they are also allowed to 
sub-devolve that authority and responsibility to municipalities, private 
corporations, and faith-based organizations.  Thus, the coherent 
message69 from Washington is, I argue, undermined, since PRWORA 
is not just aimed at prioritizing personal responsibility and anti-
dependency: Along with the substantive objectives of welfare reform 
is the process-oriented goal of increased devolution and privatization.  
Congress drafted legislation that not only aimed at fighting 
dependency, but that also reduced federal oversight, maximized 
opportunities for state and local experimentation, and permitted 
states and localities to rely on churches and corporations in carrying 
out their social service responsibilities.70 
In contending that Congress did not foresee the distortions that 
devolution and privatization may bring about, I do not have to decide 
whether Congress was misguided or myopic.  The conventional story 
is that, politically speaking, Congress either intended or had no 
choice but to cede considerable power to the states.  Judith 
Havemann and Barbara Vobejda of the Washington Post have weighed 
in on the myopia side of the debate.  They have described some state 
proposals to sub-devolve welfare policy as being “hardly envisioned by 
many of the federal lawmakers who voted for revolutionary welfare 
changes.”71  In either event, the point remains: Whether Congress 
knew it would be undermining its own substantive vision or not, the 
dominant narrative of devolution and privatization has compromised 
 
Washes Its Hands, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 1996, at 42; see also Michele L. Wiggeren, 
Experimenting with Block Grants and Temporary Assistance: The Attempt To Transform 
Welfare by Altering Federal-State Relations and Recipients’ Due Process Rights, 46 EMORY L.J. 
1327, 1340, 1342 (1997) (describing Congress’s significantly greater power under the 
AFDC system of “cooperative federalism”). 
69 See Cashin, supra note 3, at 558-59 (“The legislation does not abandon those 
Americans who truly need a helping hand.  It retains protections for those who 
experience genuine and intractable hardship.  Above all, it recognizes the 
vulnerability of America’s children.  It guarantees that they will continue to receive 
the support they need.”) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 261 (1996), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2649).  But see MARMOR ET AL., supra note 25, at 
222 (cautioning against any naïve belief that legislators’ reasons for endorsing 
particular pieces of legislation are unitary).  Marmor and his co-authors “chasti[ze] 
critics for the mistaken assumption that social welfare programs are designed to 
pursue a single purpose and are ‘failures’ to the degree they fail to achieve that 
purpose.”  Id. 
70 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 604(f) (2000).  While PRWORA does not explicitly and 
affirmatively authorize privatization, § 604(f) does so in a limited respect. More 
directly, PRWORA effectively repeals the old AFDC legislation that specifically 
prohibited privatization.  See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(6) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(4) 
(2000). 
71 Judith Havemann & Barbara Vobejda, After Getting Responsibility for Welfare, 
States May Pass It Down, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1997, at A1. 
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the effective realization of the federal objectives of welfare reform. 
III. WELFARE REFORM AS WE (NOW) KNOW IT:  
AN INQUIRY INTO IMPLEMENTATION 
These next three parts evaluate how devolution and 
privatization—welfare reform’s procedural imperatives—compromise 
the substantive and rhetorical aims of PRWORA.72  I argue that state, 
church, and private welfare vendors may exploit their discretionary 
authority and under-provide services in ways that leave hundreds of 
thousands of individuals materially far worse off than even a fiscally 
conservative Congress might have intended.  Moreover, the federal 
government’s willingness to throw its (the nation’s) hands up and 
concede defeat engenders significant psychic harms as well.73  This 
federal abandonment, magnified by a hot-potato phenomenon of 
states themselves (1) passing down responsibility to cities and 
counties by way of second-order devolution and (2) passing along 
responsibility to sister states through diversionary tactics and races-to-
the-bottom, reveals to the recipients and to the general body of 
citizens alike that the plight of America’s poor is either beyond the 
technical and economic grasp of the world’s superpower or—more 
plausibly—simply not that important.74 
I begin my analysis in Section A at the simplest and least 
problematic level of devolution: state autonomy and discretion over 
welfare policy.  I start from the generous premise, that devolution 
completely comports with—rather than undermines—the substantive 
and rhetorical aims momentously outlined in 1996.  Within the 
context of this counterfactual, I suggest that the states are dedicated 
to the same vision of welfare reform as Congress, and thus there is 
perfect-mapping such that discretion is confined within the bounded 
contours of the federal agenda and distortions are minimized. 
In Section B, I hold the counterfactual presumptions of the 
 
72 See Wills, supra note 52 (describing lone voices of concern that devolution will 
limit the federal government’s ability to tackle dependency and quoting William 
Bennett as saying that devolution “has often meant reducing the Federal 
Government’s capacity to monitor and correct”). 
73 See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1578 (describing the enactment of 1996 
welfare reform as a return to the pre-New Deal conception of the poor as personally 
weak, lazy, or morally deficient). 
74 Cf. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE 
UNSTEADY MARCH (1999).  Dudziak as well as Klinkner and Smith focus on how the 
Soviet criticism of American race relations during the Cold War challenged the 
United States to propel the civil rights agenda forward.  Their scholarship reveals the 
American ability to progress and transform society in the face of external criticism. 
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previous section up to the light and offer a more critical account of 
how states really do differ individually and collectively from the 
federal government in the design and implementation of welfare 
policy.  I argue that states may possess structural incentives that 
dampen their eagerness to implement the federal aims of welfare 
reform, and that states in general may be limited institutionally in 
their ability to promote and coordinate the work opportunities that 
ostensibly make it possible for the dependent poor to leave welfare 
en masse.  Aspects of these arguments have been ably made 
elsewhere by others;75 but those studies have stopped short of 
articulating what is fully at stake when states not only administer 
welfare reform themselves, but also when they farm it out, engaging 
in second-order or sub-devolution to for-profit corporations and 
faith-based organizations. The reconciliation of dual sovereignty with 
welfare privatization has, from my vantage point, yet to be fully 
explained. 
Accordingly, in the next two parts, I identify how this connection 
between federal policy goals and the realities of devolution cum 
privatization as implemented becomes even more attenuated once 
the states decide to outsource welfare services, leaving the 
responsibility for policy development and administration in the 
hands of for-profit and religious providers.  As detailed below in Part 
IV and Part V, respectively, these providers may lack public 
accountability, may possess competing (economic, fiduciary, and/or 
theological) incentives, and may readily acknowledge and concede 
they do not and cannot represent the will and interests of the 
American people writ large. 
* * * 
Devolution’s harms76 at any and all of these levels of 
administration can be categorized along three axes: institutional, 
managerial, and civic-citizenship.  Institutional harms, as I define 
them, arise out of structural mismatches.  Specifically, the institution 
in which authority and discretion is vested is ill-equipped, either in 
terms of resources or disposition, to carry out the core functions and 
imperatives of federal welfare reform.  In such instances, devolution 
proves to be counterproductive, if not affirmatively harmful. 
Managerial, or bureaucratic harms arise as devolved agents of 
 
75 See supra notes 1, 2, 9, 10. 
76 More precisely, I should say “distortions” rather than “harms” because states, 
cities, or private actors, in truth, could improve upon the federal agenda.  Because 
this inquiry principally concerns itself with the adverse effects of such distortions, I 
employ the term “harm” as shorthand. 
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welfare provision have incentives to distort federal welfare policy, or 
simply under-provide for the client population.  Many of these 
managerial harms are extensions of the institutional mismatch, and 
examples of these kinds of harms abound.  State administrators 
forced to meet federal work requirements may simply deter 
beneficiaries from remaining on welfare, a poor substitute for 
actually helping individuals find meaningful work and otherwise 
easing the transition into the labor market.77  Corporate providers 
may contractually be permitted to keep, as profits, all of the allocated 
funding that is not dispersed to the citizenry; accordingly, they too 
might be tempted to dissuade and divert clients, approaches which 
are much less expensive than having to provide job-training and 
child-care services.  And, sectarian providers may interject and 
impose an ethos of faith into the otherwise neutral provision of social 
services and may focus too many resources on moral or spiritual 
uplift at the expense of education and skills-training programs. 
Finally, the civic-citizenship harms are visited on recipients (and 
sometimes even members of the civic community broadly defined) 
when devolution and privatization undermine democratic 
responsiveness and accountability, core values of American public 
and political engagement.  Whether in the form of localities’ highly 
parochial governments, corporations’ lack of due process and APA-
like obligations, or faith-based organizations’ exclusionary (and thus 
potentially alienating) religious messages, devolution and 
privatization may make individuals feel less empowered and less 
connected to the organs of government. 
In what follows, mapping these categories of harm onto the 
different levels of devolved and privatized governance will help 
illustrate the nature and severity of the distortions currently 
undermining and threatening to undo PRWORA. 
A. Perfect Mapping: Non-distorting State Implementation of  
Federal Policy 
Let us commence by assuming the best-case scenario: The 
substantive and rhetorical federal objectives of welfare reform can be 
met through state implementation.  Essentially most states and 
municipalities support the aims of federal welfare reform,78 and, after 
 
77 See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice 
Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2004). 
78 In 1996, the National Governors Association endorsed PRWORA.  See National 
Governors Association Welfare Reform Bulletin, available at http://nga.org/nga/ 
lobbyIssues/1,1169,D_4940,00.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).  New York City, once 
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decades of jointly administering AFDC with the federal government, 
these states will craft their welfare policies in ways quite congruous 
with Congress’s intentions.79  States, we must remember, helped 
transform the world of welfare through their extensive use of waivers 
in the early 1990s as well as through their advocacy for passage of 
PRWORA.  And, before that, states under the AFDC model of 
cooperative federalism, have long occupied a pivotal role in welfare 
policy and administration.80  Having invested a good deal of political 
 
considered a hotbed of liberal social policy and welfare advocacy, is a great case 
study.  Lawyers from Columbia’s Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law brought 
the landmark case, Goldberg v. Kelly, against New York.  The named plaintiff, John 
Kelly, did not even have children and was not receiving AFDC benefits.  Instead, he 
was receiving more expansive, generous “Home Relief” benefits offered to New York 
residents.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 
21, at 373.  For general discussions on the strength of the welfare rights movement at 
that time, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED 10-21 (1993); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & 
RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS 264-359 (1977); JACK KATZ, POOR 
PEOPLE’S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 79-81 (1982); and Edward V. Sparer, The Right to 
Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 65, 71-72 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971). 
The attitude among political elites in New York during the PRWORA revolution 
is much changed.  New York City was on the forefront of “workfare,” a means of 
helping reduce dependency and facilitate work even before the passage of the 
federal reform bill.  See, e.g., Douglas Martin, New York Workfare Expansion Fuels Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at A1 (discussing the growth of the program from 
essentially a pilot program in the early 1990s to a major initiative by the mid 1990s).  
But see Betsy Gotbaum, Editorial, When Workfare Is Just Make-Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
1993, at A19 (describing the program as a fruitless endeavor that does not prepare 
individuals for work).  Indeed, Mayor Giuliani hired Jason Turner, Wisconsin’s 
architect of many of the welfare reform waiver-initiatives under Governor Tommy 
Thompson.  Journalist Jason DeParle describes how the city administration 
introduced an anti-dependency welfare initiative to its caseworkers in Harlem.  In 
response to a caseworker’s question regarding the city’s harsh termination policies 
under PRWORA, Commissioner Turner responded that the real way to end 
dependency is: “live on what you get, and if you run out, figure out what to do until 
your next paycheck.”  Jason DeParle, What Welfare-to-Work Really Means, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 1998, at F11.  DeParle sums up the scene as follows: 
The city’s new Welfare Commissioner—this Ivy-League-educated, 
Republican white man—had just traveled to the heart of Harlem and 
proclaimed it morally instructive for the poor to face empty cupboards.  
Once upon a time, there might have been a riot.  In the end-welfare age, the 
stunned silence [instead] leads to applause. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
79 For some general discussions of cooperative federalism in the post-War era 
and into the more recent period marked by greater devolutionary trends, see 
TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION (1998); JON C. TEAFORD, 
THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT (2002); and 
Scheiber, supra note 38. 
80 As described above, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, even before 
the 1996 legislation, state and federal administrators were actively experimenting 
with workfare reforms.  Between 1993 and 1996 alone, Clinton’s HHS approved 
seventy waivers in over forty states.  Many of these waivers sought to condition 
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capital in the design (and success) of this brand of welfare reform, 
states moreover have incentives to fulfill its mandate accordingly.81 
The explicit substantive federal goals of reducing dependency 
and increasing personal responsibility can hardly be disregarded by 
states implementing PRWORA; political, legal, and economic 
expediency converge to limit the horizon of possible variations or 
distortions within the paradigm of federal welfare reform.  Simply 
put, states must begin the process of facilitating the transition from 
welfare to work and take steps to root out long-term dependency by 
preparing individuals, both materially and psychologically, for the 
onset of TANF’s stringent time limits.  Thus, ostensibly there is little 
room and incentive for states to undertake any frolics or detours 
when they are hard at work complying with and thus furthering the 
federal aims. 
Discretion, under this scenario, is limited to ways that comport 
with popular impressions of cooperative federalism: States are given 
leeway and flexibility to determine how best to carry out these federal 
imperatives.82  Indeed, under what I consider to be these idealized 
circumstances, the dual narratives of anti-dependency and greater 
local responsibility and authority can actually be reconciled.  To 
reduce dependency, states can experiment with policies to address 
particular needs; they can, for instance, institute family caps, require 
drug testing and counseling, promote marriage, and/or offer child-
care allowances.  States can tailor the relative mix of carrots and sticks 
to suit the local needs (and treat pathologies) that prevail in 
particular communities.83  Given welfare reform’s imminent time 
limits,84 strict work requirements,85 and conditional benefit 
 
benefits on participation in the workforce.  See The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, HHS Fact Sheet (U.S. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs.), Aug. 22, 1996, at 5 [hereinafter HHS Fact Sheet]; see also Bennett & 
Sullivan, supra note 37; Purdham, supra note 37. 
81 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
82 There are a good number of ways in which PRWORA allows states significant 
maneuvering room to circumvent the direct federal aims.  I will briefly refer to those 
“loopholes” in subsequent sections; for now, however, I will adhere to a more stylized 
set of facts, in keeping with the counterfactual nature of the present discussion. 
83 Havemann, supra note 61; see also Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, supra note 61.  
There can be greater variance here with regard to what types of services and 
obligations are mandatory.  They can involve any combination of parenting/ 
fatherhood classes, money management classes, and drug rehabilitation, job training, 
or workfare programs, and may have to make themselves available to intrusive home 
visits.  This of course does make the programs quite distinct.  See, e.g., id.; DeParle, 
supra note 78. 
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000). 
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2000) (requiring that a state insist that fifty percent of its 
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structures,86 all welfare agencies have little choice but to become 
more demanding and intrusive.87  Thus, an argument can easily be 
made that the federal goal that caseworkers closely monitor 
recipients of public assistance to ensure they attend training 
workshops and actively seek work will be achieved through local 
administration.88 
Additionally, besides the failure-to-comply sanctions imposed on 
states, Congress gave states other incentives to reduce dependency.  
For example, states are allowed to keep the unspent money ostensibly 
earmarked for welfare and dedicate it to other needs of their own 
choosing.89  Moreover, there is the self-evident political windfall for 
 
recipient families include an adult working at least thirty hours a week by 2002). 
86 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 815-19, 824, 829, 110 Stat. 2105, 2315-20, 2323, 2327 
(imposing a host of behavioral requirements and sanctions). 
87 See Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, supra note 61.  The anti-dependency federal 
imperative—coupled with the statutory time limits—relies, in part, on more 
aggressive monitoring (and counseling).  The investigative work will not only help 
reduce fraud and encourage work, but it will also help agencies determine how best 
to allocate resources—and to which recipients.  The investigative power allows states 
to experiment more creatively and place different recipients on different tracks 
toward self-sufficiency. 
This transformation in our conception of welfare has changed, again ostensibly 
uniformly, the complexion of the welfare worker: “[e]ligibility specialists whose jobs 
[under AFDC] were viewed as clerical, are being replaced by case managers with 
broad authority to advise, assist, and supervise clients. . . .  [T]he case manager is 
intended to serve as a ‘teacher, preacher, friend, and cop—an all-purpose partner to 
guide poor parents into jobs.’”  Diller, Localism, supra note 1, at 421 (quoting Jason 
DeParle, For Caseworker, Helping Is a Frustrating Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1999, at 
A1).  Indeed, “the imposition of work requirements and time limits, the creation of 
diversion programs, the strengthening of sanctions, and the reorganization of staff 
functions all have one consequence in common: They increase the authority and 
discretion of caseworkers.”  Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1164; see also William H. 
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-04, 
1214-18 (1983) (describing the advent of detached, clerical welfare administrators in 
the late 1960s as a response to the intrusive social workers who were a hallmark of 
the older welfare system believed to be fraught with arbitrary and discriminatory case 
management). 
88 PRWORA, however, permits caseload reduction credits that can, if properly 
leveraged by state agencies, reduce workforce participation requirements to 
negligible numbers.  The credits are given in a 1 to 1 ratio; thus, for every one 
recipient who is turned off the welfare rolls, the state agency actually has to help find 
two fewer jobs: the one who was pushed off the rolls, and an additional individual, 
who benefits from the caseload reduction credit.  Again, this will be presented more 
fully below in how reform can be distorted.  Here, this Article assumes that workforce 
participation is unquestionably in line with the interests of the state and local 
administrators. 
89 42 U.S.C. § 604 (2000); see Law, supra note 1 (describing how states could use 
up to twenty percent of the entire welfare block grant for any other purpose they so 
choose); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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governors who can proudly claim major reductions in caseloads—in 
line with federal aims.  Under this stylized scenario, states’ political, 
legal, and economic incentives to reduce dependency, create work 
opportunities, and promote personal responsibility, directly align 
under the federal architecture of reform. 
B. Inevitable State Distortions of the Federal Agenda 
Unfortunately, this stylized “perfect mapping” in Section A is 
overly sanguine.  However rigidly constrained they are by political 
and budgetary concerns and however closely in-sync they are with the 
ambitions of federal welfare reform, state governments (1) have 
considerable institutional trouble meeting Congress’s substantive 
policy objectives; (2) have competing incentives that may steer them 
off course; and finally, (3) may engender civic harms insofar as they 
act in a discriminatory or unjust manner.  At times, state “distortions” 
of policy aims will be deliberate, and at others, they will be 
inadvertent, if not completely unavoidable.90  These “distortions,” it 
should be noted at the outset, are understood as policy deviations 
outside the bounded discretion explicitly given to states as laboratories of 
democracy to tinker with welfare reform.91 
Focusing on harms stemming from the unbounded discretion, 
this Section proceeds in three steps.  Below, I suggest why the states 
may not be reliable partners (of the federal government) as agents 
implementing the “national” reforms.  This discussion does not 
prove, of course, that the federal government, acting unilaterally, 
would be infallible in implementing welfare reform.  Rather, my aim 
is simply to describe the harms that arise given the inescapable 
structural differences between the federal government and its 
constituent states, differences that hinder national efforts to use states 
to serve federal aims and that undermine efforts to retain a truly 
national commitment to reform. 
 
90 As suggested earlier, these distortions may not compromise the federal goal 
of reducing welfare dependency, but may cause unintended adverse consequences in 
the process of reducing the rolls. 
91 While it is often difficult to disaggregate the substantive (anti-dependency) 
and procedural (via devolution) aims of federal welfare reform, it is important to 
distinguish in the course of this inquiry the category of authorized discretion 
understood as consistent with federal welfare reform from the type of (undesirable 
and possibly arbitrary) discretion that threatens to distort welfare reform.  While the 
former category enhances the aims of welfare reform by way of more refined 
tailoring of programs, the latter should be carefully monitored. 
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1. Institutional Harms 
Implicit in the aims of federal welfare legislation is a 
commitment on the part of government to promote economic 
development and create jobs.  Though Congress did not explicitly 
identify these goals in the text of PRWORA, it was only able to enact 
the welfare reform agenda with an understanding that it has the 
ability (and responsibility) to draft additional, complementary 
legislation that, if need be, can soften the shock of the transition to 
work.92  Indeed President Clinton, ostensibly, only signed PRWORA 
with this understanding in mind.93  Most notably, the federal 
government can change and recalibrate macro and microeconomic 
fiscal and monetary policy to stimulate growth and lower 
unemployment, and it can create jobs and design tax incentives to 
finance the retraining and retooling of the American workforce.  The 
states, when implementing the federal government’s welfare policies, 
lack many of these collateral tools of economic growth and expansion 
that the federal government uniquely possesses.  Although states can 
promote work opportunities by stimulating the supply side (via 
training and child care), they individually have far less control over 
the aggregate demand side (job creation) than the federal 
 
92 Linda McClain has written: 
As legislators, executives, and policy analysts take stock of welfare 
reform thus far and articulate the next steps . . . many articulate a 
model of “mutual responsibility”—or of personal responsibility and 
governmental provision of opportunity.  This was, of course, a central theme 
in the Clinton-Gore administration’s pledge to “end welfare as we know 
it”; and it was the gloss put by that administration on the 
implementation of PRWORA. . . .  This model assumes that 
government should play a role in supporting work . . . . 
Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and 
Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1675-76 (2001) (emphasis added). 
93 Almost immediately after signing PRWORA, President Clinton began 
campaigning for ways to soften some of the harsher elements of the welfare bill and 
to work to accommodate those about to be forced to transition from welfare to work.  
See Peter T. Kilborn & Sam Howe Verhovek, Clinton’s Welfare Shift Ends Tortuous 
Journey, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at A1; Robert Pear, Clinton To Sign Welfare Bill that 
Ends U.S. Aid Guarantee and Gives States Broad Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A1; 
Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Recalls His Promise, Weighs History, and Decides, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 1996, at A1; The Roosevelt Legacy, supra note 4; The Text of President Clinton’s 
Announcement on Welfare Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A24; Barbara Vobejda 
& Dan Balz, President Seeks Balm for Anger over Welfare Bill, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1996, 
at A1; see also James Bennet, Clinton Seeks Business Help on Proposal over Welfare, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1997, at A8; James Bennet, Clinton Urges More Companies To Hire People 
on Welfare Roll, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A21; Irvin Molotsky, President Says the 
Government Will Hire 10,000 Off Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at A26; Editorial, 
Tax Credits for Welfare Hires, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at A20. 
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government does.94  Thus, the state is an incomplete engine of 
welfare reform.95 
In fact, the institutional mismatch is greater now than under 
AFDC’s cooperative federalism, not simply because the states enjoy 
even greater discretion than before, but also because the imperatives 
of welfare reform require more active engagement on the part of 
social service administrators.96  Today’s statutory insistence on time 
limits and work requirements and today’s political and rhetorical 
intolerance toward dependency place unprecedented burdens on 
states to act more proactively and innovatively, burdens which 
underscore the fact that states have only a limited ability to stimulate 
the economy.97 
Taking a step back, we might suppose there are three categories 
of hurdles to work.  The first is motivational—the recipient feels no 
pressure or obligation to work.  Part of the problem of dependency 
can be boiled down to motivation.98  If you are going to get dropped 
from public assistance unless you work, you go out and get a job; this 
assertion, if it were to stand alone, presumes that current welfare 
recipients have some set of skills commensurate with the demand for 
labor, that no overriding personal or familial obligations compel 
them to stay at home, and that jobs are available.  In short, this 
 
94 See infra note 103 and accompanying text; see also Jeff Madrick, Let’s Hear From 
Those Who Feel Government Has a Role in Stabilizing the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2002, at C2 (describing the importance of the federal government’s use of 
“automatic stabilizers” to steward the economy). 
95 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 276 (1998) (suggesting that the size and 
scope of the modern political economy “so disrupted the preceding local and 
regional economies” that it became necessary to rely on the federal government to 
engage in meaningful economic policymaking). 
96 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
97 An analogy can, briefly, be drawn to welfare policy in the European Union.  
Under the Maastricht Treaty, Brussels controls monetary and trade policy for the 
entire membership—and limits the size of a nation-state’s fiscal deficit to a negligible 
sum.  Social welfare policy remains localized at the nation-state level.  With strict 
limitations on fiscal and monetary policy, the nation-state is hamstrung in 
effectuating a coherent social welfare agenda—since it may not necessarily be able to 
coordinate its programs with those of the Union’s.  See, e.g., MARK KLEINMAN, A 
EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE? (2002); Denis Bouget, The Maastricht Treaty and Social 
Quality: A Divorce?, in THE SOCIAL QUALITY OF EUROPE 35 (Wolfgang Beck et al. eds., 
1997); Ray Hudson & Allan M. Williams, Re-shaping Europe, The Challenge of New 
Divisions Within a Homogenized Political-Economic Space, in RETHINKING EUROPEAN 
WELFARE 33, 46 (Janet Fink et al. eds., 2001); Daniele Meulders & Robert Plasman, 
European Economic Policies and Social Quality, in THE SOCIAL QUALITY OF EUROPE, supra, 
at 16, 32. 
98 See MURRAY, supra note 16 (arguing that patterns of dependency and social 
pathologies more generally are heavily shaped by motivational incentives). 
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presumes too much: If this were all that were required to end 
dependency, there would be no institutional distortion in states and 
cities administering welfare policy. 
But, indeed, dependency is not simply a function of a lack of 
motivation.99  Thus, a second category of obstacles relates to a lack of 
skills, baseline support (such as child care and health care), and 
know-how on the part of the welfare recipient.  Even if threatened 
with the prospect of being cut-off from assistance if you do not work, 
you still might need business preparation classes or possibly skills or 
educational training to command economic remuneration in the 
labor market.100  Or, you may have family obligations.  You may have a 
child and the high cost of child care effectively makes working in a 
low-wage job an untenable option.  This second set of hurdles, too, 
may be overcome with the assistance of state government programs.  
States have the capacity and earmarked resources to train workers to 
reintegrate them into the workforce—and, of course, to offer child-
care services.101 
But what America’s cities and states do not have as much of, 
however, is the ability to shape structural dynamics in the economy, 
for a major part of the problem for those out of work is that there are 
not any jobs.  This is the third hurdle: a lack of demand for workers 
 
99 It is worth quoting Professor Bezdek at length: 
A wealth of social science data indicates that, in important respects, a 
significant portion of the welfare-reliant population may not be “able” 
to take the job to which they are directed by the local welfare office.  
This inability stems not only from a lack of “skills,” but also from 
deficiencies that the simple language of “work ethic” fails to  
capture . . . . 
Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1572.  But see Sewell Chan, Working Hard To Create Hard 
Workers, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2001, at T08 (describing the program STRIVE, a boot-
camp style job-training program that focuses heavily on attitude adjustments); see also 
144 Cong. Rec. 512686 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) 
(asserting that faith is the missing element to improving the lives of America’s poor); 
MARVIN OLASKY, RENEWING AMERICAN COMPASSION 138 (1996) (declaring that the 
absence of spiritual instruction contributed to the ineffectiveness of the War on 
Poverty). 
100 See, e.g., Michael M. Weinstein, When Work is Not Enough; Without Training, 
Success of Welfare Overhaul May Falter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at C1. 
101 Indeed, Professor Bezdek also recognizes that 
parent[s] also must face significant factors outside of [their] personal 
control.  Insufficient analysis has been trained on these externalities.  
The employment infrastructure entails existing labor market 
opportunities, including job availability . . . the availability of day care 
services, the availability of transit options between home/job/ 
childcare, access to welfare benefits, and neighborhood resources. 
Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1572-73. 
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in the aggregate labor market.102  States and municipalities often lack 
the economic and political power to create new jobs.103  Given their 
limited ability to stimulate aggregate demand, states often focus their 
energy and resources, instead, on attracting jobs by enticing 
businesses to move from one part of the country to theirs.  This 
movement does not actually create new jobs; it just shifts them from 
one state to another.104 
We must remember that welfare reform emerged at a time of 
unprecedented economic growth in America.105  But, even when 
unemployment was quite low, jobs for poor, unskilled Americans 
were hardly abundant.106  While the mismatch between loci of welfare 
policy and of national economic policy might not have posed 
problems in the booming 1990s, the troubles stemming from that 
mismatch may be increasingly acute when the economy is less 
robust.107 
Moreover, the jobs that are available are often beyond the 
 
102 See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 17; WILSON, supra note 19; WILLIAM JULIUS 
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996). 
103 The dynamics of interstate commerce, the realities of managing a national 
political economy, and the legal strictures of the Dormant Commerce Clause and 
interstate compact jurisprudence all limit state power over the macroeconomy.  See, 
e.g., Schreiber, supra note 38, at 259-60 (describing the centralization of the modern 
American economy through regulations, laws, constitutional interpretations, and the 
realities of commercial patterns and practices).  Thus, often states’ economic impact 
is of a smaller (and possibly zero-sum) scale, displacing jobs from another region by 
enticing businesses to relocate or expand in a given area based on subsidies or other 
incentives.  See, e.g., Mike Allen, Stock Exchange On Wall Street Offered a Home in New 
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at B1 (describing state competition over the same jobs 
and taxable industry); Brett Pulley, Exchange Delays Vote to Move as New York Adds 
Incentives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at B5 (describing similar pitched battle between 
New Jersey and New York over the Stock Exchange).  For discussions on how the 
national economy can better regulate (even local) economies, see, for example, 
Richard Munson, Is Government Shortchanging the Sun Belt?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1987, 
at C2; Jay Rockefeller & Richard D. Lamm, Editorial, Balanced U.S. Growth, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1981, at A2. 
104 For insight into the legal-constitutional limits on state policies on economic 
growth, see, for example, Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally 
Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998). 
105 See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
106 See NEWMAN, supra note 17. 
107 See, e.g., Daniel Altman, 308,000 Jobs Lost in February, the Most Since Post-9/11 
Period, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2003, at A1; Lynette Clemetson, More Americans in Poverty in 
2002, Census Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2003, at A1; Sam Dillon, Report Finds 
Deep Poverty Is on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2003, at A18; Peter T. Kilborn, Jobs Are 
Scarce in the Newest Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at A14; David Leonhardt, Payroll 
Drops as Economy Seems To Be at Standstill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at C1; David 
Leonhardt, Unemployment Rate Rises to a 9-year High of 6.1%, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, 
at A1; see also More People on Welfare After Years of Declines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at 
A16. 
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boundaries of the inner cities where many dependent poor reside.108  
Myopic state and municipal policies may confine the scope of formal 
job search initiatives within the geographic bounds of their political 
jurisdiction.  But more importantly, even when individuals are aware 
of available but physically remote jobs, transportation difficulties may 
make those opportunities all but unattainable.  The lack of 
comprehensive public transportation networks, especially in suburbs, 
makes it difficult for job-aspirants who live in central cities to get to 
and from work. 
The problem of limited coverage of suburban transit routes is 
only exacerbated, for welfare-to-work purposes, in an era of devolved 
and sub-devolved welfare when each county is focused on winnowing 
down its own welfare rolls.  Why would a suburban county spend 
money on expanding public transportation to ease the commute of 
city dwellers seeking jobs in the county when it must devote its 
energies and resources to facilitate work for its own clientele—more 
of whom might have access to private vehicles in the first place 
(simply as a function of living in the suburbs)? 109 
Consider, for example, the State of Colorado’s welfare reform 
experience.  Colorado has devolved the authority to administer TANF 
to each of its sixty-three counties.  In effect, each of those sixty-three 
counties can design individual, discrete programs.110  Imagine the 
overlap of services, the loss of economies of scale, and the overall 
myopia of administering sixty-three county transportation programs 
and sixty-three county job programs!  What effect could one tiny 
county have on job growth and economic stimuli?111  How many lost 
 
108 See WILSON, supra note 102, at 18-50 (describing the geographic mismatch 
between where many poor live and where decent jobs exist); Nicole Stelle Garnett, 
The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 173, 177-86 (2001) (characterizing the spatial and transportation mismatch 
between those in need of jobs and the location of available jobs); Jane Gross, Poor 
Without Cars Find Trek to Work Is Now a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A1 
(describing inadequate public transportation in suburban areas where low-skilled 
jobs exist); see also Alice Reid, For Many New Hires, Getting There Is Half the Battle, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 23, 1996, at B1. 
109 See, e.g., Robyn Meredith, Jobs Out of Reach for Detroiters Without Wheels, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 26, 1998, at A12 (describing immense difficulty for city dwelling poor to 
get to jobs in the suburbs in part because the city and suburban transportation 
authorities are not linked and do not act cooperatively). 
110 See Cimini, supra note 10, at 262-63.  Moreover, Professor Cimini notes that 
more than half of those counties operate welfare programs without written rules or 
guidelines to govern the decisionmaking process of caseworkers.  See id. 
111 Indeed, Professor Cimini reports that of the sixty-three counties, thirty-four of 
them operate totally without written rules or regulations to govern caseworker 
decisionmaking.  Not only does such an egregious breach of due process and 
democratic transparency redound in concerns of arbitrary behavior toward 
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job opportunities exist when the horizon of opportunities does not 
extend pass the county borders?  Indeed, as Professor Bezdek has 
aptly noted: 
Labor markets do not begin and end at jurisdictional boundaries, 
and most of the growth in economic activity is regional, not 
merely local.  Yet the structures adopted by states and counties to 
implement the [welfare reform] [a]ct are so bound.  Public job 
training and workforce development programs are fragmented by 
jurisdiction. . . .  This territorial character shreds what otherwise 
might stitch together a patchwork of family-support services for 
poor women transitioning from welfare reliance to workplace 
reliance by imposing still more hurdles as a condition of reaching 
opportunities outside their neighborhoods.112 
Not surprisingly, the federal government is better equipped and 
more responsible for internalizing the costs of cross-border 
employment searches.113 
* * * 
The social contract implicit in PRWORA creates a new bargain: 
transitional assistance by the government in exchange for 
endeavoring to find work on the part of recipients.114  Thus, for those 
seeking work, there should be a credible belief that jobs exist—or 
else the guarantor should not expect or demand work when and 
where jobs are unavailable.  For instance, America’s governors—chief 
proponents of devolved welfare reform—have been at loggerheads 
with the Bush administration’s call for more stringent work 
requirements.  President Bush has recently proposed mandating that 
seventy percent of a state’s welfare population engage in at least thirty 
hours of work (or work-related activities) per week.  The original goal 
set by PRWORA required only a fifty percent work-participation rate 
by 2002.115  The states, justifiably, have argued that they cannot create 
the necessary number of jobs required to place the recipients in 
work.116  Thus, here is an instance when the goals of federal welfare 
 
individual recipients, but it also complicates considerably efforts to coordinate tasks 
among the counties.  See id. 
112 Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1576-77 (footnotes omitted). 
113 Judith Evans, HUD Grants to Pay For City-to-Suburbs Work Transportation, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 27, 1996, at A23 (describing the imperative for HUD to intervene to 
internalize these costs by offering pilot grants providing vouchers for welfare 
recipients in the inner-cities to seek employment opportunities in the suburbs). 
114 This point has been referenced throughout the Article.  See supra Part II; see 
also, e.g., Cimini, supra note 10, at 266-68. 
115 See Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Republicans Rally Behind Welfare Proposals That 
States Oppose, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at A29. 
116 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 66; Robert Pear, Governors Want Congress To Ease 
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policy may not be able to be met by the state and municipal 
administrators. 
Having control over certain aspects of welfare reform policy (the 
supply side of labor), but not others (such as demand for labor), state 
and county welfare officers may, in turn, be devoting too many 
resources to job training (because states and counties can offer 
training sessions), when in fact those funds should be going toward 
economic development projects on a larger scale.117  Consider, as a 
representative example, Milwaukee County, where welfare recipients 
are repeatedly told there are no impediments to work.  There are no 
child-care impediments, no training impediments, no transportation 
impediments.  Nothing should stand in the way of work.118  Yet 
Milwaukee County cannot ensure the aggregate creation of new 
jobs—especially in a region of the country relatively hard-hit by the 
federal government’s economic trade liberalization policies.119 
This mismatch between federal policy and state administration is 
not simply a design flaw in the legislation, but rather a larger, 
structural axiom in federal-state relations.120  Part of the ethos of 
 
Welfare Work Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at A27; Robert Pear, Study by Governors 
Calls Bush Welfare Plan Unworkable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at A18. 
117 See The Muddled Maths of Welfare-to-Work, ECONOMIST (U.S. Ed.), Mar. 8, 1997, 
at 25 (noting that considerable economic growth would have to take place on a 
national level to generate sufficient labor demand to absorb America’s welfare 
recipients). 
118 NewsHour: The State of Workfare (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 2, 1997) 
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/welfare/july-
dec97/workfare_9-2.html) (describing Milwaukee County welfare recipients as being 
told there are no impediments to work because job-training, transportation, and 
child care is being subsidized by the state and county) [hereinafter NewsHour]; see 
also Sharon Dietrich et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform: Our 
Policymakers Must Face the Reality that Failures of Employment Law Policies Are a Major 
Reason for Welfare Dependency, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 53-55 (1998) (recognizing 
that significant barriers to work need to be overcome to achieve the objectives of 
PRWORA). 
119 See, e.g., David E. Bonior, Editorial, I Told You So, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997, at 
D17 (decrying the economic trade liberalization policies of the 1990s as harming 
American jobs and workers); John Holusha, Squeezing the Textile Workers: Trade and 
Technology Force a New Wave of Job Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, at D1 
(characterizing the job-loss effects associated with lowering international trade 
barriers); James Sterngold, NAFTA Trade-Off: Some Jobs Lost, Others Gained, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 1995, at A1 (describing the regional differences in terms of the impact felt 
from greater economic liberalization); see also Adam Nagourney, Democrats Largely 
Endorse Labor’s Views, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2003, at A14 (describing the 2004 
Democratic presidential candidates’ support for restrictions on free trade policies); 
Editorial, Trading Memories, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2003, at A28 (describing Democratic 
presidential candidates backing away from their earlier support for free trade and 
NAFTA). 
120 See Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE 
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welfare reform is to raise expectations among welfare recipients that 
work is indeed attainable and that, ultimately, those on assistance will 
be integrated into the national economy.121  While states can secure 
job training and provide child care, they are comparatively ill-
equipped to create new jobs.122  The fact that the economy has been 
so strong and the labor market so tight during the first four or five 
years of welfare reform has taken pressure off of states to do the 
heavy lifting.123  Yet as the economy has cooled considerably, states 
have again been required to bear the burden of responsibility—and 
their current array of workfare tools may be insufficient to meet the 
task at hand.124 
Finally, it bears mentioning that states can simply disagree with 
federal aims—and frustrate them.  Sovereign states are not just 
administrative branch offices,125 and states have a good deal of ability 
to undermine aims, or selectively enforce federal imperatives.  A state 
that finds some federal mandates unwise or unproductive can work 
 
REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY 111, 116-18 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984) 
(describing how one cannot necessarily expect states generally to be entirely 
desirous, or even capable, of effectuating the substantive and rhetorical goals of 
federal policy). 
121 See Robert Pear, Most States Meet Work Requirement of Welfare Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
30, 1998, at A1; Katharine Q. Seelye, Recipients of Welfare Are Fewest Since 1969, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 11, 1999, at A22; Michael M. Weinstein, Welfare to Work Partnerships: Promises that 
Might Be Kept, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 26, 1998, at C1; NewsHour, supra note 118. 
122 New York City’s and New York State’s recent request for billions in aid to 
redevelop lower Manhattan and revitalize the regional economy is, fortunately, an 
extreme example, but illustrates the limited taxing and bond-raising power of local 
government relative to the federal government, with its huge revenue intakes, ability 
to raise money, and its ability to spread costs and benefits over a much greater and 
more diverse population and geography.  See James C. McKinley Jr., Pataki Defends 
$54 Billon Aid Request, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at D5; see generally Robert Pear, 
Governors Get Sympathy from Bush but No More Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at A22 
(describing states’ frustration at their inability to stimulate their economies without 
federal assistance). 
123 See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Uncertainties Loom As New Yorkers Hit Welfare Time 
Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A1 (describing how the booming economy of the 
late 1990s was central in easing the transition from welfare to work). 
124 See Stephanie Flanders, Influential Connecticut Welfare Plan Is Tested in Hard 
Times, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at B1 (suggesting that since the economy was so 
strong during the initial years of TANF, the real work of welfare reform only has 
begun); William Julius Wilson & Andrew J. Cherlin, Editorial, The Real Test of Welfare 
Reform Still Lies Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at A21 (describing the work of state 
welfare agencies that lies ahead); see also supra note 107. 
125 See Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (recognizing the 
sovereign identities of state legislatures that impeded any effort by Congress to make 
them functionaries of the federal government). 
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around them.  If a state objects, for example, to requirements that 
single, teenage mothers must live with their parents to be eligible for 
welfare, state administrators may simply choose not to ask questions 
pertaining to that matter.  Or, on the other hand, they could 
completely impoverish welfare programs by failing to provide any 
affirmative assistance in the form of training and educational 
opportunities.126  States can simply raise eligibility standards and end 
dependency by minimizing services.  These disparate realities are 
institutional incidents of state sovereignty. 
2. Managerial Harms 
In this Subsection, I locate three related sets of managerial, or 
bureaucratic harms, which stem from a mismatch between federal 
and state incentives.  First, there is the potential for prisoners’ 
dilemmas: States race-to-the-bottom to provide minimal welfare 
benefits to discourage would-be new residents from entering as well 
as to encourage current residents to seek greener pastures elsewhere.  
This practice leads to a reduction of  overall benefits presumably 
below that envisioned by the federal government, if only because the 
level of generosity by a given state has to be objectively low in order to 
create credible disincentives for recipients to remain in residence.  
Thus, unlike the federal government, states may try to displace the 
poor to other states—so they can lower their administrative costs and 
dispense with their welfare obligations, without actually reducing 
dependency in America.127 
Second, states have a political and economic incentive to 
reallocate federal welfare funding to other public projects.  They may 
use their legally granted discretion to free up federal dollars 
ostensibly earmarked for welfare provisions to support more popular 
projects.128  This prioritization of other state interests indicates a 
 
126 See Joshua Green, Holding Out, in MAKING WORK PAY 38, 38-39 (Robert Kuttner 
ed., 2002) (describing Idaho as having spent only twenty percent of its total federal 
allocation for welfare programs and provisions); Karen Czapanskiy, Editorial, Welfare 
on the Cheap, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1999, at B8 (describing Maryland’s re-allocation of 
federal welfare moneys into the general state coffers); see also infra note 151 and 
accompanying text. 
127 See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1562-63. 
128 Professor Cashin is especially attuned to this phenomenon.  She speaks to a 
particularly fiercely pitched battle between the lower classes and the middle class 
fought in state capitals across the nation.  See Cashin, supra note 3, at 562. Moreover, 
[g]iven the competition engendered by the [welfare reform a]ct 
between welfare recipients and middle income voters, and the 
conflictual nature of redistributive politics, there are considerable risks 
to the poor of submitting such broad discretion to state majoritarian 
politics. . . .  [S]tate governors and legislatures will be hard-pressed to 
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shrinking of public responsibilities and commitments to the poor.  
Thus, this “Us versus Them” (when it is, say, New York versus 
Connecticut) prisoners’ dilemma paradigm is only one aspect of the 
dislocation of the concern for the poor.  There is also the “Us versus 
Them” (when we are the middle class, and they are the poor) that 
makes it financially attractive to under-provide for the poor.129 
Third, states may take advantage of the federal work 
requirements and create workfare projects that help serve state 
interests, but do little to facilitate the actual transition from welfare to 
work. 
 a.  Diversion to Other States 
I begin by discussing the prisoners’ dilemma scenario.130  Moving 
a family from Wisconsin to Minnesota is easier than moving an 
American family to Canada.  America, conceived of as a singular 
community, cannot fully evade its commitment to the poor that 
discrete communities and regions within the United States could 
readily shirk.  The federal government, by design, internalizes all of 
these concerns—and blame.  A state, in contrast, can (and often 
does) let others do the heavy lifting.131 
 
resist the full rigors of state budgetary and cultural politics. 
Id. at 564-65. 
Cashin takes the strong view that states are inherently more likely to exploit 
lower-class Americans than the federal government, especially if there is a racial 
dimension added to the mix.  Id. at 568.  Lacking overwhelming empirical support 
for that assertion, I personally adopt a weaker version of the Cashin thesis and simply 
recognize that states, like any other political body given too much discretion and 
lacking real oversight, spend unearmarked money in ways that will most support 
their respective political agendas.  Often, generosity to the poor does not make the 
short list. 
129 For an appreciation of the latter dynamic at the state level, see id. at 554-57.  
Recently, a Mississippi director of social services affirmed the existence of this latter, 
inter-class tension when he said his responsibilities are to the Mississippi taxpayers, 
not just those on the dole.  Governor Fordice appointed Colonel Don Taylor, who 
said his “clients” were the “taxpayers he was dedicated to protecting from those who 
were attempting to exploit them and their hard earned money.”  See David. A. Breaux 
et al., To Privatization and Back: Welfare Reform Implementation in Mississippi, in 
MANAGING WELFARE REFORM IN FIVE STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVOLUTION 43, 51 
(Sarah F. Liebschutz ed., 2000). 
130 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Jonathan 
Bender, In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
531 (1987). 
131 See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Rogue State: The Case Against Delaware, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Aug. 19, 2002, at 20 (describing the “selfish” me-first policies of Delaware, which 
enrich its citizens by imposing an array of financial burdens on non-residents).  
Economist and columnist Paul Krugman describes recent short-sighted, selfish 
political decisions by states that have caused economic troubles.  Only the backing of 
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Conceptually, states try to farm their problems out, in the 
classical free-rider, prisoners’ dilemma way.132  Professors Mashaw and 
Rose-Ackerman highlight the problems with the states acting in lieu 
of the federal government when externalities are present.  They 
argue: “when interjurisdictional externalities or prisoner’s dilemmas 
[such as the welfare magnet effect] are present, the possibly greater 
administrative capacity of low-level governments must be balanced 
against the danger that the federal purpose may be undermined if 
too much authority is delegated.”133  Their discussion of regulatory 
policy maps neatly onto the present inquiry. Devolution creates the 
very real threat of the “welfare magnet.”134  No state, anxious to 
reduce its welfare rolls, wants to attract citizens of other states to 
establish residency in order to take advantage of more generous 
welfare packages; thus, there is a virtual race-to-the-bottom,135 with 
each state and municipality low-balling one another so as to seem less 
attractive both to poor people looking to relocate to the place with 
the best welfare package and to its own impoverished.136  Though this 
 
the U.S. government, to smooth over those bumps, prevents, in Krugman’s words, 
Tennessee from looking like Argentina.  See Paul Krugman, Editorial, Our Banana 
Republics, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at A19. 
132 Professors Mashaw and Rose-Ackerman describe states as competing against 
each other to entice businesses by offering lower levels of taxes and environmental 
regulations.  See Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 120, at 117.  Judge (then 
Professor) Michael McConnell signals out the race-to-the-bottom incentives in 
federalized welfare policy as “the most important example” of the downsides to 
interstate competition, which he otherwise endorses as promoting innovation.  He 
argues: 
In most cases, immigration of investment and of middle-to-upper 
income persons is perceived as desirable, while immigration of persons 
dependent on public assistance is viewed as a drain on a community’s 
finances.  Yet generous welfare benefits paid by higher taxes will lead 
the rich to leave and the poor to come.  This creates an incentive, 
other things being equal, against redistributive policies.  Indeed, it can 
be shown that the level of redistribution in a decentralized system is 
likely to be lower even if there is virtually unanimous agreement among 
the citizens that higher levels would be desirable.  Where redistribution 
is the objective, therefore, advocates should and do press for federal 
programs, or at least for minimum federal standards. 
McConnell, supra note 35, at 1499-1500 (footnotes omitted). 
133 Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 120, at 118. 
134 See PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR 
NATIONAL STANDARDS 47-49 (1990); Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 37, at 757. 
135 See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 6-8 (1972) (describing the 
competition among states that leads to a lower overall provision of social welfare 
services); PETERSON, supra note 8 (describing race-to-the-bottom potentialities). 
136 There are notable cases in which states have tried to dissuade newcomers 
from receiving what they perceived to be generous benefits.  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U.S. 489 (1999) (characterizing a state as trying to limit benefits to newcomers under 
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race-to-the-bottom mentality may seem to comport with the general 
spirit of getting tough on dependency, it quite possibly could lead to 
more excessive and short-sighted cutbacks than Congress 
contemplated. 
Moreover, not only do states signal they do not want new 
entrants, but they also encourage the departure of those on their 
rolls.  At the extreme, some public welfare offices have boldly 
advertised their willingness to buy recipients “one-way tickets” out-of-
town.  For example, in Tulare County, California, the county welfare 
agency has paid more than 750 welfare-receiving families an average 
of $1600, essentially just to leave the state.137  And, as of 2001, 
Kentucky has paid $1.5 million in moving expenses to 2000 families 
to leave the state; the state pays for a moving truck and/or the cost of 
one month’s rent in the new locale.138 
 b.  Shifting Resources from Welfare to General Coffers 
Second, the opportunity to implement welfare reform gives 
 
PRWORA); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (describing a state’s efforts to 
deter out-of-state poor people from moving in by requiring a full year of residency 
before authorizing their eligiblity for welfare).  But see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism 
and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001) 
(offering empirical and conceptual counterarguments to the proposition that states 
inevitably look to free-ride and slack). 
Indeed, there is a growing body of empirical research that seeks to downplay this 
race-to-the-bottom concern.  Studies have shown that most welfare recipients do not 
relocate across state lines to reap the marginal benefits from more generous welfare 
assistance in another state.  See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare 
Magnets: The Race to the Top, 5 S. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (1997); Phillip B. Levine & David 
Zimmerman, An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY 20-33 
(Institute for Research on Poverty, Univ. of Wis.-Madison Discussion Paper No. 1098-
96, 1996); see also Shauhin A. Talush, Note, Welfare Migration To Capture Higher 
Benefits: Fact or Fiction?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 675, 696-97 (2000).  But this revised 
appreciation of the strength of the race-to-the-bottom may not influence 
decisionmakers, who may cling to their beliefs that welfare magnets still exist.  See, 
e.g., Jason DeParle, What About Mississippi?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at A1 
(describing Mississippi’s desire to lower services so as not to attract welfare seekers 
from neighboring states); Judith Havemann, District Could Become Welfare Oasis as 
Neighbors’ Benefits Dry Up, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1996, at A13 (describing worries that 
Washington, D.C. will turn “itself into the welfare magnet of the mid-Atlantic” and 
citing general concerns of races-to-the-bottom across the country); Robert Pear, Judge 
Rules States Can’t Cut Welfare for New Residents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at A1 
(describing Pennsylvania’s attempt to provide lower levels of assistance to new 
residents as grounded in the state’s desire not to become a welfare magnet). 
137 Evelyn Nieves, A Fertile Farm Region Pays Its Jobless To Quit California, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 2001, at A1; see also Havemann & Vobjeda, supra note 71 (citing the 
fear of states reducing their rolls by exporting their poor). 
138 See Roger Alford, State Programs Pay To Relocate Job Seekers on Welfare, WASH. 
POST, July 1, 2001, at A10. 
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states the discretion to shift funds to alternative programs, possibly 
altogether unrelated to the provision of social welfare services.  In 
1998, Wisconsin spent $98 million less than it was given that year by 
the federal government.  It kept the money and dispersed it around 
the state for, inter alia, drug-treatment programs, education, and tax 
relief.139  Other states have decided to keep that unspent federal 
money in savings for a rainy day.140 
For a variety of reasons, only one of which is cost-savings, states 
notoriously engage in tactics known as diversion.141  They try to 
discourage would-be welfare recipients from obtaining assistance by 
making it difficult to schedule appointments; thus fewer would-be 
recipients actually have the tenacity (and resources) to follow 
through and successfully enroll.142  As they return to the pre-Goldberg 
world without federal entitlements, states possess greater discretion in 
decisionmaking and can easily reject an individual applying for 
benefits, or effectively make it nearly impossible for that individual to 
maintain her eligibility.143  For example, states can deny benefits to 
those who arrive at the welfare office after 11 a.m.,144 conduct invasive 
home visits,145 move their offices beyond the reach of public 
 
139 Thomas Kaplan, Wisconsin Works, in MANAGING WELFARE REFORM IN FIVE 
STATES 103, 108 (Sarah F. Liebshutz ed., 2000). 
140 Robert Pear, States Declining to Draw Billions in Welfare Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
8, 1999, at A1 (“States see the [windfall] money as a reserve for future economic 
downturns.”). 
141 Kennedy, supra note 1, at 249-50; see Rebecca Gordon, Cruel and Usual: How 
Welfare “Reform” Punishes Poor People 26 (2001), available at 
http://www.arc.org/downloads/arc010201.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003); Super, 
supra note 77. 
142 Diversionary tactics are widespread.  See, e.g., Breaux, supra note 129, at 43 
(describing the stages of eligibility and casework interviews built into the system); 
DeParle, supra note 78 (describing diversionary practices in New York); Peter 
Edelman, Editorial, Making Welfare Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1997, at A27 (describing 
diversion tactics). 
143 See Cimini, supra note 10, at 250. 
144 See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, New York City Admits Turning Away Poor, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 1999, at B3. 
145 PRWORA relaxed many of cash-based welfare’s legal-procedural 
requirements and thus created new opportunities for state and county welfare 
agencies not only to reduce benefits to deter welfare seekers, but also to become 
more broadly intrusive in the lives of the poor.  Punitive welfare policing has been 
reported, among other places, in the State of Utah.  There, intrusive home visits 
revealed egregious examples of arbitrary discretionary power.  During an 
unannounced home visit, a welfare agent removed children from one home because 
she caught the family in the middle of piling up their clothes for the mother to take 
to the laundromat.  Her report indicated that there was a pile of dirty clothes beside 
the front door.  Another woman, who had left a violent domestic situation, was 
similarly sanctioned for “permitting her children to watch her get beat up.”  Gordon, 
supra note 141.  This broad, unprincipled discretion seems beyond the 
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transportation,146 use disabled children’s SSI payments as proof that 
the family is not poor,147 or require weeks of job searches before 
allowing individuals to apply for welfare.148  In this environment, 
welfare is intended to be understood as a last resort.  This situation 
may work to motivate individuals to wake up early, secure day care, 
perhaps marry, and otherwise remain diligent with job searches.  But 
it also represents the danger of diversion qua moneymaking—a 
windfall for states. 
Of course, diversion, as suggested above, comports moderately 
well with congressional intent; but states may take it too far.149  There 
is a high—possibly exceedingly high—state interest in diversion 
because states may want to reallocate the resources they save on 
welfare to other projects.  While the financial incentive to divert 
would-be clients is built into the system, there are many cases in 
which diversion takes on an overwhelming passion, which may not 
reflect, again, the intent of the federal government.150 
Diversion, from an idealized federal perspective, is a stick to 
encourage those most able to go to work—freeing up money to invest 
 
contemplation of many of those in Congress supporting tougher work requirements. 
146 See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 290 (describing the practice of relocating 
welfare offices further from public transportation routes); see also Barbara 
Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor into Gold: How Corporations Seek To Profit from Welfare 
Reform, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 1997, at 44. 
147 See Michael Janofsky, West Virginia Pares Welfare, But Poor Remain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 1999, at A20. 
148 See Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, States’ Welfare Shift: Stop It Before It 
Starts, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1998, at A1 (describing Florida’s policy).  In Missouri, 
the application process required candidates for TANF to contact ten prospective 
employers each week for four weeks.  Only then, if unsuccessful in securing 
employment, an applicant may be deemed eligible. Id. 
149 See, e.g., Editorial, Deflecting Welfare Applicants, WASH POST, Aug. 17, 1998, at 
A17 (“The question is whether the deflections are a good thing or bad.  They’re 
good if the families being turned away were really not that needy, bad if the 
genuinely needy are being denied.  The answer, which seems likely to blur and 
plague evaluations of welfare ‘reform’ generally in the years ahead, is that no one 
knows.  The families turned away aren’t generally tracked.  Some doubtless do all 
right; that has to be particularly true in an economy that continues to expand.  
Others don’t but, at least in the short run, disappear from official view.”); see also 
Super, supra note 77. 
150 It might be counterintuitive for transitional assistance not to be continued for 
those who are completing their educational training.  See Karen Houppert, You’re Not 
Entitled!: Welfare Reform is Leading to Government Lawlessness, NATION, Oct. 25, 1999, at 
11 (describing egregious examples of state diversion tactics and asserting that 
“whether out of willful disregard or real misunderstanding, states are failing to fulfill 
their . . . obligations to the poor”).  Yet refusing to offer waivers from work for 
college students allows states to save money in the short term, even though it comes 
at the cost of losing future, highly skilled labor participants who now may have to 
quit school and find jobs immediately.  See infra notes 164-66. 
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in those harder-to-move cases.  Yet the fact that there are insufficient 
requirements to ensure welfare grant money is spent on moving 
individuals into work opportunities suggests diversion may be used by 
some states, for instance, to help improve highways and stem beach 
erosion.151 
 c.  Putting Recipients to Work—for States 
Sometimes, states use federal mandates for self-serving ends, 
such as to create a workfare system that helps the states themselves, 
but does little to facilitate the transition to actual work.  Typically of 
course, states and cities create public sector workfare jobs in order to 
give those outside of the labor market work experience (since the 
market demand for low-skilled labor is not sufficient to absorb the 
numbers required all at once).152  Abstractly, these workfare programs 
reflect the best traditions of the New Deal’s WPA (Works Progress 
Administration) and CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps) that instilled 
in participants a sense of self-worth and an attachment to the labor 
force in troubling times.153  Similarly, modern workfare’s intended 
 
151 For a recent example of states violating the spirit of congressional funding 
allocations by diverting resources away from their intended destination, see, for 
example, Joshua Green, The Welfare Shell Game, in MAKING WORK PAY 46, 46-47 
(Robert Kuttner ed., 2002), describing Texas’s aim to substitute federal funds for 
states’ funds and thus “launder[] federal welfare dollars to finance more politically 
popular programs,” and Robert Pear, A Study Finds Children’s Aid Goes to Adults, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, at A1.  See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE 
REFORM: CHALLENGES IN MAINTAINING A FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL PARTNERSHIP (GAO-01-
828 Aug. 10, 2001); Sewell Chan, D.C. Welfare Funds To Go To Children; Critics Say $12 
Million Shift Irresponsible, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2000, at B1 (describing the re-
allocation of TANF funds to less specifically targeted children’s programs); Jim 
McLean & Chris Grenz, Use of Welfare Grant Debated, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Aug. 30, 2000, 
at A7 (characterizing Kansas’s re-direction of nearly half its TANF money to foster 
care programs); supra note 126. 
152 See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 17; Alan Finder, Welfare Clients Outnumber Jobs 
They Might Fill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at A1; Mickey Kaus, Editorial, Welfare Reform 
Made Difficult; President Clinton and Congress Can’t Possibly Reduce Dependency Without 
Funding Public Jobs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 5, 1995, at A9. 
153 See, e.g., Editorial, Pact Keeps Workfare on Right Track, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 
11, 1997, at 22 (referring to WEP as the “most successful welfare-to-work program in 
the nation”); Editorial, Job Link to Welfare Reform, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 1996, at 46 
(referring to the great success in transforming welfare recipients into workers). 
For discussions of those New Deal programs mentioned in the text, see 
PATTERSON, supra note 21.  The Civilian Conservation Corps employed young men in 
a variety of forestry and conservation projects. Id. at 57.  The Works Progress 
Administration employed manual and professional labor in a host of government 
projects.  Id. at 63.  These programs conserved the human spirit by allowing family 
heads to “earn” their relief.  Id. at 59 (citing New Dealer Harry Hopkins as saying 
“Give a man a dole, and you save his body and destroy his spirit.  Give him a job and 
pay him an assured wage and you save both the body and the spirit”). 
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purpose is to create an ethos of work and to acculturate individuals 
into mainstream society.154 
Yet there is a more problematic side to welfare-to-work, and I will 
rely on New York City’s Work Experience Program (WEP) in the late 
1990s and early years of this decade as a case study.  My purpose here 
is not to levy any global criticism so much as it is to indicate ways in 
which even cosmopolitan local governments might distort welfare 
policy to suit their own needs.  Welfare-to-work programs may, in 
such circumstances, re-create the rigid class boundaries that have 
always existed between the working class and non-working poor. 
The City of New York employs many municipal workers who are 
unionized, decently compensated civil servants.  It also “employs” 
workfare participants, many of whom work side-by-side these civil 
servants, doing the same job without the benefits, job security, union 
protection, or a living wage.155  Despite the occupational similarities 
between some civil service and workfare jobs, there is surprisingly 
little upward mobility from workfare to regular civil service jobs; this 
immobility widens not only the economic gap, but also the 
psychological and sociological gaps between “real” workers and WEP 
workers that make it difficult for the latter to make the transition to 
gainful employment.156 
Indeed, this dual-class system of labor, this reification of class 
within the workfare system, runs counter to the goals and ideals of 
moving people from welfare to work.157  Stigmatizing workfare 
participants, by denying them protective equipment and uniforms, 
health coverage, and economic security, signals a failure on the part 
 
154 Former Wisconsin and New York City welfare administrator Jason Turner 
considers workfare to be better than any other training program.  He has stated: 
“[t]he best preparation for work is working.”  And, when asked about those who 
cannot speak English, he responded: “The best way to learn English is to interact 
with English-speaking people in the workplace.”  DeParle, supra note 78. 
155 Havemann, supra note 61; see also Matthew Diller, The Social Message of the New 
Workfare: Work Programs Are Deliberately Structured so that They Are Virtually Never 
Comparable to Holding an Actual Job, 9 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 19 (1998); Mary J. 
O’Connell, Municipal Labor Perspectives on the Public Sector Welfare Workforce in New York 
City, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 805, 805-06 (1999). 
156 See David L. Gregory, Br(e)aking the Exploitation of Labor?: Tensions Regarding the 
Welfare Workforce, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1997); Nina Bernstein, City Fires 35,000 
Former Welfare Recipients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2002, at B3. 
157 Havemann, supra note 61 (“If welfare recipients are doing the work for the 
city . . . shouldn’t they be able to work their way onto the city payroll and receive 
employee benefits and protections like any other municipal worker?”).  For a broad 
philosophical critique of New York’s WEP program, see Anthony Bertelli, 
Impoverished Liberalism: Does the New York Workfare Program Violate Human Rights?, 5 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175 (1999). 
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of government to take seriously its charge of promoting welfare to 
work.158  The WEP worker’s hourly wage is below the federal 
minimum and, alone, will not permit her family to climb out of 
poverty.159  To stigmatize workers who are poor, but who work, seems 
antithetical to the spirit of the program designed to link work with 
dignity, self-respect, and improvement.160  To do so for the purposes, 
perhaps, of reducing the city payroll and appeasing the public sector 
unions contravenes the spirit of welfare reform.161  Hence, here an 
incentive-based, managerial harm produces civic-citizenship harms as 
well.  It is demoralizing to create this second (or third?) class of 
worker-citizens, who are not afforded basic respect at the workplace 
and are forced to accept substandard equipment and facilities. 
Nothing dramatizes this antithetical vision of workfare as welfare 
reform more than New York City’s early policy on welfare recipients 
who attended college.  Prior to PRWORA, only three states did not 
allow welfare recipients to satisfy their work requirements through 
 
158 See Mark Greenberg, Bush’s Blunder, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 2002, at A2 
(describing New York City’s workfare program as an initiative that displaces other 
workers, “requires people to work without the dignity of a paycheck or the rights of 
other workers,” and that has been shown to be largely ineffective in transitioning 
welfare recipients into unsubsidized employment).  I have attempted to avoid 
discussing the more sensational tidbits about New York City workfare.  See, e.g., Tara 
George, Workfare Blamed for Heart Death, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), June 25, 1997, at 1 
(describing the conditions under which an older woman with a known heart 
condition was sent out to a manual labor, outdoor work assignment); Jessica 
Graham, Workfare Women Rip Harassment, N.Y. POST, Oct. 1, 1999, at 24 (describing a 
number of sexual harassment instances by supervisors that have gone unpunished). 
159 A WEP worker gets “none of the perks . . . of her unionized colleagues.  She 
doesn’t get sick leave or vacations . . . and she doesn’t have automatic access to the 
federal labor, civil rights, disability and sexual harassment protections of other 
workers.”  Havemann, supra note 61. 
160 See Annette Fuentes, Slaves of New York, IN THESE TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at 14 
(describing the caste hierarchy among public laborers).  Fuentes describes WEP in 
the following way: 
WEP creates a pool of contingent workers, doing the same work as city 
employees and often working shoulder to shoulder with them, but for a 
fraction of their pay.  With no sick leave, no vacations, no pensions or 
other benefits, WEP workers are a constant and not-so-subtle threat by 
management to workplace standards. . . .  For example, WEP workers 
doing street cleaning get no gloves or uniforms or footwear, and have 
no locker facilities to change clothing so they must go home wearing 
whatever filth the day brings.  In the parks, WEP workers are forced to 
climb higher than union contracts allow in pruning trees. . . .  At the 
sanitation depot in Brooklyn where they meet before being driven by 
van to work sites, union workers wrote on the bathroom door, “No 
WEP workers.” 
Id. 
161 See id.; Havemann, supra note 61; Editorial, Welfare, Workfare and Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at A32. 
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post-secondary education.162  After passage, more than half the states 
refused to count college education as work participation.163  New York 
City, for example, did not give “work experience credit” to those 
public assistance recipients attending college.  Twenty-one thousand 
students from the City University of New York alone had to withdraw 
from classes in the wake of welfare reform because the terms of 
welfare required them to pick up trash in the city streets and parks 
for up to thirty hours a week.  The WEP program’s insistence on 
manual labor, even for these college students, is economically 
shortsighted.164  Research has shown that within two years of getting 
into college, seventy-five percent of those students receiving public 
assistance during their schooling move off welfare; and, eighty-seven 
percent of women on welfare who then earn a college degree move 
into jobs that pay a living wage—and never to return to the welfare 
rolls.165  This myopic policy decision not to excuse these students from 
work assignments illustrates how local agents can distort the message 
of independence and self-sufficiency.166 
 
162 See Andrew S. Gruber, Comment, Promoting Long-Term Self-Sufficiency for Welfare 
Recipients: Post-Secondary Education and the Welfare Work Requirement, 93 NW. L. REV. 
247, 256 (1998). 
163 See id. 
164 See, e.g., Karen W. Arenson, Workfare Rules Cause Enrollment to Fall, CUNY Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1996, at A1; David Firestone, Mayor Defends Workfare for Students, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at B3. 
165 Applied Research Center, Worthwhile Welfare Reforms 1 (Feb. 2001), available at 
http://www.arc.org/downloads/worthwhilepolicies.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003); 
see also Gruber, supra note 162, at 275-76, 281-83 (describing the increased likelihood 
of success and self-sufficiency as a result of post-secondary education).  Other studies 
have shown that “postsecondary education increases wages enough to radically 
decrease the need for families to rely on welfare.”  Indeed, women who finish high 
school or pursue post-secondary education are much less likely to return to the 
welfare rolls.  See Rebekah J. Smith et al., The Miseducation of Welfare Reform: Denying 
the Promise of Postsecondary Education, 55 ME. L. REV. 211, 220-22 (2003). 
Of note, the New York State Legislature modified its policy and allowed students 
to count college internships or work-study toward their TANF work requirements.  
See Raymond Hernandez, Legislature Passes Bill Letting Internships Count Toward 
Workfare, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at B9. 
166 In fairness, President Bush recently decried a bill originating in the Senate 
that would allow a certain number of welfare recipients to remain enrolled in 
college, exempt from work requirements.  President Bush said: “Some welfare 
recipients . . . could spend five years going to college, not holding a job.  Now that’s 
not my view of helping people become independent.”  Thus, states and cities are not 
alone in believing education is an unacceptable substitute for work. See Elisabeth 
Bumiller, Bush Criticizes Senate’s Version of Welfare Bill as Harmful, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 
2002, at A14. 
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3. Civic Harms 
Though not a major problem given the political legitimacy and 
responsiveness of state government vis-à-vis the federal government, I 
do pause here to flag one civic concern: the legacy of oppression and 
discrimination that particular minority communities associate with 
their state governments has not yet, unfortunately, been relegated to 
the annals of ancient history.  Not only do segregationist policies, 
denial of the franchise, and ruthless state-sponsored violence come to 
mind for many poor black southerners when they think about their 
relationship to the state government; they may also have salient 
memories of King v. Smith types of intrusive, humiliating home visits 
related directly to welfare administration.167  In light of PRWORA’s 
abandonment of federal welfare entitlements, the oppressive and 
discriminatory policies and attitudes of the 1950s and 1960s, which 
had been reined in by the federal protections afforded by way of 
Goldberg and King, may potentially be revived. 
Indeed, institutional racism at the state and local level is 
alarmingly enduring.  Professor Cashin, for one, devotes considerable 
attention to how states profoundly discriminate against their African-
American welfare populations.168  And another, Professor Susan 
Gooden, presents a particularly salient case study of Virginia welfare 
services.  In her study, she documents and contrasts state 
administrators’ disparaging and ungenerous treatment of black 
welfare recipients with their treatment of similarly situated white 
clients who were always given first notice of new jobs, offered the 
“newest” work clothes, and given access to automobiles.169 
Understanding discrimination is not just an academic exercise, 
but also a visceral part of the welfare experience.  The civic harms 
associated with returning power to the states cannot be disregarded 
as historically contingent.  Such harms persist today. 
4. Summary 
In the above discussions, I traced a few important ways that states 
 
167 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (describing the practice of 
caseworkers’ midnight “raid” inspections aimed at ascertaining whether any 
employable men were residing in the home of welfare recipients). 
168 Indeed, Professor Cashin makes this concern a focal point of her critique of 
PRWORA.  Her analysis of systematic discrimination by state governments leads her 
to conclude that state-administered welfare policy is quite threatening to already 
highly disadvantaged, minority communities.  See Cashin, supra note 3. 
169 See Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal: Differences in Caseworker 
Support Toward Black and White Welfare Clients, 4  HARV. J. OF AFR. AM. PUB. POL’Y 23 
(1998). 
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can—and (both deliberately and unwittingly) have—threatened to 
undermine a true model of welfare reform.  Specifically, because of 
the limitations of state governments to effectuate macroeconomic 
growth, it may be difficult for states to design policies to achieve 
federal goals.  Moreover, the scope of state power aside, states may 
lack the incentives to comply fully with the federal directive.  There 
may be reasons to let other states bear a disproportionate burden in 
terms of servicing the American welfare population, there may be 
opportunities to use welfare reform to achieve alternative state 
objectives (possibly completely outside of the social welfare context), 
and there may be a general reluctance to take ownership over the 
problems of dependency.  In all, the current legal model of 
devolution allows states to reshape welfare policy in ways that may 
depart considerably from Congress’s substantive objectives. 
IV. ONE STEP FURTHER I: 
STATE EXPERIMENTATION WITH FOR-PROFIT CORPORATE 
CONTRACTORS 
The attenuation of the line connecting federal objectives to state 
policy initiatives described in Section III.B merits concern.  But our 
discussion of the federal-state mismatch reveals only the tip of the 
iceberg.  Once we recognize that states, themselves, can and have 
turned around and sub-devolved and privatized welfare design and 
implementation, our concerns about maintaining fidelity to federal 
objectives should mature into full-blown fears.  In enacting PRWORA, 
Congress lifted the prohibition against wholesale privatization, which 
had existed under AFDC.170  But, as I have suggested earlier, there was 
no preternatural link between privatization and the actual substantive 
agenda of welfare reform; the narratives may have followed common 
trajectories, i.e., two sides of the anti-big government coin, but they 
did not necessarily speak to one another.  Whether specific welfare 
goals would be distorted by privatization was, most likely, an ancillary 
consideration of those whose primary agenda was reducing the size 
and scope of the government while enlarging that of the private 
sector.171 
PRWORA gave for-profit corporations unparalleled and 
previously uncontemplated opportunities to participate in social 
service programs.172  Prior to 1996, for-profit entities had been 
 
170 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
171 See Havemann & Vobjeda, supra note 71. 
172 Of course, opportunities were also extended to private non-profits.  I choose 
not to devote an entire section to non-profits because all of their traits, both positive 
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involved in social service provision; but that provision had been 
largely confined to information management and data processing.173  
Notably, for instance, the early success of Ross Perot’s Electronic Data 
Systems in the 1960s came by way of designing and implementing the 
computer networking programs for the State of Texas’s Medicaid 
system.174  Private corporations, however, had not been allowed to bid 
to administer interpersonal, policymaking aspects of welfare, such as 
eligibility determination and case management.175  Then, PRWORA 
opened the proverbial floodgates.176  As Professor Bezdek notes: “for 
the first time the Act authorizes states to employ private entities to 
conduct intake and make eligibility determinations—traditional gate-
 
and deleterious, are exemplified by way of my discussions of state actors, private 
corporate actors, and private sectarian actors. 
173 See Gilman, supra note 40, at 591. 
174 Bill Berkowitz, Prospecting Among the Poor: Welfare Privatization 4 (2001), 
available at  http://www.arc.org/downloads/prospecting.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 
2003). 
175 See LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE 236-37 (1995) 
(describing the rise in for for-profit social service provision since the 1960s). 
176 Kennedy, supra note 1, at 257-58.  Forty-nine states have already introduced 
some level of privatization into their welfare social service provision.  Mark Dunlea, 
The Poverty Profiteers Privatize Welfare, 59 COVERT ACTION Q. 6 (Winter 1996-1997). 
Private corporations have embraced the opportunity to compete for welfare 
contracts.  Their enthusiasm alone signals an awareness of the new, lucrative 
opportunities that heretofore have been unavailable.  See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 
146 (describing the frenzy of activity among private corporations to take advantage 
of the privatized welfare regime); Merill Goozner, Welfare’s Gold Rush, CHI. TRIB., 
June 29, 1997, at C1 (recounting a similar tale of private activity). 
One has to look no further than the business announcements of some of the 
corporate providers.  Corporations and their investment bankers proudly proclaim 
that privatized welfare has translated into $28 billion in annual contracts.  See 
Dunlea, supra.  Commentators, for instance, estimate the winning bid to privatize 
welfare in the State of Texas would be $2-3 billion.  See William D. Hartung & 
Jennifer Washburn, Lockheed Martin: From Warfare to Welfare, NATION, Mar. 2, 1998, at 
11. 
From these and future contracts, corporations expect financial windfalls.  
Maximus, a leading private provider of welfare services, witnessed its stock rise fifty 
percent in 1997, its first year public and the first full year of American welfare 
governed by PRWORA.  Its chief executive officer made, in that first year, $18.8 
million in cash and received stock worth $110 million. Adam Cohen, When Wall Street 
Runs Welfare, TIME, Mar. 23, 1998, at 64; see also Hartung & Washburn, supra. 
Corporations are, furthermore, hiring talented public administrators to help 
them with contract procurement.  Lockheed hired Gerald Miller, the head of 
Michigan’s welfare agency and architect of Governor Engler’s welfare-to-work 
program.  Maximus, in turn, attracted George Leutermann, who had formerly run 
Milwaukee’s public job placement center, to run its Milwaukee operation.  See 
Goozner, supra (“It’s the welfare system’s equivalent of the Pentagon’s revolving 
door, where procurement officials fly out the door to make big bucks with the 
contractors, while denuding the government of the management talent needed to 
monitor what’s going on.”). 
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keeping functions [that are] . . . most often identified with the legal 
[Goldberg] protections under AFDC.”177 
A. Introduction 
How does privatization work?  A state, county, or municipality 
contracts out some or all of its welfare responsibilities.  It may 
contract out simply the billing and accounting work, which raise few 
welfare-specific concerns; or, it may request bids for vendors to 
provide aspects of job training and job search responsibilities.  More 
dramatically, states may contract out all the social services, including 
casework and eligibility determinations.178  Effectively, then, welfare 
seekers or recipients might never see the inside of a government 
building or interact with actual, bona fide civil servants.179 
Opportunities to reap efficiency gains motivate privatization.180  
States, counties, and municipalities can reduce the size (and payroll) 
of government and allow the market to function in its stead.181  The 
private sector claims the experience, flexibility, and profit motives to 
make welfare provisions less wasteful.  Indeed, its claims are so 
persuasive that state and local governments are willing to allow 
corporate providers to walk away with excess rents in order to 
promote streamlined welfare governance.182  The lure of slashing the 
size of government and the seduction of efficiency gains through 
private-sector competition supply the one-two combination that the 
 
177 Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1566. 
178 See, e.g., Breaux et al., supra note 129, at 46-47 (describing Mississippi’s 
experimentation with the privatization of most social welfare services); Jonathan 
Walters, The Welfare Bonanza, GOVERNING, Jan. 2000, at 34.  For a broader 
examination of state welfare privatization initiatives, see Gilman, supra note 40; and 
Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 83 (2003). 
179 See Welfare, Inc, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 55 (“Texans who claim state-
financed income support, health care and food coupons, or who take part in job-
training, drug rehabilitation and pregnancy-prevention [programs], may never see a 
civil servant.”). 
180 See SALAMON, supra note 175, at 223-25; SAVAS, supra note 42, at 118-20; 
Richard W. Bauman, Public Perspectives on Privatization: Foreword, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1, 3 (2000); Minow, supra note 7; Schuck, supra note 38, at 6. 
181 Cohen, supra note 176 (suggesting that hiring private contractors to run state 
welfare programs is believed to hold the promise of unleashing the efficiency and 
flexibility of the market on dysfunctional state bureaucracies). 
182 For discussions of this compromise whereby rent-seeking is permitted because 
the efficiency gains are so considerable, see Thomas Kaplan, supra note 139, at 108; 
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 259; Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run 
State Welfare Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at A1; and Walters, supra note 178, 
at 36. 
  
2004 DEFORMING WELFARE 627 
cost-conscious legislator finds so attractive.183 
Corporations often can outperform state and municipal 
government through savings in labor costs; they can employ a lower-
wage, more flexible (i.e., less secure) labor force that can be 
augmented or reduced with an ease the public sector could not begin 
to approach.184  Of course, corporations may also possess 
sophisticated delivery and monitoring technologies that give firms 
such as Andersen Consulting and Lockheed Martin comparative 
advantages in bidding for contracts.185  But it also should be 
appreciated that further cost-savings gains, unrelated to efficiency per 
se, can be accrued because corporations serve shareholders, not 
welfare clients, and thus decisions that boil down to a question of 
serving the shareholders or the clients will be resolved in a manner 
consistent with the fiduciary duty to the former.186 
Before commencing this Section’s inquiry, I would like to offer a 
few brief notes.  First, any policy distortions that may occur under the 
framework of state administration apply in instances of privatization, 
too (and, later, under Charitable Choice).  Certainly, a corporation 
lacks the tools, mandate, and wherewithal to affect the demand side 
of the labor market.  Also, corporations’ interests, too, may diverge 
from the federal objectives (and to a much greater extent).  
Moreover, concerns regarding the corporation’s legitimacy and 
accountability may affect how individuals and communities of 
recipients feel about themselves and their relationship to government 
and society.187  Stipulating to these similarities between state 
 
183 See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 180, at 3 (describing legislators who support 
privatization initiatives as frequently extolling the virtues of efficiency and private-
sector competition). 
184 See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF 
MARKETS 98 (1997) (noting the lower wages and benefits offered in the private sector 
as reasons why governments outsource); SAVAS, supra note 42, at 34-35, 287 
(suggesting the degree to which non-executive civil servants are paid significantly 
more than similarly situated workers in the private sector); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 
264 (describing the transition from public to private sector as one in which 
unionized, secure jobs with pensions are replaced by nonunionized, often part-time 
or casual labor); Minow, supra note 1, at 500 (describing the expectation of cost-
saving gains from harnessing the resources and flexibility of the private sector). 
185 See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
186 Kennedy, supra note 1, at 302 (“[B]ecause a publicly traded company has a 
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profits, the private provider will seek to 
maximize profits even if it means harming the needy.”).  For a detailed discussion on 
fiduciary duties in the government contracting context, see Michele Estrin Gilman, 
Charitable Choice and the Accountability Challenge, 55 VAND. L. REV. 799, 826-27, 837-39 
(2002), in which for-profit corporate fiduciary duties are discussed, and id., at 837-39, 
in which religious corporations’ fiduciary duties are discussed. 
187 Professor Minow notes: 
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devolution and privatization,188 I will move quickly to discuss the 
distorting qualities unique to for-profit provision.  Issues regarding a 
corporation’s distinct and disparate interest in welfare reform as well 
as those regarding its status as a non-state entity will be discussed in 
turn. 
* * * 
Privatization’s distortions fall into the categories of harm 
established at the beginning of this Article, but are replete with 
spillovers across categories.  Some of the institutional harms reach 
into the civic realm as do some of the incentive-based, managerial 
harms.  In what follows, I describe the three categories of harm in 
order.  First, the institutional harms take a number of forms.  The 
corporate enterprise itself creates prima facie concerns.  Important 
institutional concerns include the fiduciary duty to promote 
shareholder wealth, which goes well beyond a state or city’s incentive 
to under-provide services.  Another institutional concern is that 
corporate enterprises are not equipped to resolve due process 
concerns, conduct APA-like hearings, or hold notice and comment 
fora.  Second, managerial concerns include the possibility that 
corporate providers have incentives to provide selectively to those 
they can help most inexpensively, as well as, counterintuitively, to be 
less flexible vehicles of welfare policy and to be less local than 
otherwise contemplated.  I note here that it is somewhat ironic that 
though states and municipalities lobbied so fervently to take over the 
reins of welfare policy, a good number of them quickly turned those 
 
Privatization of public services [has] soared precisely when major 
corporations engaged in unfettered private self-dealing and one major 
religious group reeled from scandals, cover-ups, and mounting distrust 
among the faithful.  This coincidence in timing should be all the 
reminder anyone needs of the vital role of public oversight and checks 
and balances. 
Minow, supra note 7, at 1259-60 (footnote omitted). 
The extent of the public distrust of corporate America, today, in the wake of 
high profile scandals, cannot be overstated.  See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Oversight; The 
Biggest Casualty of Enron’s Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at D1; David Callahan, 
Editorial, Private Sector, Public Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A21 (suggesting the 
Enron scandal may mark a turning point in America’s trust in deregulated corporate 
enterprise); Janny Scott, Once Bitten, Twice Shy: A World of Eroding Trust, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2002, at D5 (describing the public’s waning trust in American business). 
Note, further, that the distrust of corporate America coincides with a rising 
distrust of organized religion in light of the sexual abuse scandals “roiling the Roman 
Catholic Church.”  Scott, supra.  This, of course, will be relevant in the subsequent 
Part.  See infra Part V. 
188 It is, in part, due to these similarities that I also skip over private non-profits 
altogether, for they have attributes that are fully discernible from a study that spans 
public and private, for-profit actors. 
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reins over to private corporations.189  Finally, civic harms can be 
recorded in the form of recipients feeling as if their concerns are not 
important enough for government to handle itself and in the form of 
recipients feeling that the loci of provision are unaccountable and 
undemocratic. 
B. Privatization’s Distortions 
1. Institutional Harms 
Besides having even less of an impact on national economic 
policy than sovereign states possess, corporations are constituted in 
ways that inevitably and inescapably engender actual harms.  
Corporations have a preexisting fiduciary commitment to 
shareholders that they are duty-bound to prioritize over any 
commitment to government service.190  As Nina Bernstein of the New 
York Times notes: “[n]o company can be expected to protect the 
interests of the needy at the expense of its bottom line, least of all a 
publicly traded company with a fiduciary duty to maximize 
shareholder profits.”191 
This core institutional characteristic far exceeds any 
discretionary motivation among public bureaucrats to cut costs.  It is 
the raison d’etre of the corporate enterprise.  A private-sector 
caseworker and her directors employed by private firms thus operate 
under an entirely different system of responsibilities than would a 
public outfit.  Most obviously, a civil servant is charged with fulfilling 
the mandate to serve the designated clientele.  Her secure position 
and her organization’s (i.e., the state’s) ability, if so inclined, to bend 
and flex a budget to ensure adequate support for recipients192 simply 
cannot be replicated easily in the private sector.  Indeed, a private 
sector caseworker has a contrary obligation to the shareholders—and 
to the terms of the contract.193  Professor Diller highlights this 
 
189 Kennedy, supra note 1, at 232 (“After fighting so hard for greater authority 
over the welfare system, states seem strangely eager to pass the prize to private 
corporations.”); Ehrenreich, supra note 146. 
190 See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 302. 
191 Bernstein, supra note 182. 
192 See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, U.S. Welfare Limit May Put Thousands in Albany’s 
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000, at A1 (describing New York’s sense of obligation to 
support with its own funds those welfare recipients summarily dropped from TANF 
due to the stringent time limits). 
193 One is reminded of the economic argument regarding the winner’s curse.  
The winning firm in a bidding proceeding inevitably outbids all other firms, thus 
suggesting that there is a good chance the firm mistakenly overvalued and 
miscalculated the contract’s worth.  See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: 
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caseworker distinction succinctly: Professional civil servants “are 
accorded trust because they are viewed as part of a social institution 
that operates according to a larger set of norms and principles.”  For 
those working for private firms, in contrast, that larger set of norms 
and principles boils down to profits.194 
Private firms are also institutionally ill-equipped to be 
transparent institutions of public policy.  First, it is difficult to fathom 
the corporate form proving hospitable to public input either in the 
process of the corporation designing its bid or once that bid has been 
accepted.  A notice-and-comment paradigm too would be 
institutionally anathema.  Indeed, the design and development of a 
competitive bid, of course, would need to be afforded at least a 
modicum of secrecy.195  And, in the absence of competitive bidding, 
there is no institutional corporate ethos regarding soliciting public 
opinion—outside, perhaps, the use of focus groups to maximize 
profits.196  In truth, these institutional opacities spill over greatly into 
the civic-citizenship column; but I discuss them here because they are 
inescapably a function of the corporation. 
 
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50-51 (1992).  But in the welfare 
context, a private firm (assuming competitive bidding) may win a contract only if it 
underestimates its costs of provision, and thus the winner will have to cut services 
below that which the contract may specify.  See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying 
text. 
194 Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1194-95.  It is further asserted that 
[y]ou really need the individuals who are making decisions about who 
receives government benefits to be held accountable to the taxpayers, 
not to some private company whose main concern is its profit margin.  
A public employee is more likely to be concerned about moving a 
welfare participant into a long-term employment situation. . . .  A 
worker for a private company is going to focus on how to get 
individuals off welfare in the shortest time . . . since that is what 
increases their company’s profits and keeps the worker employed. 
Dunlea, supra note 176, at 7 (quoting a representative of the Texas State Employees 
Union); see also Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1606 (expressing concern that “private 
vendors may lack the norms of public service and of professionalism, which 
characterize many public bureaucracies”). 
195 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000) (excluding trade secrets and other 
proprietary information from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information 
Act). 
196 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (forthcoming 
2004) (describing the heavy reliance in contemporary America on focus group 
research and its adverse effect on the quality of democratic debate and 
policymaking). 
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2. Managerial Harms 
 a.  Profits over Service 
Corporations have incentives to underprovide services.  The 
incentive for state welfare agencies to divert recipients for the sake of 
padding the general coffers is not to be understated; yet it does not 
rise to the level we would customarily associate with rent-seeking 
private corporations.  Corporations can and do actually design their 
contract proposals with this aim in mind.  Again, I consider corporate 
provision as a more extreme version of a managerial distortion via 
devolution because most of the “diverted” money under state-
administered PRWORA at least ends up being used either indirectly 
for the benefit of the state’s poor or, at the very least, to support the 
general good of the state, which represents a distinctly broader 
segment of the population than equity investors in a private 
corporation.  With corporations, the incentive is to pocket the 
change. 
Corporations can tender bids with payments based on (1) how 
many individuals are “serviced” by the vendor, (2) how many 
individuals are placed in jobs, or simply, (3) a flat fee.  In different 
contexts, each of these three schemes may make most sense (either 
for the corporation or for the government agency).  However, for a 
corporation, there is great incentive to churn or divert clients in the 
first instance (and offer few substantive services), and to dump them 
in the third.  If one gets paid for “servicing” a client, the less effort 
(cost) that is expended in the process, the greater the marginal 
return.  Moreover, if the only incentive is to place people in jobs, a 
skimming effect will occur whereby firms will devote much of their 
resources to those (already) likely to get jobs, while cutting its losses 
on those harder to place.  This, of course, is no different than the 
incentives facing state agencies under conditions of federal work 
mandates, but once again a corporation’s institutional and 
motivational disposition represents a more acute example—once the 
possibility of profits are infused into the equation.197  For those flat fee 
 
197 In its contracts, the private welfare firm, America Works, gets between $6 and 
$9 for its placements.  The dual fear with this system is that, first, America Works will 
only devote resources to those it can actually place; and second, with those it tries to 
place, it will view a good match as less important than an immediate match.  Getting 
the job is all that counts in terms of collecting a bonus.  Berkowitz, supra note 174.  A 
Lockheed contract in which the government gives Lockheed a bonus for placing a 
welfare recipient in a job for six months reduces the incidence of the latter problem 
(haphazard placements), but possibly at the expense of exacerbating the former.  If 
it is estimated that only a quarter of all recipients can probably hold jobs for six 
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contracts, it makes sense for the corporation to lie low and turn away 
as many as possible.198  These corporations, after all, boast not how 
many people they have helped over the past year, but how much 
profit they have made.199 
One might suggest I am prematurely marching out the parade of 
horribles; but a shocking number of contracts already have been 
subject to abuse of discretion by corporations that have managed to 
achieve these super-profitable ends—under the noses of government 
contracting agents.  For example, in New York, Wisconsin, and 
California, judges and investigators have voided welfare contracts 
with private vendors for reasons ranging from a failure to comply 
with the terms of the contract, the violation of federal laws, or the 
finding of corrupt bidding processes.200  Moreover, in Connecticut, 
Maximus failed miserably to comply with the terms of its welfare 
contract; yet, inexplicably, its contract was renewed.201  Professor 
 
months, the remainder may be offered de minimis services.  See Hartung & 
Washburn, supra note 176.  Some advocates fear that if a company’s profits are tied 
to reducing the number of people on welfare, the firms will work to manipulate the 
system to keep poor women from signing up in the first place and force recipients 
into jobs lasting long enough so that the firms can collect their money (for successful 
placement).  See Judith Havemann, Welfare Reform Incorporated, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 
1997, at A1. 
198 This is the incentive structure for one of Wisconsin’s early privatization efforts 
as part of its Wisconsin Works (W-2) program.  Private welfare leader Maximus was 
given $58 million to operate a welfare program in Milwaukee.  It gets to keep 
whatever it does not spend.  Thus, “Maximus makes money only if it saves some of 
the $58 million it has been given by the state to run TANF for two and a half years[;] 
the Milwaukee County setup would arguably be a textbook case of a for-profit having 
every incentive in the world to find as few clients and provide as little service as it 
could get away with.”  Walters, supra note 178, at 36. 
199 See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Squabble Puts Welfare Deals Under Spotlight in New York, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at B1 (describing Maximus as employing “more ‘greeters’ 
and others promoting the company than case managers, who were floundering 
under large caseloads that violated its contract” with Wisconsin).  The for-profit 
provider websites are revealing.  See, e.g., http://www.maximus.com (last visited Dec. 
28, 2003); http://www.lockheedmartin.com (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).  Their profits 
are impressive.  See Lorraine Woellert, Maximus Inc., BUS. WK., May 31, 1999, at 96 
(describing that between 1996 and 1999, Maximus sales grew an average of 60.4% a 
year, its earnings grew at an average of 21.3% a year, and its stock prices soared sixty 
percent); see also Cohen, supra note 176. 
200 See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Federal Agency Finds Workfare Contractor Violated Wage 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, at B6; Christopher Drew, Wisconsin To Audit Welfare 
Contractor, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000, at B14; David S. Hilzenrath, NY Judge Shelves 
Welfare Contracts Won by Maximus, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2000, at D13; Cindy Loose, 
Disputes Snarl D.C. Welfare Plan; City Revokes Contract of Job Placement Firm, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 11, 1999, at B1; Caitlin Rother, Judge Orders Privatized Welfare Contracts Ended, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 9, 2000, at B5. 
201 See Liz Halloran, State Delays Contractor Payment, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 9, 
1997, at A3; Liz Halloran, State Privatized Program Without Analyzing the Cost, HARTFORD 
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Bezdek has chronicled some of these contracts without effective 
oversight in Baltimore, Maryland: 
The [Baltimore] contracts provide a discouraging portrait of the 
city’s commitments to its neediest citizens’ employment needs, 
and raise large questions about the value added by the vendor 
contracts.  The contracts [often] propose service for too few, aim 
for quite limited employment outcomes, and . . . engage in 
creaming. . . .  Thus, most of Baltimore’s expenditures for welfare-
to-work services is made without the apparent expectation that 
referral to vendors will lead most welfare recipients to 
employment success and independence from welfare.202 
Professor Bezdek further describes a series of private vendor 
contracts that secured the right to manage social services without 
specifying what they will provide.203  One provider in particular 
promised to offer a selection of training programs, but did not 
disclose which ones.204  Another successful bidder only vaguely 
“pledged to help recipients conduct meaningful career planning and 
job search . . . in a field that could provide employment.”205  Providers 
also can be quite selective in who they decide to cover and are 
especially motivated to be selective if their contracts are performance 
based.  A “good” program may only accept those recipients who can 
attest to having no child-care needs, who have a high school diploma, 
and/or who can pass a physical endurance test.  Essentially, providers 
may be able to service only those least needy.206 
These favorable (or unfavorable, depending on one’s vantage 
point) contracts are not incidents of an institutional harm, because 
there is nothing intrinsic about the corporate form that enables it to 
elude effective government monitoring.  Rather, their incentives to 
elude oversight may, on occasion, simply exceed those of 
procurement officers to rein in contractors. 
 b.  Local Authenticity at Odds with Corporate Efficiency 
We must also remember, as we proceed, that there is a 
 
COURANT, Mar. 6, 1998, at A1. 
202 See Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1598.  Professor Bezdek further notes that 
surveying all of Baltimore’s welfare agreements, “[d]espite the modest promise of the 
RFPs [requests for proposals], the contracts themselves reveal no meaningful 
benchmarks, outcomes, or central mechanisms . . . [and] [t]here were no control 
provisions whatsoever in any of the contracts.”  Id. at 1603. 
203 See id. at 1600-01. 
204 See id.  One might also, in fairness, blame municipal officials for accepting 
such vague promises. 
205 Id. at 1601. 
206 See id. 
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difference between decentralized design of programs and full-out 
devolution of authority.  This distinction has been described in 
earlier parts and will be a focal point of discussion again in Part VI.  
But for now, it is important to understand that the narrative of local 
implementation and experimentation is a salient feature of PRWORA 
and welfare reform more generally.  Ironically the unbounded 
discretion co-opted by the states via the narrative of devolution has 
actually created incentives to frustrate the localism that appeared so 
important to welfare reform.  Corporate providers have great 
incentives not to be truly local agents of policy development and 
implementation.  Many of the most successful bidders are national, if 
not multinational corporate providers—and thus hardly embody the 
localism that welfare reform sought to harness.207  The reason these 
national or global firms are comparatively successful is that their 
competitive edge is directly connected to (1) an efficiency that only 
arises from the economies of scale associated with producing (and 
replicating) generic welfare programs across the country and to (2) a 
proven track record that, too, only experienced providers can boast.  
Thus, instead of promoting locally tailored solutions that fit within 
the federal framework, corporations may end up creating 
McWelfare.208  For instance, some of the biggest providers include 
Lockheed Martin, Andersen Consulting (Accenture), and Maximus, 
Inc., a giant social service corporation also known for building and 
managing prisons.209  These major, multinational corporations may 
have little particular, let alone intimate, knowledge of a given 
community’s needs (and every incentive to keep it that way). 
 c.  Walling Off the Laboratories of Democracy 
Another hallmark tradition of decentralization is that, over time, 
one can safely anticipate that good ideas that develop out of 
individual laboratories of democracy will rise to prominence and, 
then, be shared with other locales.  But unlike states, corporations 
have incentives to horde information.  Whatever I may argue about 
 
207 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 9; Gilman, supra note 40, at 599 (describing the 
most successful bidders for government contracts as some of the biggest in the 
industry and suggesting that this outcome is “inconsistent with privatization’s goal of 
returning control over welfare policies to communities”).  I am indebted to Josh 
Civin for our discussions on this point. 
208 Cf. Elizabeth Kolbert, Unchartered Territory, NEW YORKER, Oct. 9, 2000, at 34 
(describing pre-packaged, for-profit education centers in terms evocative of a 
McDonald’s franchising manual). 
209 Maximus’s Internet website details its many projects.  See 
http://www.maximus.com/corporate/pages/index (last visited Dec. 28, 2003). 
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the paradox of devolution, I have not argued that decentralization is 
not important in achieving a flexible innovative approach to welfare 
reform.  Corporations will not share their innovations with other 
institutions—public or private—because that reduces their 
competitive advantage; at the same time, however, the hording of 
good ideas elongates the learning curve and undermines the 
constructive dynamics undergirding a decentralized vision of welfare 
reform. 
 d.  Flexibility at Odds with Corporate Efficiency 
Corporate providers, moreover, have great incentives to insist on 
long-term contracts, creating a tradeoff for government procurement 
agencies between more flexible, short-term contracts and less 
flexible, long-term contracts.210  All things being equal, government 
might prefer the former.  But, short-term contracts create 
uncertainties for bidders, and thus firms vying for those contracts will 
ask for more money (to compensate them for the uncertainty factor).  
By contrast, corporations take comfort in the stability and security of 
a long-term contract and can thus bid a lower price for the vending 
rights.  Thus, surprisingly, privatization may produce a procurement 
dilemma between flexibility and efficiency, the core values motivating 
desires to outsource in the first place.211  In many geographic regions 
and in some social service fields that have never before been open to 
market competition for government services, private corporations 
have minimal existing infrastructure or, possibly, institutional 
knowledge.  In these areas, the fixed, start-up costs of establishing a 
welfare system may be quite high.212  Corporations encouraged to bid 
 
210 Cf. David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1999) (raising concerns in general about the binding qualities of 
government contracts that frustrate opportunities for democratic input and policy 
modifications); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the 
Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1996) (describing the 
economic efficiencies associated with long-term contracts).  The Dana/Koniak and 
Logue articles represent part of a richer debate on the tradeoffs between more 
responsive, democratic control-retaining contracts and the economic cost efficiencies 
associated with locking-in contracts that provide long-term stability for the 
government and contractor alike. 
211 The intuitive, conventional wisdom, of course, suggests privatization 
enhances organizational flexibility.  See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, 
MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 45 (1990) (describing the market efficiencies that 
privatization can introduce).  My intent is not to refute this position, but rather, it is 
to acknowledge some problems with that model. 
212 Though any more elaborate discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, we 
should recognize that the conventional wisdom that private is always more efficient 
may not hold up in all circumstances. 
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might seek (or insist on) long-term contracts to ensure their initial 
investment and outlay pays off.  Corporations may not, for instance, 
want to build a facility, design programs, research local economic 
patterns, and hire and train employees, for a one-year trial run.213  If 
privatization were to promise efficiency gains in the long-run (and 
thus a corporation would only agree to enter as a provider if it were 
guaranteed a long-term deal), there are serious accountability and 
monitoring concerns that would arise.  Once a state or county 
commits itself to a long-term contract, it is essentially limited in its 
ability to hold those providers accountable.214  These corporate 
providers may be less likely or able to shift policy abruptly than might 
a government agency (less concerned about making profits).  Thus, 
though the private sector is heralded as being dynamic, there are 
distinct possibilities that long-term contracts may encourage 
performance behavior that is quite the opposite of dynamic; 
accordingly, inflexibility poses direct harms to service provision in the 
form of more staid, less innovative administration and services. 
3. Civic Harms 
The nature of private contracting does not necessarily sit well 
with our conceptions of public governance.  In many cases and 
contexts, however, we have come to accept the benefits of privatized 
outsourcing.  But, while corporations may be designated as 
acceptable welfare provision providers, there is something truly 
disruptive about this move, which neither our desire to enhance 
efficiency or to reduce the size of government fully captures.  Indeed, 
while many other social service provisions have gone the way of 
corporate outsourcing,215 there is something particularly troubling 
about taking welfare in that direction.  We have fewer problems with 
a Laidlaw Bus Company taking our children to public schools or a 
 
213 See DONAHUE, supra note 41. 
214 In fairness, some private social service providers have been fired, but this 
usually happens only in cases of abject failure or malfeasance.  See supra note 200.  
Maryland canceled a Lockheed Martin contract for failure to meet child support 
collection objectives, and California cancelled a contract with Lockheed Martin when 
the company’s cost expenditures suddenly tripled.  See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 40, at 
572-73; Greg Garland, Collections of Child Aid Questioned, BALT. SUN, Jan. 10, 1999, at 
1B; Greg Garland, Lockheed Called Failure on Child Support Goals, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 
1999, at 1B. 
215 See DONAHUE, supra note 41; Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition: 
Accountability in Government Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465 (2003); Steven Lee Myers, 
Giuliani Moves on “Privatization” Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, at A33; Rachel L. 
Swarns, Giuliani Will Put Foster Care to Bid, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at A1; see also 
supra note 43. 
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Waste Management removing our garbage.  But we measure—or 
should measure—(and value) welfare reform in ways much more 
complicated than how we determine whether a bus driver is 
competent or trash is removed punctually. 
From the outset, we must resist a natural trend.  Once we place 
welfare provision in the hands of private corporations, entrusted to 
act as vendors precisely because we want to maximize efficiency, we 
inevitably bind ourselves to evaluating welfare reform on efficiency’s 
terms: the lingua franca of the corporate paradigm.  In the process of 
assessing the costs and benefits of the privatization decision, we may 
deprive ourselves of a richer analytical framework within which to 
measure our commitment to the poor and our humane, respectful, 
and dignified treatment of them. 
These concerns of non-economic harm center precisely on a 
private corporation’s lack of public accountability and 
responsiveness.  It is a source of concern that the lines of 
accountability between the government and the private welfare 
provider may be seriously attenuated.  Once we establish that welfare 
reform should be guided, in part, by local influences, we are after all 
privileging the know-how of communities. 
While I do not want to overstate or conflate the discrete 
concepts of localism and democracy, it must be conceded that often 
the forces pushing for localism tend to base their arguments on a 
desire for more democracy.216  If a national corporation is running a 
local welfare program, concerns should be raised regarding how local 
(and locally tailored) the policy really is and how accountable its 
administrators are to that local polity.217 
Indeed, Professor Diller argues that this new privatization 
regime has the potential to render existing mechanisms for 
establishing public accountability largely ineffective or irrelevant.  
[Privatization engenders a] system that, when fully operative, 
largely may be closed to outside input and oversight and in which 
key decisions may be made through obscure processes of which 
the public is largely unaware.218 
 
216 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 95; McConnell, supra note 35; Andrzej 
Rapacznsk, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 
SUP. CT. REV. 341; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: 
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213-15 (1998) (describing the 
“federalist revival” endorsing greater political autonomy at the state level). 
217 Indeed, corporate providers need not abide by APA guidelines or offer a 
notice and comment proceeding.  See Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1569; Cimini, supra 
note 10, at 263; Gilman, supra note 186, at 818-19. 
218 Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1187. 
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Instead, if the administration of policy resides in corporate 
headquarters, which may sit thousands of miles away from the locus 
of actual implementation, we are faced with a direct affront to the 
logic of experimental tinkering; this kind of privatized service closes 
the door to constructive dialogue among community members, 
welfare recipients, and policymakers.  The Vice President of Social 
Services for Maximus is less likely than a state legislator or city 
alderman to run into welfare recipients—or ordinary taxpayers, for 
that matter—in the local supermarket and get an earful.219 
The theory of privatized welfare is a theory of efficiency.  But 
more troubling, it is also a theory of abandonment.  Essentially, in 
devolving to the states, and the states turning around and themselves 
outsourcing, government has demonstrated an inability and an 
unwillingness to deal with the problems of welfare policy; and, by 
extension, it has signaled a faltering commitment to the social 
contract known as federal welfare reform.220  With private 
corporations as the ersatz guarantor, the poor just become one 
strand of a web of interrelated sources of profits. 
Privatization, moreover, alters the symbolic and “contractual” 
terms of welfare among those in the beneficiary population.  
Essentially, corporate control may blur the avenues of legislative and 
judicial access.  Without the central presence of, say, a city agency, 
without a defined set of transparent political actors and 
administrative proceedings, welfare recipients may be at (more of) a 
loss.221  Given the end of entitlements, and the federal protection that 
 
219 Large-scale government contractors simply contradict the stylized belief that 
privatization is a “democratizing force that returns power from the government to 
local communities and their mediating institutions.”  Gilman, supra note 40, at 596 
(describing what many conservative supporters of privatization consider to be a 
considerable asset of the movement away from government provision). 
220 But see Cimini, supra note 10, at 259-60.  Professor Cimini points to a number 
of states that have individual responsibility plans that are “entered into” by 
caseworkers and clients.  Thirty-five states require responsibility contracts, “which 
prescribe conduct in both employment and other matters such as child school 
attendance, child immunization, child support enforcement cooperation, parent 
training, and agreements to achieve self-sufficiency.”  Id. at 259.  Cimini contends a 
new contractarian infrastructure—a shift to mutual obligations—has replaced the 
Goldberg entitlements, but the evidence she offers indicates that although contractual 
relations exist, they are highly privatized.  No longer is a state committed to a 
community of poor families, but a caseworker may be committed to a particular 
individual.  This commitment, I should hasten to add, may have little, if any, legal 
import.  See Kennedy, supra note 1. 
221 See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) 
(describing the dignitary values associated with individuals having the opportunity to 
voice their legal grievances and believing those grievances are taken seriously).  
Professor Cimini, however, argues that welfare reform creates a new paradigm of 
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had accompanied those entitlements, there should be, it would seem, 
a premium on ensuring channels of communication remain open 
and clear when procedural problems arise.222  Barbara Ehrenreich 
captures this sense of exacerbated helplessness when individuals are 
left alone to comprehend and navigate the web of welfare service 
provisions and providers.  In characterizing her own, personal 
confusion with the new privatized system, she anticipates the 
difficulty that lies ahead for welfare recipients: “[If] diffused 
responsibilities are frustrating to journalists, imagine their effect on a 
welfare recipient . . . when she goes to her Lockheed-operated ATM, 
presents a fingertip for identification, and finds herself rejected.  
Whom is she going to call?”223  And, even if she happened to know 
whom to call, it is not entirely clear what obligations private providers 
have to the client population in the form of due process.224 
 
private rights that are readily enforceable.  As suggested, she describes the welfare 
reform movement as ushering in a new era of social contractarian rhetoric and 
responsibility.  See Cimini, supra note 10, at 257-58 (describing politicians at both the 
national and state levels as having clearly used contractual rhetoric when discussing 
welfare reform).  More concretely, she contends that states and other providers have 
created thousands of agreements with individual welfare recipients that “are legally 
cognizable contracts between government and each recipient.  As such, these 
contracts constitute ‘property’ requiring the application of procedural due process 
protections pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 253. 
222 See, e.g., Hartung & Washburn, supra note 176 (“Contracting out garbage 
collection, computer upgrades and other routine public functions is one thing.  But 
what Lockheed is proposing would allow private companies to run entire 
government programs; in the case of welfare and Medicaid, moreover, these are 
essential government services, affecting the most disfranchised members of the 
population, who are least able to defend their rights.”). 
223 See Ehrenreich, supra note 146.  But see Kennedy, supra note 1, at 283-84.  
Professor Kennedy argues that there may be greater due process protection afforded 
under privatization, because the state interest in efficient governance, as articulated 
as one of the prongs in the Mathews v. Eldridge test, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), has declined 
considerably.  Compelling state interests in government keeping costs and burdens 
low have decreased in an “era of privatization.”  “Where most states have chosen to 
privatize their welfare systems, the countervailing interest must be measured in terms 
of the burden on a private corporation.  In most cases, the cost of due process will 
come out of the private company’s profit margin.”  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 284; see 
also Cimini, supra note 10, at 282-83 (describing common-law rights to due process 
even in private contractual proceedings). 
224 The Supreme Court recently rejected the extension of Bivens protections to 
beneficiaries of privatized government programs.  See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 
534 U.S. 61 (2001).  As for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits, the test to measure whether a 
private actor is acting under color of state law is one of assessing how traditionally 
“public” that function is.  See Gilman, supra note 186, at 816.  The paradigm example 
is private prisons, where employees have been held to be operating under the color 
of state law and thus subject to § 1983 suits.  See Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982); see also Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age 
of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1192 (1995); Gilman, supra note 40, at 573 
(“[I]t is questionable whether a private entity such as Lockheed Martin will be 
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C. Summary 
Ultimately, I contend that the architecture of privatization in 
toto may be less conducive to flexibility, political accountability, and 
responsiveness—and hence, may run contrary to the purposes of 
experimentation, localism, and innovation that are at the heart of the 
decentralization goals.  Efficiency may run up against democratic 
accountability and responsiveness in this respect. 
Accordingly, privatization narrows not only the size and scope of 
the public sphere, but also the range of our public consciousness.  
Our national commitment to the poor did not hinge historically on 
cost-cutting decisions of a private bidder.  No longer can we talk 
broadly about normative ideals and non-measurable aspirations.  The 
language of private, for-profit provision is the language of efficiency, 
which does not necessarily understand the vocabulary of justice and 
fairness. 
V. ONE STEP FURTHER II:  
CHARITABLE CHOICE AND FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES 
Along with the market-centered privatization agenda, another 
strong current in American politics and policy is the faith-based 
movement, ardently championed by President Bush and his newly 
fashioned White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives.225  Faith-
based social welfare initiatives, however, antedate the Bush 
administration and the 2000 campaign more generally (where 
candidate Al Gore also strongly endorsed faith-based initiatives)226 
 
deemed a state actor to whom constitutional guarantees apply.”) (footnote omitted); 
id. at 611.  Incarceration, of course, is held to be a much more “public” function than 
welfare; in fact, with the passage of PRWORA in 1996, the federal government has 
argued it has dispensed with welfare entitlements, ostensibly indicating that welfare 
may not be as core a state function as are prisons.  Thus, while private welfare 
services would probably be covered under § 1983, the attenuated connection is worth 
noting.  See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1006-09 (1982) (suggesting that though 
Medicaid paid most of the nursing home expenses, private nursing home providers 
are not state actors); see also David J. DelFiandra, The Growth of Prison Privatization and 
the Threat Posed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 591 (2000); supra note 43. 
225 Bush on the Creation of a White House Office Tied to Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2001, at A18 (reprinting the president’s remarks). 
226 See, e.g., Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 13, at 265 (describing Bush’s 
campaign pledge); Sara Mosle, The Vanity of Volunteerism, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at 
F22 (describing the support of both Gore and Bush for faith-based social services); 
Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Sacred?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at F40 (“Bush and Gore 
have enthusiastically endorsed a provision of the 1996 welfare-reform bill called 
charitable choice, which allows faith-based organizations to administer welfare 
programs with public funds.”); Kevin Sack, Gore Backs Federal Money for Church Social 
Service Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at A23. 
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and were explicitly included as part of the 1996 welfare reform 
legislation.227  “Charitable Choice,” as it is called, permits religious, 
sectarian organizations to bid for welfare service contracts at no 
disadvantage relative to private, secular contractors.228  To suggest that 
the genesis of church-state social service partnerships can only be 
traced back to the summer of 1996, however, is quite misleading.  
Since the early years of the Republic, faith-based organizations have 
played an active and central role in social services, both in private, 
charitable capacities and working within the framework of 
government grants.229  But when entering partnerships with the 
government, these religious organizations, at least since the advent of 
the modern Establishment Clause doctrine,230 were required to 
separate—and totally wall-off—their sectarian philosophy from their 
government-funded, social service activities.231 
Today, however, these religious organizations need not abandon 
 
227 42 U.S.C. § 604 (2000). 
228 See id.  For discussions of the legality of faith-based social services, see Minow, 
supra note 1; Elbert Lin, Jon D. Michaels, Rajesh Nayak, Katherine Tang Newberger, 
Nikhil Shanbhag, & Jake Sullivan, Note, Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political 
Future of Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 188 
(2002).  See also Ehrenreich, supra note 146. 
229 See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 1-28 (1996). 
230 In truth, I am talking mostly about the post-World War II period.  See infra 
note 231. 
231 See MONSMA, supra note 229, at 1-28; Gilman, supra note 186, at 811; see also 
Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 13, at 266-68 (describing America’s increasing 
willingness to lower the wall between church and state); Jonathan Friedman, Student 
Research, Charitable Choice and the Establishment Clause, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 
103, 104 (1997); Lin et al., supra note 228, at 188. 
A series of recent Supreme Court cases has increasingly permitted this lowering 
of the wall between church and state.  In Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 
(1947), the Court offered what became gospel in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence for decades to come.  It held that the “First Amendment has erected a 
wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and impregnable.  We 
could not approve the slightest breach.”  Id. at 18; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962).  The Court reaffirmed that sentiment in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971), when it struck down a state law providing salary supplements to teachers in 
sectarian schools.  The Court barred the public financing of programs that advance 
or involve religion.  Id. at 612-13; see also Aguliar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) 
(affirming this line of cases).  Yet a new set of cases, beginning in 1988, has effectively 
permitted the breaching of the Everson wall.  See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 
589 (1988) (permitting government to award grants to sectarian organizations if the 
requirements set out for awarding the grant are neutral with respect to religion); see 
also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).  Most recently, the Court upheld school 
vouchers that awarded a disproportionate number of state dollars to students 
intending to use the funds at parochial schools.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639 (2002). 
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their core spiritual messages as a condition of eligibility to bid for and 
administer social services.232  Under Charitable Choice, faith-based 
providers can retain control over how they define and express their 
religious beliefs.  They do not have to alter their internal form of 
governance as a condition of bidding for or receiving a government 
contract.  This means these organizations cannot be required to 
change or tone down their message of faith or open up their 
personnel hiring practices to fit some secular, neutral conception of 
government-like propriety.233 
A. Introduction 
In tangible ways, Charitable Choice—as compared simply to 
market privatization of the kind discussed in Part IV—represents a 
truer departure from government provision.  Though they ostensibly 
operate just like private corporations bidding for contracts to supply 
state and local welfare services, Charitable Choice organizations do 
not simply offer, as an advantage, market-based efficiencies; rather, 
they promise an altogether different model or methodology to 
promote personal success and improvement.234  Faith is trumpeted as 
the missing element in the welfare reform puzzle.235  Underlying the 
impetus for Charitable Choice is the belief that a spiritual awakening 
can give individuals the moral impetus to succeed in ways that job 
training and employment preparation alone simply cannot.236  
 
232 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 604a(d)(1), 604a(d)(2)(A), 604a(d)(2)(B) (2000); David 
Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (2003). 
233 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000); see Peter Edelman, Poverty & Welfare: Does 
Compassionate Conservatism Have a Heart?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (2001); Center 
for Public Justice, A Guide to Charitable Choice, available at 
http://www.cpjustice.org/charitablechoice/guide/analysis (last  visited Dec. 28, 
2003) [hereinafter A Guide To Charitable Choice]; see also CHARLES L. GLENN, THE 
AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE 107-08 (2000).  Importantly, though, faith-based providers 
cannot discriminate against clients based on their religious allegiances or lack of 
such allegiances.  A Guide To Charitable Choice, supra. 
234 Michael J. Joyce, Gotta Have Faith?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 17, 2001, at 
1J.  For discussions of non-economic motivations behind decisions to privatize, see 
Michaels, supra note 45. 
235 Some have directly blamed the government’s insistence on secular neutrality 
for the lack of progress in the War on Poverty.  See, e.g., OLASKY, supra note 99, at 138 
(suggesting that welfare programs in the past “declared a war on poverty that was 
actually a war on God, since the Bible was excluded . . . from governmental 
antipoverty work”); Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 13, at 267. 
236 See DiIulio, supra note 41; see also Minow, supra note 1, at 505 (describing the 
Charitable Choice lobby as offering the spiritual renewal that can be more important 
than meeting material need); Rick Santorum, A Compassionate Conservative Agenda: 
Addressing Poverty for the Next Millennium, 26 J. LEGIS. 93 (2000) (outlining the 
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Charitable Choice’s conceptual framework, which has morphed into 
the larger ideological and political framework popularly known today 
as “Compassionate Conservatism,” was formulated in part by Marvin 
Olasky, who has for years written that religious groups outperform 
the government precisely because the former serve the spiritual and 
moral needs of individuals.237  President Bush, of course, warmly 
embraced Olasky’s platform in his 2000 campaign.238 
In its best light, religion can break through the procedural 
sterility of the post-King v. Smith, post-Goldberg world of entitlements 
and offer warmth and neighborly authenticity to assist those in 
need.239  Since Tocqueville’s famous visit, religious institutions in 
America have been seen as essential mediating social institutions 
connecting individuals and communities, often in apolitical—but 
culturally and morally thick—ways.240  Thus, without having these 
mediating social institutions “integrated into the political to make 
policy more meaningful, the political order becomes detached from 
 
senator’s support for religiously oriented welfare services). 
237 See, e.g., OLASKY, supra note 99; MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN 
COMPASSION 204-33 (1992). 
238 See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Bush Draws Campaign Theme from More Than “the 
Heart,” N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at A1; Frank Rich, Editorial, Everybody into the 
Mudfight!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A15; William Safire, Editorial, Political “God’s 
World,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A29 (describing Olasky as “the revered 
intellectual guru of Governor [George W.] Bush”). 
239 See Martin Davis, Faith, Hope, and Charity, 33 NAT’L J. 1228 (2001) 
(characterizing the spiritual passion among faith-based workers as an advantage 
Charitable Choice may have over secular alternatives); Faith-Based Social Work: With 
Help from a Hidden Hand, ECONOMIST (U.S. Ed.), Feb. 12, 2000, at 28 (describing 
some early studies pointing to the higher success rate among faith-based social 
service providers than their secular counterparts); Joyce, supra note 234 (“[The 
recipient] gets help—not from top-down government, but from a neighbor who 
knows his name. . . .  Such an approach will restore the human link between the 
recipient and the giver, meeting the needs of the soul, as well as the immediate social 
concern.”); cf. Simon, supra note 87 (recognizing the modern, pre-PRWORA era of 
welfare administration eschewed the social worker model of case management). 
240 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 292 (J.P. Mayer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1988) (1835) (“Religion, which never 
intervenes directly in the government of American society, should . . . be considered 
as the first of their political institutions . . . .”).  Indeed, Solomon & Vlissides report 
that the rise in support for faith-based social services is not wholly related to the 
evangelization of America and American politics.  They argue that the 
[p]ublic interest in [faith-based organizations] is not a product of 
heightened religiosity, rather, it is derivative of the public discrediting 
of government social service provision. . . .  [T]he public is willing to 
accept some level of religious involvement in heretofore-secular 
government programs because there is a general belief that they work. 
Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 13, at 267-68; see also Eyal Press, Lead Us Not unto 
Temptation, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 9, 2001, at 20 (describing the critical importance of 
churches and ministers in inner-city communities). 
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the values and realities of . . . life.  Deprived of its moral foundation, 
the political order is delegitimized.”241  Concomitantly, however, with 
that level of intimacy comes the possibility (or opportunity) to judge 
and degrade.242  Faith-based providers can decry a practice or 
behavior as immoral.  As another architect of Compassionate 
Conservatism recently asserted: 
government should stop doing all the things it currently does to 
normalize illegitimacy.  It should stop setting up nurseries in high 
schools, which give the message that having babies is perfectly 
normal for unmarried teens.  It should give married couples 
preference in allocating scarce public housing units, and it 
shouldn’t penalize them by taxing them more heavily than if they 
remained cohabitating singles.243 
Charitable Choice is more than government-funded supplemental 
service provisions with a religious or sectarian characteristic.  Its goals 
are more expansive as it seeks, explicitly, to provide services in lieu of 
the government.244  Charitable Choice in America already includes 
alcohol treatment centers, prison rehabilitation services, job training, 
GED classes, money management classes, domestic abuse clinics, 
child-care provisions, and family support;245 supporters of 
Compassionate Conservatism argue that their programs outperform 
secular counterparts.246  Though the successes of these programs are 
celebrated,247 doubts regarding the accuracy of any empirical 
 
241 GLENN, supra note 233, at 3. 
242 See id. at 17-19 (raising concerns with service providers’ ambitions to impose 
perfectionist models of improvement on susceptible client populations). 
243 Myron Magnet, Editorial, “Compassionate Conservatism” Will Guide Domestic 
Policy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 21, 2001, at G1. 
244 The legislation does require governments to offer secular alternatives to 
religious welfare provisions.  Yet cities, counties, and municipalities are only required 
to provide them upon request.  See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e)(1) (2000); see also Gilman, 
supra note 186, at 808; Julie A. Segal, Welfare for Churches: Buyers and Beneficiaries 
Beware, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 71, 71-73 (1997); Kenneth Roe, Editorial, 
Faith-Based Groups Need Safeguards, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 2001, at 29A. 
245 A 2002 survey found Charitable Choice providing more than forty services in 
over fifteen states.  Amy L. Sherman, Collaborations Catalogue: A Report on Charitable 
Choice Implementation in 15 States (2002); see also Davis, supra note 239; Press, supra 
note 240. 
246 See Davis, supra note 239; Ronald J. Sider, Editorial, Can Faith Help Solve Our 
Tough Social Problems?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2001, at A11; Governor’s Advisory 
Task Force on Faith-Based Community Service Groups, Faith in Action . . . A New 
Vision for Church-State Cooperation in Texas 16 (Dec. 1996), available at 
http://www.twc.state.tx.us/svcs/charchoice/faithful.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003) 
[hereinafter Governor’s Advisory Task Force]. 
247 Commentator Stephen Monsma has noted: “My wide examination of the 
relevant literature has yet to reveal a single study that has shown secular programs 
outperforming similar or parallel faith-based programs.”  See Stephen V. Monsma, Are 
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evaluations linger since it is almost universally conceded that those 
who have availed themselves of sectarian services tend to be a self-
selecting group more likely to be willing to be helped and 
reformed.248  But, as mentioned throughout this discussion, my 
argument is not conditioned on the relative successes of devolved or 
privatized welfare.  My inquiry is confined to an exploration of how 
the institutional and motivational characteristics of the service 
providers affect the promulgation of the substantive and rhetorical 
objectives of federal welfare reform. 
It may be worthwhile to offer some brief thoughts on the advent 
of faith-based initiatives, which admittedly are still in their nascency.249  
Disclaiming any attempt at comprehensiveness, I offer merely some 
description and analysis of faith-based social service provision.  For 
starters, it may be helpful to focus on Texas, which has embraced 
Charitable Choice more extensively and enthusiastically than have 
most other states.250  As Governor of Texas, President Bush 
commissioned a major study focusing on the impact of Charitable 
Choice in Texas.  The Governor’s Advisory Task Force recommended 
embracing Charitable Choice opportunities because they, uniquely, 
 
Faith-Based Programs More Effective?, PUB. JUST. REP., 2d Quarter 2001, available at 
http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$545 (last visited Dec. 28, 2003). 
248 The methodological evaluations are very difficult to test.  The problem of self-
selection complicates the process by which one goes about measuring the success of 
faith-based providers versus government programs.  “People who turn to faith-based 
charities are likely to be particularly receptive to the message they deliver.”  Jacob S. 
Hacker, Should Churches Take Over Social Policy?, NEW REPUBLIC, June 28, 1999, at 16; 
see Press, supra note 240. 
249 See Laurie Goodstein, Religious Groups Slow to Accept Government Money to Help 
the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at A22; Laurie Goodstein, States Steer Religious 
Charities Toward Aid, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A1 (suggesting states had just 
begun, in the summer of 2001, to develop offices to cultivate religious-based social 
service partners) [hereinafter Goodstein, States]; Abraham McLaughlin, Few Recruits 
for the “Armies of Compassion,” CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 27, 2001, at 2 (suggesting 
the “vast battalions of faith-inspired workers Mr. Bush envisions may turn out to be 
more like a few scattered squadrons”). 
250 While Texas may be an outlier in its extremely warm embrace of Charitable 
Choice, it remains the most significant state to study in the wake of welfare reform 
given both its advanced faith-based programs and that its then-governor is now 
president of the United States and quite desirous of extending faith-based initiatives.  
See, e.g., Goodstein, States, supra note 249 (“[Until the 2000 presidential election,] 
most states had virtually ignored the charitable-choice laws. . . .  Mr. Bush, one of few 
governors who actively directed state agencies to finance religious programs, made 
expanding charitable choice a priority.”); Hanna Rosin, George W. Bush: The Record in 
Texas; Putting Faith in a Social Service Role; Church-based Providers Freed from Many Rules, 
WASH. POST, May 5, 2000, at A1; see also Carolyn Barta, Texas Tops List for Faith-Based 
Aid Efforts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 1A (noting that the Center for 
Public Justice gave Texas the highest grade among states for its Charitable Choice 
initiatives). 
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can instill values, alter behavior, and “assert the essential connection 
between responsibility and human dignity by requiring changed 
behavior in return for help.”251 
* * * 
Faith-based providers, quite frankly, could at times be superior 
agents of welfare reform.  It is often argued that churches and 
communities of faith can better meet the policy goals and objectives 
of welfare reform than the government itself could.  This thickening of 
the connection between the stated goals of welfare and their on-the-
ground implementation should not be overlooked. 
The argument in favor of Charitable Choice is three-fold.  First, 
those who work for religious organizations may be ultra-motivated in 
their work by a “higher calling.”  Their commitment as caseworkers, 
contra those doing the work in the private sector, may more likely 
seem to them an act of faith; these religiously affiliated caseworkers 
often serve without the political and fiscal guile found among those 
operating in the ranks of government and corporate employment.  
Thus, the religious component may lead caseworkers to go that extra 
mile for those in need.252 
Second, the packaging of Charitable Choice provisions is more 
spiritual and thus may offer those attempting to make the transition 
the requisite boost of faith or inspiration needed to persevere in the 
job search and/or reform pathological behavior—especially if the job 
market is less than accommodating.  The added spirituality may 
provide the proper complement to material benefits and training 
programs necessary to transform lives.  Transforming lives, after all, is 
the goal of welfare reform.253  Indeed, it has been argued that “no 
bureaucracy, and no amount of money, can buy the reformation of 
 
251 Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at vii; see also id. at i.  Notably, 
the Report decidedly recommends moving beyond “devolution,” and instead 
encouraging Texans to embrace “genuine reform.”  Id. at viii. 
252 See, e.g., GLENN, supra note 233, at 186-89 (describing instances in which the 
greater passion and commitment among church-based providers is apparent); Joseph 
P. Shapiro & Andrea R. Wright, Can Churches Save America?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Sept. 9, 1996, at 46 (describing Mississippi church groups as “adopting” needy 
families by not just assisting them financially, but offering them friendship and 
community); see also Davis, supra note 239 (emphasizing the importance of a 
religiously committed and driven community of welfare administrators and social 
service providers). 
253 Professor James Q. Wilson has held up Alcoholics Anonymous as the “single 
most important organized example of personal transformation we have.” James Q. 
Wilson, Religion and Public Life, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1999, at 36.  Building on that 
model, Wilson understands the potential for faith to spark the personal 
transformation necessary for success.  He thus advocates Charitable Choice to 
combat an array of social ills.  See id. 
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morals that is desperately needed by many of those served by social 
service agencies.  Religiously motivated organizations can press the 
demand for such reformation in ways that government agencies . . . 
cannot.”254 
The Governor’s Advisory Task Force in Texas echoed this point: 
“Religious ministries aim for inner conversion and inject spiritual and 
moral resources that are beyond government’s know-how.”255  The Task 
Force questioned the secular sector’s ability to achieve the stated 
goals of welfare reform.  “[C]ivil society needs guardrails, some moral 
consensus that dissuades deviant behavior.  Religion, unlike 
government transfer payments, provides it.  Transforming people 
from the inside out . . . [r]eligion fills man’s moral vacuum.”256 
Third, the church as an institution may resonate more with at-
risk communities than would the city social service department that is 
perceived to have failed them for years.  The church may be able to 
provide a more comfortable, less adversarial setting for caseworker-
client contact, thus satisfying a key aim of the federal legislation.257  
Professor John DiIulio, the first director of President Bush’s Office of 
Faith-Based Initiatives,258 has emphasized these pragmatic benefits of 
using church providers.  Spirituality notwithstanding, DiIulio sees 
church organizations as the most important social structure in many 
 
254 GLENN, supra note 233, at 34 (footnote and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting OLASKY, supra note 237, at 24).  It should not be too surprising 
that faith-based institutions, bolstered by a religious American polity, speak about a 
cultural impediment to personal success and independence in ways more salient 
than those who previously guised similar calls for reformation in class and even racial 
terms.  The most notable sociological description of a community in need of 
reformation—that spoke outside the boundaries of an economic empowerment 
vocabulary—was Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s.  See Moynihan, The Negro Family, supra 
note 26, at 39, 43, 51-60.  For a more direct “critique” of the underclass’s “culture of 
poverty,” see Lewis, supra note 26, at 188.  Moynihan was criticized and some even 
labeled him a racist for suggesting that there is something morally deficient about a 
particular segment of America’s underclass.  Though today’s calls for moral 
transformation are ostensibly race-neutral, they nevertheless smack of a similar 
paternalistic repudiation of contemporary behavioral patterns among America’s 
poor. 
255 Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at ix (emphasis omitted and 
added). 
256 Id. at 21. 
257 See GLENN, supra note 233, at 187-88. 
258 See Frank Bruni & Laurie Goodstein, New Bush Office Seeks Closer Ties to Church 
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at A1 (announcing the creation of the Office and 
the appointment of DiIulio as its head).  Professor DiIulio resigned before the end of 
a year in office. See Elizabeth Becker, Head of Religion-Based Initiative Resigns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at A17 (describing his resignation); see also Towey Leads “Faith – 
Based” Effort, ASSOC. PRESS, May 3, 2002 (describing the nomination of Jim Towey to 
replace DiIulio). 
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blighted communities and, as such, should be acknowledged as an 
institutional standard bearer dedicated to the public good.259  Thus, it 
simply makes good common sense to subsidize the work these 
churches already do.260  In some inner cities, the black ministry 
remains one of the few standing social institutions of support and 
connection: 
Day-by-day, clergy, volunteers, and people of faith monitor, 
mentor, and minister to the daily needs of the inner-city black 
children, who, through absolutely no fault of their own, live in 
neighborhoods where opportunities are few and drugs, crime, 
and failed public schools are common.  There, faith-driven 
community activists strive against the odds to help these children  
. . . avoid physical violence, achieve literacy, gain jobs, and 
otherwise reach adulthood physically, educationally, and 
economically whole.261 
From this perspective, churches may be seen as a better 
guarantor of promoting the objectives of the federal legislation than 
the bureaucracy itself could be.  And, they may be a better center for 
civic engagement.262  Whereas the public, as I argued in Part IV, does 
not have opportunities to engage in meaningful dialogue with 
privatized providers, church-group welfare organizations may provide 
extensive opportunities for the general public to get involved in the 
shape and direction of welfare provisions—more so than, perhaps, in 
the case of government providers.263  Given my explicit criticism of 
private providers for their role in sharpening the separation between 
the general public and the work of helping low-income people, it is 
only fair for me to recognize this countervailing trend here. 
 
259 See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Supporting Black Churches, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1999, 
at 42; see also Shapiro & Wright, supra note 252. 
260 See DiIulio, supra note 259.  For illustrations of inner-city ministries working to 
keep impoverished neighborhoods together, see, for example, Jodie T. Allen, 
Ministers Test the Limits of Faith, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 3, 2000, at 20; John 
Leland with Claudia Kalb, Savior of the Streets, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1998, at 20; and 
Robert Worth, Amazing Grace, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 11, 1998, at 28. 
261 DiIulio, supra note 259, at 42. 
262 See Benjamin R. Barber, Editorial, Where We Learn Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
9, 1986, at G15 (recognizing black churches as traditional loci of civic and political 
community); Richard L. Berke, At Church, Sermon Is Often How You Vote, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 1994, at B9 (noting the political activism among church congregations); see 
also Eric Lipton, In Churches, Candidates Call for Black Voters To Respond, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 2, 2001, at B3. 
263 One key factor militating against the fostering of inter-class community 
between church providers and welfare recipients is that, often, the target group to 
assist is demographically quite distinct from the provider population.  Hence, the 
existence of paternalism and the sense of noblesse oblige may dampen efforts to bring 
recipients and providers closer together.  See infra note 299 and accompanying text. 
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* * * 
On the flip side, however, whereas governments and 
corporations lack the potential intimacy that a faith provider might 
enjoy with its clients, they are also less likely to alienate (because the 
governmental and corporate agendas do not include spiritual 
reformation).264  Spiritual messages are desirable only insofar as the 
clients are receptive to such “callings.”  If a client hews to a different 
creed than his provider, the church provider—intent on combining a 
message of faith and self-help—could become a much less effective 
(if not altogether deleterious) partner in welfare reform.  In what 
follows, I describe how faith-based welfare reform can distort the 
federal welfare message on three fronts. 
First, institutionally, Charitable Choice providers as religious 
institutions might confuse and conflate their spiritual mission with 
the goals of federal welfare reform.  Accordingly, they would serve as 
inherently exclusionary administrative bodies, implicitly defining 
boundaries of eligibility not just in terms of financial status or 
residential geography, but also in terms of adherence and conformity 
to a particular creed.  Moreover, faith-based organizations are also 
inherently non-neutral.  Unlike the government or even private, 
market providers, there is a conception of the good and moral life 
that communities of faith propound.265  This affirmative moral ethos, 
too, may create obstacles standing in the way of effective service 
provision.266 
Second, and related on the managerial level, Charitable Choice 
providers might stigmatize or ill-serve those that do not share their 
religious ethos of reform and reformation.267  They may focus on the 
wrong package of services and training, i.e., more attention to 
spiritual and emotional well-being than material security and job-
readiness. 
And, third, there are civic harms.  A legal and political regime 
too heavily focused on faith-based provision will erode trust in the 
ability of government, as a neutral, inclusive provider, to service 
needs; instead, individuals (recipients and general members of the 
civic community alike) will feel compelled to define their community 
more narrowly and focus attention and allegiance in the direction of 
 
264 See Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1371. 
265 See, e.g., OLASKY, supra note 99; OLASKY, supra note 237; Magnet, supra note 
243; see also infra Section V.B. 
266 See Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1361 (describing the providers’ “political 
and ideological concerns beyond the desire to help the poor”). 
267 See Segal, supra note 244, at 71-72. 
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church groups, which may be exclusionary and discriminatory. 
Again, my aim is not to discredit faith-based provisions.  I 
recognize the long and meritorious history of religious providers.  My 
goal, and thus I lay emphasis on it, is to identify some of the more 
problematic elements of Charitable Choice.  For centuries, churches 
and synagogues worked closely with government to provide services.  
What is different today is that some groups are much more inclined 
to participate because they do not have to subordinate their 
particular message of faith.  Thus, I focus particular emphasis on 
these new Charitable Choice providers, which jumped into the TANF 
world precisely because they could promote their messages of faith 
and redemption.  These groups, which are largely Evangelical 
Protestant outfits, may be distinguished from Catholic Charities or 
Lutheran Social Services,268 because, to borrow Saperstein’s 
terminology, they are “pervasively sectarian” rather than simply 
religiously affiliated organizations.269  Catholic Charities and Lutheran 
Social Services have long been involved in government service 
provision and appear less likely to test the waters of heavily sectarian 
social service administration.270 
B. Charitable Choice’s Distortions 
1. Institutional Harms 
First, the religious and spiritual raison d’etre of religious providers 
may conflict or get confused with the overarching goals of welfare 
reform.  Spiritual salvation may override the commitment to work—
for a successfully “rehabilitated” person may be pious, but still 
jobless.271  As suggested,272 to date not many of the most prominent 
 
268 Indeed, prior to Charitable Choice, sixty-two percent of Catholic Charities’ 
funding came from the government, and thirty-nine percent of Lutheran Social 
Services’ funding came from the government.  See Gilman, supra note 186.  At the 
risk of privileging the “mainstream,” these organizations may be viewed as too well-
respected to risk deviating too far outside the line they have carefully towed since the 
advent of the modern Establishment Clause doctrine. 
269 See Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1361. 
270 See Laurie Goodstein, Bush’s Call to Church Groups To Get Untraditional Replies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at A1 (noting that the biggest enthusiasts in the faith-based 
community to administer PRWORA and other social service initiatives are the less 
traditional religious outfits); Laurie Goodstein, Bush’s Charity Plan Is Raising Concerns 
for Religious Right, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at A1; see also Diller, supra note 9, at 1764 
(describing the high participation rate of less well-established churches in faith-
based, government initiatives). 
271 Success, after all, is defined in terms of spiritual, not material gain.  See, e.g., 
Marci A. Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 871 (2001) (“We need 
to be absolutely clear here: the but-for reason proffered for the success of these 
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churches in America have become seriously or aggressively involved 
in this wave of welfare reform,273 so we must focus on the 
performance of those private religious providers that have emerged 
as candidates for the first sets of Charitable Choice contracts. 
Some notable providers who have demonstrated considerable 
interest in Charitable Choice are exclusionary by virtue of their 
institutional constitution.274  What I raise presently is admittedly 
anecdotal, but it is nevertheless evidence that confirms there can be 
distortions in welfare policy.  Consider Teen Challenge, a group 
publicly lauded by then- Governor George W. Bush as early as 1995.275  
It is considered a highly successful and rapidly expanding evangelical 
Protestant group that believes drug and alcohol addiction is the 
result of spiritual troubles and can only be cured by moral teaching, 
or more specifically, through the process of being “born again.”276  
The Governor’s Advisory Task Force, not some skeptical liberal 
watchgroup, described Teen Challenge’s methodology as 
rehabilitation through salvation.277  The specific policies and aims of 
Teen Challenge were discussed quite frankly before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.  Alarmed observers noted that “Teen Challenge 
based their assessment of Jewish patients’ success on their willingness 
to convert to Christianity—Jewish beneficiaries were labeled either 
‘uncompleted’ or ‘completed’ Jews based on whether they had fully 
converted.”278  This success criterion was, apparently, evaluated 
 
religious welfare service programs is the presence of God, or religion, in the 
program.  They claim they work better because God is integrally incorporated 
throughout the program.”). 
272 See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
274 See Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1361, 1371; Segal, supra note 244, at 71-72. 
275 See GLENN, supra note 233, at 63; David Gramm, Where W. Got Compassion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1999, at F62 (describing then-Governor Bush’s efforts to promote 
Teen Challenge’s message and programs). 
276 See Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Church Leaders Find a Pillar in Bush, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at A16; Gramm, supra note 275 (characterizing Bush’s and 
Olasky’s strident support for Charitable Choice social services as deriving from their 
own evangelical faith). 
277 Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at 18.  Charles Glenn devotes 
an entire chapter to Teen Challenge.  GLENN, supra note 233, at 62-73. 
278 Lin et al., supra note 228, at 195; see also Faith-Based Solutions: What are the Legal 
Issues?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony 
of Richard T. Foltin, Legislative Director and Counsel, the American Jewish 
Committee Office of Government and International Affairs); GLENN, supra note 233, 
at 62 (“When one does not have a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, that 
person has a great emptiness inside.”) (quoting from the “Philosophy of Teen 
Challenge”).  Glenn recounts the major tenets of Teen Challenge. 
There is hope. 
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independently of whether or not the client actually overcame her 
addiction. 
Lest we dismiss the rhetoric of Teen Challenge as aptly localized 
to heavily Protestant, rural Texas, it is important to recognize that 
Teen Challenge has a noticeable presence in border towns in Texas, 
as well as in more cosmopolitan locations including San Antonio, Los 
Angeles, and New York City.279  In all these communities there are 
quite large non-Protestant populations, who potentially could be 
assigned to its services as a condition of receiving welfare under 
TANF.  And lest we dismiss Teen Challenge as a fringe provider with 
which no county or municipality would formally contract, its success 
rate has been widely heralded.280 
Another program endorsed by the Governor’s Advisory Task 
Force is Lands Victory Fellowship.  Its methodology, too, is quite 
simple: 
We don’t use drugs or psychiatrists or any of that, only Bible 
study.  We believe that sin is the reason why people take drugs. . . . 
The drug addict is a slave to sin, not to drugs.  We believe that 
drug addiction is a spiritual problem, and that Jesus Christ is the 
solution.281 
Finally, one last active social service provider seeking state 
funding is Victory Home, which also centers its drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation curriculum on instilling Christian values.  The 
 
Drugs are not the major root problem. 
Sin is the major root problem. 
Drugs are not sin; they are a symptom of the problem. 
The only cure for sin is Jesus Christ. 
Jesus Christ died on the cross to save a man from his sin. 
Through faith in Jesus Christ you can be forgiven and cleansed from 
the power of sin . . . . 
GLENN, supra note 233, at 67 (citing the group’s central creed). 
279 Id. at 64-69.  After all, there must have been a sufficient number of Jews 
involved in the program to make such discussion relevant to their congressional 
testimony. 
280 See, e.g., Nat’l Ctr. on Addiction & Substance Abuse at Columbia Univ., So 
Help Me God: Substance Abuse, Religion and Spirituality 26 (2001), available at 
http://www.casalibrary.org/CASAPublications/Spirituality.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 
2003) (noting Teen Challenge’s eighty-five percent rehabilitation rate); see also 
GLENN, supra note 233, at 62-73. 
Indeed, praise for religiously oriented substance abuse programs is hardly 
monopolized by the Right.  Joseph Califano, an architect of Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under President Carter, has 
said: “I don’t see anything wrong with public funding for a drug-treatment program 
that provides for spiritual needs . . . if that’s what an individual needs to shake 
cocaine, to shake alcohol, to shake heroin.”  Shapiro & Wright, supra note 252. 
281 See Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at 17 (quoting Lands 
Victory’s founder). 
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program, though also praised for its success rate, recognizes it is not 
for everyone.  Its founder has suggested that Victory Home “is geared 
to a particular modality—which is accept Jesus and accepting Jesus 
will drive out the addiction—and that’s not going to work for 
everyone.”282  As a program “not for everyone,” Victory Home, like 
Victory Fellowship and Teen Challenge, may fill a particularly gaping 
hole in the broad tapestry of private service provision.  The founder 
of Victory Home, testifying before Congress, remarked that “we teach 
Jesus in the morning, Jesus at noon, Jesus at night.”283  But when it 
stands in for the state—and seeks government contracts—and is given 
the state’s imprimatur, it cannot help but alienate individuals who 
want personal and professional assistance but not salvation, and may 
fail, quite possibly, to provide the proper medical care necessary for 
those whose addiction is more physiological than these groups are 
willing to concede. 284 
* * * 
In such instances, faith-based provision is, accordingly, 
institutionally ill-equipped (and structurally ill-disposed) to handle all 
clients.  In those cases, it may not realistically treat individuals on 
their own, or at least neutral, terms.  The traditional norms of 
eligibility for service provision are geographic, jurisdictional, and 
economic: If you are poor and can claim a local residency, you are 
likely to be eligible for service.  But, faith-based provisions create an 
additional barrier: a religious litmus test.  Though one does not, by 
law, need to ascribe to the faith messages associated with the service 
provider to remain eligible, the programs are obviously geared 
toward promoting particular perspectives.  It would be a false analogy 
to say that litmus tests exist in the public sector.  Indeed, the 
government’s “litmus test,” a willingness to work, is a decidedly 
neutral one.  Thus, it is problematic that the sectarian providers 
could effectively divide communities according to the message 
proffered and its receptiveness. 
Justice O’Connor, in a pair of Establishment Clause cases, 
articulates the concerns raised above more eloquently.  In Wallace v. 
Jaffree, she opines that government endorsement of a particular 
religious grouping may make people’s religious beliefs or their 
 
282 Karen Branch-Brioso, Faith-Based Drug Rehabilitation Program Offers Only One 
Treatment: Jesus Christ, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2001, at A1. 
283 GLENN, supra note 233, at 70. 
284 See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Antidrug Program Lauded by Bush Is More Ministry 
than Treatment Center, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at A18; Marvin Olasky, Editorial, 
Bush’s GOP Critics Miss His Point, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 17, 1999, at A11 
(celebrating the fact that faith-based centers “break bureaucratic rules”). 
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membership in a religious grouping determinative of their political 
standing in the community.285  Elsewhere, Justice O’Connor has 
written that when government has the purpose of endorsing religion, 
it sends a message to some that they are favored insiders.  And, for 
those who adhere to different sets of beliefs, they are not “full 
members of the political community.”286  Under PRWORA, there 
must be a secular alternative;287 but the existence of an alternative 
does not fully render acceptable that which is a de facto endorsement 
of a particular religion.  Even if that religious institution does not 
fully stand in place of the government, it does—at the very least—
stand along side it in an undeniably privileged place that should 
make observers mindful of Justice O’Connor’s writings. 
Moreover, the laws on Charitable Choice do not say that such a 
secular alternative has to be remotely comparable to the principal 
provider in scope or funding.  Indeed, if a religious provider has the 
main contract with the city or county, inevitably we can envisage any 
secular alternative as being a makeshift, ersatz set-up for the few 
dissenters in town.288  Their choice, then, (if one actually is aware that 
she has a choice)289 becomes one of whether to swallow the religious 
message as a necessary by-product of the main social service 
provider—that may likely be better funded and have better 
connections for purposes of job placement—or take one’s chances 
with the ostensibly less well-situated, but neutral provider.  To provide 
services in an uncomfortable environment is antithetical to the spirit 
of improvement.  It is one thing to use diversion tactics to encourage 
self-help and to use workfare to instill an ethos of employment; it is, 
 
285 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
286 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  A 
federal judge in Wisconsin recently voided a state contract with a faith-based 
provider on similar grounds.  See Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. 
Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002); Laurie Goodstein, Judge in Wisconsin Voids A Religion-
Based Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at A22. 
287 See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Filter Aid to Poor Through Churches, Bush Urges, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 1999, at A1.  As suggested above, supra note 244, the secular 
alternative provision is a weak one, for providers do not have to alert clients of their 
right to seek this alternative. 
288 One might be reminded of the makeshift law school education provided to 
blacks in the South in the 1940s and 1950s and how this system of alternative 
schooling was ultimately declared separate—but not equal.  See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that a makeshift law school for blacks could not 
provide an education equal to that offered by the University of Texas Law School). 
289 See Segal, supra note 244, at 71-72 (“Charitable choice does not provide 
adequate protection for the religious liberties of welfare beneficiaries. . . .  
[B]eneficiaries may assume that they have no option but to go to a religious 
institution or forgo their benefits altogether.”). 
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however, quite another, to deter people based on sectarian 
differences of opinion.  The former set (ideally) promotes self-
sufficiency whereas the latter simply serves no work-related goal. 
Moreover, institutionally does welfare reform sit well with the 
possibility of religious messages?  One might say, welfare reform is an 
act of Congress throwing up its hands and letting communities do 
what they think will work well.  But, as I have been arguing, that 
conventional line of reasoning must be refined.  Does separating 
members of a community along religious lines further a goal, and if 
so, does that goal outweigh the cost imposed on those who are 
discomforted and alienated in the process?290  Recall Justice Breyer’s 
gloss on the virtues of a strong Establishment Clause in Zelman.  He 
suggested the Warren Court protected the Establishment Clause in 
part because it recognized the “anguish, hardship and bitter strife 
that could come when zealous religious groups struggle with one 
another to obtain the government’s stamp of approval.”291 
Indeed, perhaps the Governor’s Advisory Task Force provides us 
with an honest look at how Charitable Choice might map onto the 
welfare scene in a divisive manner.  In lieu of offering the governor 
an objective, policy-wonkish plan to reduce dependency, it concludes 
with a sectarian parable: 
When a lame beggar asked for a handout, Peter didn’t do the 
kindhearted (but weak-minded) thing and give him money.  Nor  
. . . did he proffer a job, ‘the secular conservative solution’ (work 
alone cannot redeem, either).  Instead he addressed the deeper 
problem and told the man to arise and walk in Jesus’s name.292 
It would seem as if workfare might not be the governing theme 
of Charitable Choice.  If federal welfare reform shifted the welfare 
eligibility standards from “being poor” to “being poor and actively 
seeking work,” then the Charitable Choice dimension adds a third 
component: some commitment to a life of faith. 
2. Managerial Harms 
It is not a far leap for us to consider that these heavily sectarian 
organizations may ill-serve or alienate potential clients.  From the 
institutional distortion, the managerial harms follow closely on its 
 
290 See, e.g., Salim Muwakkil, Editorial, Need for Secular Public Square, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
7, 2002, at N15 (recognizing the dangers of retreating into religious enclaves and 
noting religious programs’ likelihood to polarize members of a multicultural 
society). 
291 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 659 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962)). 
292 See Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at A-16. 
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heels.  Religious service is infused with messages that may distort the 
ideals of welfare reform and may push people away from social 
service assistance altogether. 
 a.  Message of Patriarchy 
Religion in the United States can be a force of patriarchy and 
Occidentalism, perhaps condemning of those who do not fit the 
mold.  The messages offered on the respective sabbaths in people’s 
respective private services may not map well onto the messages 
offered seven days a week to a diverse (but highly dependent by 
virtue of their poverty) American population.  For instance, “[t]he 
interests of the faith-based crowd in ‘repairing’ the family [may] 
mean[] restoring the male head, crafting legal obstacles to divorce, 
and deepening the stigma attached to female-headed households.”293  
Presumably, messages regarding abortion play a role, as well.  Indeed, 
in religious contexts, women may often stand to lose more than they 
would in civic space.294  To some extent, secular welfare social policy is 
already moving toward promoting marriage and traditional family 
values,295 which implies welfare reform notwithstanding Charitable 
Choice may itself be patriarchal and implicitly linked to the 
Protestant Work Ethic; this realization takes some of the force out of 
the argument that religious organizations are unique in this respect.  
So to this extent, it would seem as if religious providers comport well 
with the government’s message of self-sufficiency not only through 
work, but also through an affirmation of the traditional nuclear 
family. 
 
293 Rickie Solinger, But No Faith in the People, SOC. JUST., Mar. 22, 2001, at 11. 
294 Id. (“Women stand to lose full access to citizenship status when the faith-
based crowd prevails. . . .  Faith-based initiatives . . . would strengthen the anti-
abortion work by involving religious institutions in changing the culture of the 
United States.”); see also McClain, supra note 92, at 1722 (acknowledging the concern 
that some religious organizations would use social service organizations to promote 
their messages of male authority and female submission). 
295 See Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of 
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 427-28 (1999) (describing 
PRWORA’s pro-marriage rhetoric as well as state implementation of “Bridefare” 
proposals that offer economic incentives for poor single mothers to marry); Backer, 
supra note 4, at 45 (characterizing sections 101(1)-(10) of PRWORA as expressing 
Congress’s unabashed promotion of marriage); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual 
Regulation Dimensions of Contemporary Welfare Laws: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 121, 124 (2002) (“[PRWORA’s] policies have led directly to an 
intensive, widespread, and arbitrary invasion of poor women’s private lives and bodily 
integrity . . . .”); Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Bush Urges Work and Marriage Programs 
in Welfare Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A18. 
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 b.  Focus on Spirituality over Tangible Services 
However, there remain religious distortions.  Leaving aside the 
potential proselytizing impact, which I focused on above as a source 
of institutional exclusion, the thrust of the provider’s message—for 
any and all would-be clients—may not focus enough on the welfare-
to-work agenda.  Recall above the methodology of some faith-based 
providers.  They focused exclusively on personal salvation and such 
efforts might have to come at the expense of emphasizing job 
training, job-search skills, and physical well-being.  The potential 
managerial harm, therefore, may take the form of a relatively 
inflexible and possibly unhelpful package of service provisions. 
 c.  Religiosity of Providers 
Finally, but related, it should be noted that part of the religious 
freedom of church providers is not just permission to sermonize, but 
also to hire those who will reflect the teachings of the particular faith.  
Church providers are exempt from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act anti-discrimination provisions296 and thus may have a staff of 
caseworkers who do not have much of a demographic connection 
with the client population. One of the goals of welfare reform was 
more intimate client-caseworker relationships.297  If the caseworkers 
are somehow vastly different than the clients with respect to sex, class, 
ethnicity, and even race,298 this process might be impeded.  The 
combination of a demographically distinct and moralizing 
caseworker may impede the process of mainstream integration.  One 
of the goals of localism is to foster stronger ties between members of 
the larger community and the client population.  It might be helpful 
if some of the individuals assisting the poor actually looked like (and 
had shared experiences with) the poor,299 a suggestion one also hears 
 
296 See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Congress intended the 
explicit exemptions to Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and 
maintain communities composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal 
practices.”); Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 
1183 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (non-ministerial officers are exempt from Title VII); EEOC v. 
Presbyterian Ministries, 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that a 
Christian retirement home can ask a Muslim receptionist to take off her religious 
head covering).  For a discussion of anti-discrimination and faith-based provision, see 
Lin et al., supra note 228, at 196-97, 214-16. 
297 See Diller, Localism, supra note 1; Simon, supra note 87. 
298 See Wendy Kaminer, The Joy of Sects, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 32 
(positing that anti-discrimination Title VII exemptions on religious grounds may 
affect the racial composition of employment patterns). 
299 See, e.g., Shapiro & Wright, supra note 252 (describing Mississippi Governor 
Fordice’s call to, presumably, white churches to each adopt a needy black family). 
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raised in the context of community policing reform. 
3. Civic Harms 
Here, I briefly describe the potential undermining of “faith” in 
government; like privatization, Charitable Choice signals an erosion 
of trust in the public sector.  Charitable Choice posits a great civic 
harm:300 that government is (only) next to godliness.  With individuals 
and communities turning (most optimistically) inward to focus on 
help via their religious organizations, a local sense of engagement in 
a particular religious community may engender a concomitant 
withering of the public domain.301  God, not government, helps 
people—parishioners, not citizens—and the collective action of a 
community is sacrificed for the collection action of a congregation.  
Leaving aside these organizations’ structural limitations in promoting 
work opportunities, this metaphorical insularity will segregate rather 
than connect people.  As we retreat to our respective altars, we lose 
our sense of pluralism and our links to the American experience and 
her people.  The threat this poses is considerable, for it spawns great 
divisions.302  Moreover, will every faith-based organization have 
opportunities to provide?  Probably not, even assuming there is no 
prima facie discrimination against non-Western religious providers.303  
Some faith communities will not have the resources to compete with 
the more established church providers.  Their messages of salvation 
will never be accorded the same prominence in public discourse 
because they do not have the financial means or popular sway to bid 
competitively to manage a segment of the welfare infrastructure.  All 
 
300 See Muwakkil, supra note 290; cf. Michaels, supra note 45 (characterizing 
privatization initiatives not motivated by economic efficiency as posing unique 
problems vis-à-vis public governance). 
301 See Mike Allen, “Faith-Based” Backup Plan; Agencies Look To Lower Barriers to 
Social Service Contracts, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2001, at A2 (describing concerns and 
reservations among government officials unsure of the degree to which religion can 
pervade social service administration); Muwakkil, supra note 290; Peter Steinfels, 
Hiring for Faith-based Programs, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2001, at B6 (describing the public’s 
discomfort with discriminatory hiring practices). 
302 See Zelman v. Harris-Simmons, 536 U.S. 639, 717-19 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1371; Muwakkil, supra note 290. 
303 Many erstwhile supporters of faith-based provision balked at the idea of 
including non-Western faiths within the Charitable Choice tent.  Reverend Pat 
Robertson has said the Unification Church, the Hare Krishnas, and the Scientologists 
should not be funded.  Pat Robertson, Editorial, Bush Faith-based Plan Requires an 
Overhaul, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2001, at 15A.  Reverend Jerry Falwell has insisted on 
the exclusion of all Muslim groups—even before September 11, 2001—on the basis 
that “the religion of Islam ‘teaches hate.’”  Jane Lampman, Faith in Government?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 15, 2001, at 11. 
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of this also suggests that religious provision, especially sectarian 
provision, may be alienating to individuals and communities.  Will 
there be, for instance, internal struggles with one’s own faith as 
another religion happens to emerge as the source of welfare 
provision and material and spiritual comfort? 
C. Summary 
Parts III, IV, and V of this study focused on the possible 
distortions that can occur when the federal government leaves policy 
implementation decisions to local, for-profit, and religious service 
providers.  But a study of welfare devolution and privatization stands 
out from examinations of devolution and privatization in other 
domestic policy areas for two reasons.  First, the target population 
being served is, by definition, one of the weakest, most marginalized 
in society.  Those resorting to public assistance, by and large, have 
few socio-economic resources, civic or political ties, or alternative 
means of support or subsistence.304 
Second, welfare reform is a particularly subjective business.  
Unlike a host of other policy programs that Washington has punted 
to the states, welfare policy is difficult to assess—except in absolute 
numbers in roll reduction.  And even with absolute numbers, it is 
hard to keep track of those who do not succeed in welfare reform 
programs, and it is difficult to evaluate what percentage of workfare 
failures will land on their feet versus those who will fall flat.305  Success 
stories may be fatuous as well, for it is difficult to determine whether 
improvements should be attributed to extrinsic factors (the 
economy) or to the hard work of innovative local administrators.  
Indeed, the federal government has left itself with limited access to 
gauge how well the program is working, let alone to revise and 
recalibrate the programs accordingly.  Those federal officials serious 
about making welfare reform work have an attenuated connection to 
the programs, data, and families themselves—that limits their ability 
to continue to improve the lives of poor Americans.  In short, 
Congress’s concessions to the narrative of devolution sparked a 
 
304 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976) (discussing how an 
individual on SSI disability, unlike someone on welfare, can always find alternative 
sources of funding—including welfare—to survive). 
305 See, e.g., Laura Cohn, From Welfare to Worsefare?, BUS. WK., Oct. 9, 2000, at 103 
(“Sadly, no national surveys track welfare mothers after they leave the dole.”); 
Raymond Hernandez, McCall Urges Better Tracking of Those Leaving Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 1999, at B4; Leslie Kaufman, Are Those Leaving Welfare Better Off Now? Yes and 
No, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2003, at B1 (noting the difficulty of tracking former welfare 
recipients). 
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seismic shift in the federal-state balance that left it without any 
principal control over the direction of welfare reform.  Its failure to 
strike the proper federalism note left it without the opportunity to 
guide reform as only the federal government can. 
VI. REDESIGNING WELFARE REFORM:  
PROMOTING INDEPENDENCE THROUGH BALANCED FEDERALISM 
In this final Part, I briefly outline a possible alternative, process-
based approach to achieving the substantive goals of federal welfare 
reform.  My aim is to build a policy framework that can serve as the 
foundation of a new legal paradigm—and to rekindle an important 
conversation.  The federal goals should, by now, be clear: to end 
dependency by promoting an ethic of work and personal 
responsibility.  The federal government’s intended methodology 
should be equally clear: to end the federal entitlement to cash 
assistance and to enlist the help of local and private actors with the 
design and implementation of innovative strategies to transform 
welfare recipients into self-sufficient workers.  Thus, we want to end 
dependency and want to rely on local actors to experiment with 
different approaches to help us arrive at our collective goal.  Yet in 
the course of its legislative process, devolution seemed to be 
privileged above all else—even the substantive objectives of welfare 
reform, objectives which themselves were compromised by the forces 
of devolution.  Simply put, a legal regime focused exclusively on local 
autonomy may sound appealing and play well on the campaign trail.  
But, it is a fundamentally impoverished (and counterproductive) 
conception of welfare reform—and of federalism.  States and their 
subsidiaries lack the requisite tools (notably, large-scale economic 
policymaking) and, at times, the proper motivation to promote fully 
the substantive and rhetorical aims of welfare reform as designed by 
Congress. 
The avowed procedural reforms in welfare policy—flexibility, 
localism, discretion, efficiency, and faith—all have the potential to be 
taken too far, suggesting devolution is better swallowed in 
moderation.  We need to develop a strategy to rein in devolution and 
embark on a new course relying on a more balanced version of 
federalism.  This more balanced federalism retains the dynamic 
benefits of localism while enlarging opportunities for greater federal 
participation, coordination, and oversight.  Unpopular as this shift 
back toward the center may seem, such a shift is not only necessary to 
carry out the substantive aims of welfare reform, but it also represents 
a more faithful effort to maintain the delicate balance of American 
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federalism.  Realistically, the current, dominant narrative of protest 
against greater federal involvement will not be quieted by a simple, 
dispassionate lesson on the virtues of a more balanced approach to 
federalism.  But, reformers may be able to appease the states if 
Congress is willing to compensate them (with added funding) for 
loosening their vice-grip on welfare policy authority. 
This Part proceeds in two stages.  In the first section, I offer an 
alternative legal architecture for welfare reform, one perhaps better 
able to promote its substantive and rhetorical aims.  Yet power 
politics may make it difficult to disturb the status quo.  Thus, the 
second section posits a political solution for Congress to wrest back 
some control it too readily abdicated in 1996.  Congress needs to 
reassert some authority and build partnerships that combine the local 
virtues of experimentalism and dynamism with the federal virtues of 
being able to set national standards,306 to coordinate national 
economic policy, and to internalize the state-level externalities that 
encourage races-to-the-bottom.  Thus, Section A and Section B lay a 
cursory groundwork for reconceptualized welfare reform. 
A. Re-federalizing Devolved Welfare Policy 
There is strong and persuasive evidence that states and localities 
can do a better job of crafting welfare programs than can 
Washington, if it were to set policy by fiat.  But there is a third legal 
regime that, I argue, can outperform either a totally centralized or 
completely localized and atomized model of reform. 
Reforming welfare may require recalibrating Congress’s (and 
the states’) view of federalism.  This approach is hardly novel.  
Imagine a return to a more balanced, cooperative system in which 
the states continue to craft and shape policy, but with more federal 
oversight that includes advice, rewards, and punishments: a 
decentralized regime in which state and federal excesses can both be 
mitigated by the coercive power each level of government has over 
the other.307  This system308 might be structured in the following way.  
States would be required to design welfare programs in exchange for 
federal funds.  States would then submit their proposals to HHS for 
 
306 See Cashin, supra note 3, at 620-24 (highlighting the desirability of imposing 
minimum national standards and stronger federal oversight over local programs). 
307 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
308 What follows is merely a cursory sketch of an alternative legal structure for 
welfare reform.  It is intended to be understood as merely a start of a larger 
conversation about reforming welfare reform. 
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stringent review.309  HHS would have the ability (and obligation) to 
negotiate with states over the design of those experimental 
innovations it finds troublesome.  The political consensus favoring 
localism and devolution would, in turn, keep the federal authorities 
deferential to the states in most circumstances.310  But, federal 
oversight would still help policymakers anticipate problems or, in the 
alternative, quickly correct them. 
Presently, I posit three foundational tenets for a revised welfare 
strategy.  First, as a condition of approving a state’s plans that may 
have fewer safeguards than HHS might otherwise want, the federal 
government could insist on retaining greater oversight involvement 
in that state’s program.  Congress and HHS might exact promises 
that states file periodic research reports attesting to the success of the 
program; that a federal officer (or a welfare recipient, or both) would 
be allowed to sit ex officio on any private welfare vendor’s board of 
directors;311 or, that the state add statutory protection for fair hearings 
and, perhaps, receive a good-faith bonus from the federal 
government to subsidize these legal expenses.  Thus, some of the 
more innovative programs that the states devise might be subject to 
federal-state negotiations over safeguards. 
All of these measures might be derided by proponents of 
devolution as more of the same “red tape” they successfully fought to 
eliminate in 1996.  Yet we should see these heightened administrative 
costs as actually offering a boon to democracy and innovative 
policymaking as these partnerships between federal and local officials 
create a climate conducive to thoughtful reform and greater political 
collaboration among governmental entities.312  And, in the long run, 
this more rigorous collaborative process may produce more effective, 
 
309 In fairness, states currently need to report to the federal government 
periodically on their programs.  But this reporting is often understood to be merely 
pro forma.  See 42 U.S.C. § 617 (2000) (“No officer or employee of the Federal 
Government may regulate the conduct of States . . . or enforce any provision . . . 
except to the extent expressly provided . . . .”); see also Mary Jo Bane & Richard 
Weissbourd, Welfare Reform and Children: Welfare Reform Is Likely To Result in More 
Children in Struggling Low Wage Working Families, and More Children in Families Without 
Either Employment or Other Means of Support, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 131, 131 (1998); 
Cimini, supra note 10, at 256-57. 
310 One need only recall the popularity of the Midwestern governors, especially 
Governor Thompson and Governor Engler, during the AFDC waiver efforts of the 
mid 1990s, taking on the HHS bureaucracy.  See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Aid from an 
Enemy of the Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, at D1; Gary Wills, The War Between 
the States . . . and Washington, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1998, at F26. 
311 See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1609. 
312 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 95, at 314-39 (outlining “deliberative polyarchy,” 
their innovative model of cooperative federalism). 
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enduring welfare programs. 
Second, the federal government can place a minimum standards 
floor to forestall pernicious races-to-the-bottom.  The federal 
government need not mandate a rigid floor uniform across the fifty 
states.  Instead, in keeping with the desire for flexibility while fending 
off races-to-the-bottom, the federal government may create minimum 
standards for certain state clusters, neighboring, comparable states 
that have similar economic climates and high incentives to divert 
their poor across state lines. 
It can, moreover, work to offer advice and support.  For 
example, HHS can compare proposals from states in a given region 
and recommend those states work together to realize some 
economies of scale.  There is no reason why the Dakotas or, for that 
matter, New York and New Jersey might not want to coordinate 
welfare policy to achieve economies of scale, collaborate on job 
search and transportation needs, and minimize fears of cross-border 
welfare magnets.313  The federal government can play a central role in 
identifying and encouraging opportunities for such collaboration and 
coordination.314 
Third, a movement back toward the old federal-state contracting 
system allows the federal government to always be in the know.  It can 
request updates and reports and ask the states to conduct studies in 
exchange for increasingly lenient waivers.  Transparency and 
disclosure on the part of states could be rewarded by HHS with less 
 
313  For discussions of interstate compacting and their applications in the context 
of modern policy contexts, see JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE RELATIONS: THE 
NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF FEDERALISM (1996); Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The 
Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 
(1925); Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in Democratic Society: The Problem of 
Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1997); and Jon D. Michaels, The Compacting Renaissance 
(working draft, on file with author).  See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992) (describing the contours of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management 
Act and the compacts that the federal legislation spawned). 
314 See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 483, 498 (1991).  He has contended: 
Many of the common clichés about the benefits of “federalism” actually 
have little to do with the idea of federalism, strictly speaking.  States 
can indeed “experiment” by passing different laws whose results can be 
monitored and assessed.  But a centralized government could run the 
same kind of experiments among geographically defined “provinces” 
whose governments hold office at the pleasure of the center.  Indeed, if 
experimentation is our chief desideratum, a purely pyramidic 
government structure may well be preferable, enabling central 
planners to shape and reshape government boundaries and policies for 
more carefully controlled experiments. 
Id. 
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intrusive oversight.  This framework of more robust communication 
enables Congress to be more readily informed and better prepared to 
step in to correct problems.  For example, the states might work with 
the federal government in determining how much job growth is 
needed (and whether or not stimulus programs are forthcoming).  It 
is important to make those decisions before programs are designed 
and work targets are set.315  Thus, if the federal government and a 
state develop a plan with these factors in mind, more realistic goals 
could be established and met.  In this process, states, too, can extract 
demands of the federal government.  A state may expand its 
education vouchers for the poor on the condition the federal 
government invests in job growth in the area. 
Professors Dorf’s and Sabel’s scholarship on federal-state 
relations in the policymaking context might be applicable here.316  
Dorf and Sabel endorse a more dynamic model of consultation and 
evaluation in cooperative policymaking—as opposed to a rigid, 
periodic review system.  Their proposals contemplate a need to create 
a primary information clearinghouse to pool and evaluate findings 
around the country.  Thus, Wisconsin can be informed that 
Minnesota had numerous problems starting up a rural job center, or 
that Tennessee had troubles contracting with a particular 
corporation.  Moreover, Dorf and Sabel endorse a system of central 
“benchmarking,” which enables the federal government to set 
standards317 that, again, limit the likelihood of a race-to-the-bottom 
effect and require the states to make gains—but only those gains that 
have already been proven to be feasible.  This benchmarking based on 
empirical results stands in contrast to the current approach in which a 
new work-requirement standard is (rather arbitrarily) established, 
even though it may not be rationally or empirically pegged to the 
contours of economic growth or labor demand.318 
In short, we need to reverse the default position.  No longer 
should states be allowed to design welfare reform policies with little 
federal oversight.  A deferential, but still rigorous, review of state 
policies by Congress and HHS should be made a necessary precursor 
to federal funding.319  The single biggest obstacle to this reform 
 
315  See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text. 
316 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 95, at 288 (envisioning the role of Congress vis-à-
vis domestic social policy as authorizing, coordinating, and financing state 
experimental reform). 
317 See id. at 287, 298-302. 
318 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 66; Editorial, supra note 66. 
319 While effectively allaying some of the concerns raised in Section III.B, this 
proposed reorganization of authority and autonomy between the federal 
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proposal, of course, is the political opposition from the states.  I 
address this directly in Section B. 
B. Paying an Efficiency Wage:  
Inducing the States toward Specific Performance 
Ultimately this policy will require state acquiescence.  States may 
be more likely to accept these reforms if the federal funding structure 
were amended to (1) compensate states for this loss in discretion and 
to (2) reward them with carrots for complying with federal objectives.  
Without including these compensatory measures, reclaiming state 
authority and discretion is politically problematic, if not altogether 
untenable.  But, if packaged as part of an effort to overhaul the 
incentive structure of the grants, the states may prove more receptive. 
Let me begin with a brief digression.  An elementary concept in 
economics is that the marginal cost for labor (the wage) is set equal 
to the laborer’s marginal product of labor.  Similarly, of course, if the 
federal government wants to give the states $100 million in aid, say, to 
increase the number of teachers, it writes a check for that amount.  
But, in practice, many firms (with principal-agent problems) do not 
adhere to the rigors of orthodox economic theory in structuring their 
 
government and the states does not, prima facie, do anything vis-à-vis problems 
introduced into the welfare system via privatization.  Given the federal government’s 
enthusiastic reliance on private actors for all sorts of provisions, it is highly unlikely 
that Congress would scale back its extensive outsourcing agenda.  See supra note 42 
and accompanying text. 
That said, the federal government’s larger presence in the world of welfare will 
provide an extra layer of government oversight, and an extra layer of governmental 
influence to keep contractors in check; it is, after all, understood that contractors 
such as Lockheed, Andersen, and Maximus also have considerable business dealings 
with the federal government.  While it is doubtful that greater centralization and 
federal-state cooperation will turn the tide on privatization and deregulation per se, 
the federal government’s potential to resist corporate capture and negotiate better 
deals (because of its larger purchasing power) might create the right set of 
disincentives to keep private actors from overstepping their bounds.  See, e.g., 
Freeman, supra note 42, at 1317.  Professor Freeman suggests: 
Congress could, therefore, tailor privatization experiments to extend 
federal goals not only to the state and local government grantees that 
directly receive the funds, but also to private contractors charged with 
service delivery.  Congress might minimize the discretion of private 
contractors by specifying performance criteria or dictating substantive 
contractual terms, including requirements for regular and detailed 
reporting.  Congress might demand closer or more extensive 
monitoring of private contractors by federal agencies, not only for cost 
control and fraud prevention purposes, but also for quality control, 
which these agencies charged with oversight have traditionally not 
done very effectively. 
Id. 
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own payrolls.  Instead, many offer employees an “efficiency wage.”  A 
firm pays a worker more than the value of her marginal product of 
labor in order to reduce her incentive to slack or, perhaps worse, take 
another job with another firm.  Thus, the firm spends a little more on 
the worker, but reduces its long-term costs associated with turnover 
(hiring and training new employees).  An efficiency wage, moreover, 
also encourages workers to be more affirmatively gung-ho about their 
jobs.  Satisfied with their generous compensation, they may go the 
extra mile for the boss.320 
Perhaps we should think about funding state initiatives mindful 
of the applicability and utility of efficiency wages.  The welfare 
recipient population is such a vulnerable community in America that 
it is imperative for the federal government to ensure fair and humane 
treatment of those undergoing the transition from welfare to work.  A 
more comprehensively and sensitively structured funding system may 
go a long way in increasing state compliance with federal objectives 
(and in reducing incentives to deviate).  Currently, largely 
undifferentiated state block grants are given with relatively few strings 
attached.  States’ grants are largely open-ended.  It might make more 
sense, however, to give more generous grants, but with greater 
conditions attached.  Thus, give the bitter with the sweet.321 
Under the proposed system primitively sketched out in the 
previous section, a state could still be given an undifferentiated block 
grant and continue to operate as it presently has been.  Or, it could 
take advantage of a federal bonus scheme.  A modest bonus might be 
offered to states in exchange for comprehensive monitoring and 
reporting of welfare-to-work programs and their successes.  To 
receive this modest bonus, states would be required to investigate, 
analyze, and report on the status of its programs to HHS.  
Additionally, a more generous bonus could be offered in exchange 
for successful job placements.  An “unsuccessful” roll reduction, in 
contrast, would take the form of diverting an individual from welfare 
and losing track of her.  That person may have a job, but he also may 
 
320 For an analysis of the efficiency wage, see WENDY CARLIN & DAVID SOSKICE, 
MACROECONOMICS AND THE WAGE BARGAIN 401-07 (1990). 
321 This criticism of current welfare reform as underutilizing incentive bonuses 
could be extended to the design and administration of AFDC.  The cooperative 
federal-state relationship under AFDC could be characterized as having sticks, but 
few carrots.  States could lose grant money for failing to serve the community, but 
they were not eligible for bonuses if they did a particularly good job at alleviating 
poverty and dependency.  Current welfare reform does build into its funding the 
opportunity for states to “pocket” unspent money, but that bonus is too loosely tied 
to the objective of empowerment (for the federal government does not condition 
that surplus on any showing of “success” other than roll slashing). 
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be on the streets.  A report attesting to the successful (employed) 
transition, on the other hand, would result in extra funding.  If the 
tracking attests to successful long-term placements, perhaps six 
months or a year, then, again, the states could be given additional 
moneys.322 
Federal spending on welfare provisions is surprisingly small.  
And, the bonuses contemplated would only be a fraction of aggregate 
spending, yet may mean a great deal to states.  It may be worthwhile 
for them to track and report, to be diligent in placements, and to be 
extra-diligent in making good placements.  The additional money 
could be invested back into social welfare (to get even larger bonuses 
by getting more clients into jobs) or could be used for any other state 
endeavor.  States do not have to go along with this system, but the 
offer and opportunity is there for them to work just a little harder to 
see welfare reform succeed.323  Who says government service provision 
has to be indifferent to forces of market incentives? 
Efficiency funding greases the wheels of political compliance 
and in turn improves the overall operation of welfare reform.  We 
can retain the benefits of decentralization, so long as we are willing to 
invest a little more money to establish the requisite amount of 
oversight.  All of this, of course, applies equally in the context of sub-
devolution and privatization. 
* * * 
Implicit in a movement away from wholesale devolution is either 
a return to central authority or an effort to balance the two extremes.  
I endorse the latter alternative and thus underscore the need to 
cultivate federal-state partnerships, not only to regulate state 
behavior, but also to get public officials and civil servants at all levels 
of government thinking and talking about policy.  I earlier noted that 
Colorado’s welfare reform is administered individually by each of its 
sixty-three counties; nearly half of those sixty-three counties lacked 
formal, written regulations for administering welfare.324  The 
importance of federal oversight is obviously central to my desire to 
strike a better balance vis-à-vis federalism; but having each of those 
counties convene meetings, hash out ideas, and issue referenda is 
also a worthy end insofar as it is democracy-enhancing.  Federal 
 
322 A “performance” bonus system does exist under TANF.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
603(a)(4) (2000).  My aim would be to make this a bigger part of a revised version of 
welfare reform. 
323 For an extensive discussion of the structuring of welfare incentives, see David 
A. Super, Working for Food: The Food Stamp Program as Model for a New Anti-Poverty 
Agenda, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
324 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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involvement does not need to be reduced to fiats from HHS, just as 
federalism does not mean a complete abdication of national 
oversight.  It should, alternatively, contemplate federal partnerships 
with cities, corporations, and faith institutions to coordinate efforts, 
highlight efficiency gains, and promote the substantive and rhetorical 
aims of welfare reform.  In all, reining in devolution does not mark 
the death of autonomy, localism, or efficiency; it marks a new 
movement to more creative policymaking and civic participation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a counterintuitive proposition: 
Devolution does not go hand-in-hand with welfare reform.  I took 
that proposition further and challenged the argument that 
privatization and Charitable Choice actually promote the substantive 
and rhetorical aims of welfare reform.  These private actors, like their 
local governmental counterparts, are structurally limited in their 
ability to achieve the ostensible federal objectives of welfare reform.  
They do not have all the tools, incentives, and, possibly, allegiances 
necessary to devote themselves fully to the imperatives of federal 
welfare reform. 
Even without a booming economy, there is no reason why these 
providers could not reduce the welfare rolls by engaging in diversion 
tactics and by conditioning payments on unreasonable demands.  
Ostensibly, then, these providers would be furthering the objectives 
of welfare reform, but only ostensibly.  It is more difficult, however, to 
demonstrate affirmative results: actual self-sufficiency.  While federal 
mandates on work requirements put pressure on states to find jobs 
for clients (or simply divert them from the rolls), there is no corollary 
commitment to making sure these clients become self-sufficient.  
Congress can demand reductions in dependency, but cannot 
similarly mandate improvements in families’ socioeconomic status 
under the present formulation of PRWORA.  Without greater federal 
oversight, states have few incentives to work toward that latter end.  In 
fact, current funding practices suggest states and private firms may 
have incentives to under-provide services aimed at promoting 
socioeconomic advancement. 
In criticizing devolution and privatization as potentially at odds 
with the substantive goals of welfare reform, I do not reject localism 
or experimentation.  Rather, I seek to distinguish the ideology of 
devolution from the pragmatic understanding of federalism that 
balances the forces of devolution with those of decentralization.  
Moving away from devolution toward decentralization, the federal 
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government should take a firmer grip of the reins of welfare policy 
and require states to submit proposals as a condition of funding.  
Though remaining deferential, Congress and HHS may reserve the 
right to ask states for additional safeguards to be put in place if their 
proposed programs seem particularly risky.  Moreover, I suggest 
restructuring the federal grant appropriation system.  The federal 
government should offer a series of bonuses to states that specifically 
comply with more detailed federal welfare goals.  The federal 
government should not simply require a certain percentage of 
welfare roll reduction.  Instead, it should give bonuses to states that 
can demonstrate that their welfare “graduates” remain gainfully 
employed.  Finally, the (more) generous bonus structure lessens the 
political opposition states might otherwise mount in the face of a 
proposed shift in power back to Washington.  I have argued that 
Congress subverted its own substantive and rhetorical aims when it 
decided to abdicate nearly complete authority over welfare reform, 
and thus I recommend the need to reconceptualize welfare policy 
(and federalism) to correct those distortions. 
 
